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This study examines a strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security between the 
EU and Africa. The EU has been strengthening its institutional ties with African 
organisations since 2000, with security relations with Africa a priority on the EU‟s agenda 
following the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America. The study shows the driving 
forces behind the establishment of the partnership, arguing that the EU‟s economic 
interests have played a significant role in its development. In addition, new global threats 
and challenges, such as immigration issues, climate change, international terrorism, 
conflicts, and the emerging global actors in Africa have affected the EU‟s current foreign 
and security policy towards Africa. Norms and ideas also contribute to the emergence of 
the notion of strategic security partnership, but to a lesser extent. Drawing on literature, the 
method of process-tracing, and primary, secondary and tertiary sources, this dissertation 
opens up previously unexplored aspects of security relations between the two continents. 
Against the historical background of colonialism and recent moves to continental 
confederation and globalism, it seeks to determine why the EU has consolidated its 
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CHAPTER ONE 
STRATEGIC SECURITY FOR AFRICA AND EUROPE 
 
1.1 RATIONALE, MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Conflicts, conflict resolution and post-conflict restitution have for some time been major 
political concerns in Africa, demanding increased attention from the African Union (AU) as 
well as major external actors, such as the European Union (EU). Prior to the Cairo Summit in 
2000, the EU‟s involvement in Africa was mainly in terms of trade and aid, but at the Summit 
the notion of a new strategic partnership emerged to shape Africa-EU security relations, to be 
strengthened by a second Africa-EU summit, held in Lisbon in 2007. Both summits paid 
much attention to conflicts on the African continent, emphasising their obstruction to peace 
and stability, and the threat to regional and international security. For the EU, Africa‟s 
geographical proximity, the spread of international terrorism following the 9/11 attacks on the 
United States of America (USA), mass migration,
1
 the effects of the recent global recession, 
as well as current popular uprisings in North Africa, underline the importance of security.  
According to the Council of the EU, “Europe and Africa are bound together by history, by 
geography, and by a shared vision of a peaceful, democratic and prosperous future for all its 
peoples.”
2
 These strong historical relations have played a significant role in developing 
security relations between the two continents, recently reinforced by the establishment of the 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2003 and the African Peace Facility 
(APF) in 2004. For post-colonial Africa‟s part, the difficult struggle to eradicate regional and 
local war, bloodshed, genocide and ethnic cleansing, whilst obtaining and/or sustaining peace 
and security, has been among the greatest challenges its people face. Success so far has been 
minimal, and much more needs to be done to eradicate the scourges of conflict and war from 
the continent. The EU‟s involvement is an important, new and dynamic development, given 
its increasing importance as an international player and African partner. This development 
warrants systematic academic analysis and explanation, in particular from the standpoint of 
African countries themselves, many of which are attempting to develop a more unified 
continental voice.  
                                                 
1
  See European Security Strategy adopted by Council of the European Union on 12 December 2003.  
2
 See the official report published by Council of the European Union (2005), The EU and Africa: Towards a 
Strategic Partnership. Brussels, 19 December 2005, 15961/05 (Presse 367). 
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The purpose of this study, therefore, is to analyse and explain the rationale behind the Africa-
EU strategic security partnership (SSP), and assess its real and possible impact on conflict-
stricken areas. It will also consider possible directions of change in African politics and 
development, stability in general, and the possible spill-over to other areas of interaction and 
cooperation. Against a broader background of increasing influence on, and interference in the 
African continent from international actors (including China, India, Brazil, Turkey, the USA 
and others), the dissertation will examine the motives behind the EU‟s own involvement in 
Africa, and will explore the insight of this new evolving SSP. The main research question this 
dissertation will aim to answer is: What are the main driving forces and elements of security 
cooperation between the EU and Africa? Why does the EU pursue an SSP with Africa?  
Closely related sub-questions that also need to be addressed are: What determines the patterns 
of cooperation between African regional organisations and the EU? How can an SSP be 
established between unequal actors?  
1.2 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
As Seale (2004:417-418) underlines, good research does not lie in a specific philosophical or 
theoretical consideration, but rather in an eclectic blend of theories relevant to the problem 
being examined. In this dissertation a number of theories provided useful insight into the 
pursuit of a strategic partnership between different actors, with three in particular, namely 
realism, liberalism, and constructivism to be discussed in this section. The theoretical 
framework will be discussed explicitly in chapter two but a short overview of each of these 
three theories discussed in chapter one.  
Jervis (1986:78) points out that international security cooperation in an asymmetrical power 
relationship is possible because weak actors feel that if they are not cooperating with powerful 
actors this can bring more challenges for themselves. According to Lipson (1984:12-22), 
international security cooperation is more difficult than international economic cooperation 
because security issues are too complicated and there are no tangible rules or norms to resolve 
them. Great or rising powers cooperate with weak actors in the fields of peace and security in 
order to protect their own economic interests, thus linking the two fields. The idea of security 





Waltz (1979) argues that: 
… when faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel 
insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not “Will 
both of us gain?” but “Who will gain more?”  
Mistrust among states is a large impediment that blocks international cooperation, and great 
powers have a tendency to exploit weak states. In addition, the international structure is 
settled on the premise of “take care of yourself!” (ibid., p. 107). Therefore, according to this 
reasoning, it is difficult to achieve fair international cooperation in the fields of peace and 
security between Africa and the EU. Dougherty and Phaltzgraff (2001:505-507) contend that 
cooperation can emerge as a result of the relationship between a powerful and a weak actor. 
Hegemonic actors can provide international security by cooperating with weak actors for 
mutual goals. Cooperation can also arise from mutual interests of actors not based on 
compulsion or oppression. Critics of realism point out that it overemphasises the role of states 
in world politics and does not take into account the role of international organisations in 
maintaining peace, security and stability. Therefore, realism restricts the numbers of 
international actors (Kauppi & Viotti, 1999:84-85).  
Geo-economic and geo-political interests of the global powers have been playing a significant 
role in cooperating with weak actors. Conflict of interests and struggle for power among 
actors in the international system will continue to be the order of the day, and international 
cooperation will thus be undermined by lack of trust between states and non-states actors. 
Powerful actors will invariably aim to gain more from their strategic partnership when they 
cooperate with weak actors, and issues related to common threats and common interests are 
overshadowed by the notion of state interest (Morgenthau, 1967:5-7). According to realism, it 
would be naive to expect a fair and genuine SSP between the EU and Africa, the rationale of 
which essentially favours the economic wellbeing of the former over that of the latter. 
Burchill (2005:120-121) contends that cooperation between actors can reduce risks 
concerning conflict or war and increase a broad range of relations between different actors, 
including economic, security, academic, and technological. International institutions can 
weaken the concept of self-interest among states and create international cooperation. 
However, maintaining a true sense of cooperation among different actors is difficult. 
Particularly, international agreements and procedures made between states or international 
organisations remain weak. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that cooperation can emerge 
with or without a hegemonic power (ibid., p.122).  
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According to Carey and Salmon (1996:33), cooperation is of crucial importance for the 
development of the modern world. However, implementing international cooperation between 
actors is very costly and risky. International organisations can promote international peace, 
security, and prosperity but at the same time they can diminish uncertainty that leads to 
asymmetrical relations in world politics (ibid., p.33). Neoliberal institutionalism suggests that 
successful cooperation among actors in a particular field can contribute to other fields, such as 
the socio-economic and political (Keohane, 1984:6-13). From this point of view, the success 
of strategic partnership in security matters among Africa and the EU is important for 
strengthening socio-economic and political structures in Africa. The Africa-EU SSP can 
reduce insecurity in both continents, if the EU aims to create a genuine partnership with 
Africa. However, implementing such cooperation between the two continents remains 
difficult because powerful actors pursue absolute gains while cooperating with weak ones. 
Milner (1992:469-70) states that mutual interests and political adjustments are vital for the 
emergence of international cooperation. Keohane (1984:16,135) emphasises the importance of 
mutual interests created by economic interdependence as one of the most significant elements 
in triggering international cooperation. Neoliberals also affirm that international institutions 
can eradicate all the impediments that inhibit international cooperation. The sharp critiques of 
liberal theory maintain that liberalism only focuses on the fields of low politics, such as 
financial, social, and environmental issues, and neglects the fields of high politics, such as 
security concerns and the role of states in world politics. The critics of liberal theory also 
contend that liberalism overemphasises the importance of moral principles (Kegley, 
1995:153; 2009:38-9).  
By comparison, constructivism emphasises that reconstructing a common identity and culture 
among actors is very important in paving the way for the establishment of international 
cooperation, and underlines that social rather than material factors shape world politics 
(Wendt, 1992:392-95). Whereas neo-realists and neo-liberalists focus on material factors, 
constructivism focuses on social factors in international politics. Landolt (2007:394) points 
out that both social and material factors play key roles in shaping international politics and are 
not divided. According to constructivism, the notion of international cooperation is made by 
inter-subjective understandings, culture, beliefs, and identities. Wendt holds that the future of 
international cooperation depends upon “human consciousness.” International organisations 
have beliefs, culture and identities, which before they perform in international politics play a 
significant role in their decisions and actions. Although international organisations create 
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peace and security, they can also lead to wars and conflict. More significantly, they are 
established by “structures of identities and interests” (Wendt, 1992:398-9).  
Checkel (1998:325) asserts that constructivism made a momentous contribution to the study 
of IR with its sociological insight, however, it downplays the importance of material factors 
by overemphasising the role of social factors. Criticism of constructivism charges it with not 
explaining the concept of change or answering the questions of why, when, and how changes 
occur in inter-subjective understandings, identities, beliefs, and cultures. Furthermore, 
constructivism is not clear about which factors affect identity, beliefs, and shared knowledge 
(Kegley, 2009:42). The theoretical framework guiding this dissertation will be described in 
more detail in chapter two and specific hypotheses drawn from it will be derived.  
1.3 SECURITY AND EU-AFRICA RELATIONS 
Much has been written about the foreign policy of the EU and peace and security in Africa, 
and on strategic partnership. However, a survey of the literature on the current Africa-EU 
security partnership reveals little published on it specifically. The available literature in this 
regard mostly examines peace and security in Africa, not the SSP between Africa and the EU. 
1.3.1 The concept of strategic security partnership 
Balon (2002:138-141) signifies that to define concepts is always a difficult and challenging 
task because they do not have precise limits or rules, and attempts to present them as simple 
definitions are problematic and misleading in academia. The content of the concept of 
“strategic partnership” is about cooperation of parties within the framework of international 
organisations, seen by Balon as based on cooperation and equality between partners. Without 
equality, strategic partnership cannot be actualised, and the basic goal is “to maximise 
benefits and minimise losses” (ibid., p.141). The question of how two unequal actors will 
maximise the mutual benefits and resolve challenges while cooperating in the areas of peace 
and security is problematic. The main challenge behind the Africa-EU SSP is that neither the 
EU nor Africa made a common definition, thus causing ambiguity among the actors and 
undermining the development of cooperation. Each actor has its own definition about the 
current cooperation.  
Crossick and Reuter (2007:7-8) stress that internal parameters of a country, such as socio-
economic and political developments, NGOs, think tanks, academia, and business, are also 
vital for shaping strategic partnership. It also requires a clear objective and long-term 
relationship. Importantly, the aim is not only to serve international actors‟ common interests, 
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but also to address issues around international peace, security and prosperity. The concept 
ought to take into account the internal parameters of Africa, such as socio-economic and 
political conditions and differences between it and Europe. Baldwin (1997:9-12) states that 
academic works based on security have neglected the/a conceptual analysis of security, 
therefore the concept of security faces challenges and it is necessary for security studies to 
relate to, examine and analyse it in a conceptual way. For Brauch (2005:18), the concept was 
used in too narrow a perspective during the Cold War, however it has been reinvented since 
1990 and is nowadays seen from a wide range of perspectives, including military, political, 
economic, environmental and social.  
Since the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the concept of security has been further redefined. Soko 
(2007:16) asserts that the character and language of security are blurred and risk has replaced 
threats. In this respect, “the character and language of security” has been critical to understand 
the security relations between Africa and the EU. The concept of security should also consider 
the challenges and threats of the modern world, such as poverty and HIV/AIDS. Security 
cooperation should not only focus on conflicts and wars in Africa, but also on the root causes 
of the structural problems of Africa. Luciani (1998:151) explains that security is dominated 
by economic interests and security issues are linked to economic problems. Peace and security 
are necessary for development and a broad approach to security and development is crucial 
for security studies. According to the author, the EU‟s current security strategy towards Africa 
does not pay sufficient attention to the balance between security and development.  
The current literature on the concept of SSP is limited, and does not link the concept of 
security to that of strategic partnership or the current changes in Africa and in the world. The 
existing work is mostly far from assessing the Africa-EU security relations theoretically or 
critically, so this dissertation will try to address this deficiency.  
1.3.2 The Africa-EU strategic security partnership 
Olivier (2006:151) assesses the adoption of the Cairo Declaration and the Cairo Plan of 
Action of 2000 as having replaced the old paradigms with a new one, based on the concept of 
strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, which for Sidiropoulos (2007:2-3), ought to 
be based on equality, mutual responsibility and mutual accountability. According to the 
author, the EU needs to change its traditional relationship with Africa, that of a donor-
recipient relationship. However, Vasconcelos (2009:10) states that “the responsibility to 
protect” is the main aim of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU and 
that the EU‟s security policy is based on human security. The European Security Strategy 
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(ESS) was approved by the European Council (EC) in December 2003, and underlines three 
important strategic goals: addressing threats, establishing security in the EU‟s neighbourhood 
and strengthening an international order based on effective multilateralism. However, 
Gnesotto (2004:52) and Vasconcelos (2009:27) emphasise that the EU needs to redefine its 
international role and should increase its responsibility in maintaining global security and 
constructing a better world. 
Empirical evidence shows that the EU has a significant economic interest in Africa. In 
particular, the UK, France, Italy, and Germany have strong economic relations with African 
countries, with Africa being the largest trading partner for the EU. Research has found that the 
EU‟s economic interests in Africa have played an important role in shaping its security 
relations with Africa. The EU tends to regard foreign and security policies with Africa as 
secondary to its own economic and political interests. Furthermore, the new actors in Africa, 
including China, India, Brazil and Turkey, have also increased their economic and political 
relations and established strategic partnerships with African countries and organisations since 
2000. Their active involvement in Africa has changed the EU's economic and political 
relations with the continent. At the same time, the 9/11 attacks on the US played a significant 
role in modifying relations between Africa and the EU, which before 2000 had no institutional 
relationship with Africa beyond aid and trade.  
 
After the 9/11 tragedy the EU dramatically transformed its relations with Africa as it began to 
consolidate its relations with the continent on an institutional level. This provided significant 
opportunities for the EU, the first of which is that the EU strengthened its global position in 
Africa through the Africa-EU SSP, despite the impact of the global economic crisis of 2007. 
Secondly, the EU has maintained and even increased its economic and political interests in 
Africa against the new emerging actors on the continent by establishing new strategic 
partnerships Thirdly, the EU aims to fight with new threats and challenges more effectively 
by cooperating with African regional and sub-regional organisations. Fourthly, the EU has 
developed effective mechanisms to spread its own values and norms in the world. Finally, the 
EU wants more global responsibilities to contribute to global peace and security through 
strategic partnerships. Empirical data shows that the EU has strengthened its institutional 
relations with African organisations through its financial means, however strengthening 
African organisations with donations is not an effective strategy to establish an SSP with 
Africa. It merely increases the dependency of African countries and organisations on the EU 
and undermines the development of a true SSP with Africa. 
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Empirical evidence also demonstrates that the EU made a structural change in its foreign and 
security policy towards Africa after 2000. Before 2000, the EU mainly used economic aid as a 
strategic means to develop its economic and political relations with Africa, but after 2000 it 
decided to take on more global responsibilities and to become actively involved in conflict 
management, resolution and prevention in Africa. It therefore deployed peacekeeping 
operations in the conflict areas of Africa, including the Democratic Republic of Congo  
(DRC), Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau and Somalia. It can be said 
that the EU‟s foreign and security policy has been transformed from “soft power” to “hard 
power” in line with its economic, political, global interests and global developments. New 
threats and challenges, potential EU enlargement, the EU‟s strong economic and political 
relations with Africa, the new actors‟ growing relations with Africa, and the 9/11 tragedy 
have all had a significant impact on the transformation of the EU‟s foreign and security policy 
towards Africa. 
 
1.3.3 Regional organisations and security in Africa 
In the view of Marchal (2009:2-4), however, African governments must deal more effectively 
with security problems, supporting the principle of African solutions to African problems. In 
particular, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and sub-regional organisations, such as 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) might create their own security agenda to prevent potential conflicts and wars in 
Africa. Landsberg (2007:51) argues that the AU should strengthen its political structure and 
institutions in order to consolidate democratic and sustainable development and to build up an 
African continental union. He adds that the serious “challenges of the Twenty-First Century” 
facing Africa include peace, security, governance, democracy and development (ibid., pp.51-
52).  
Structural problems of Africa and financial and logistical constraints have been damaging the 
African organisations‟ security policies, a lack of a unity and solidarity among whose 
members has been a major problem in evolving a strategic partnership. While Africa is 
becoming more dependent on the EU, the latter appears to be becoming an increasingly 
dominant power in this partnership. For Cooper (1994:1545), crises in Africa, that derive 
from the legacy of colonialism and the use by colonial regimes of power for their own 
interests, continue to influence Africa‟s security and future. Chevalier (2006:6-8) cites the 
example of France, which as an international power has played a considerable role in terms of 
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security and economics in Africa. It has recently strengthened its military role in order to play 
a more strategic role on the continent, as well as in the wider international system, such as the 
EU and the UN. According to Chevalier, like other former colonial powers, it maintains 
strong diplomatic and strategic ties with Africa and plays an important role in peace and 
security, but France has been the most significant actor in forging the Africa-EU SSP, the 
main reason being that France has strong historical relations with Africa, which if lost would 
bring more challenges and threats to the EU. Conversely, reinforcing them would bring more 
opportunities for the EU in general, and for France in particular (ibid., pp.6-8). 
Literature on the Africa-EU security partnership has not considered the effects of other 
international actors, such as, China, Brazil, India and Russia. These newly emergent 
international actors have strengthened their economic and political relations with African 
states and its regional and sub-regional organisations in recent years, and their involvement in 
Africa has had a momentous impact on the changing of the EU‟s strategic policy towards 
Africa. Therefore, while evaluating security relations between Africa and the EU, it is 
necessary also to investigate the political and economic effects of other international actors on 
this partnership.  
1.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The research strategy adopted in this dissertation is the method of process-tracing (PT), which 
was developed systematically in George and Bennett‟s Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences (2005). PT is viewed as one of the most significant tools of qualitative 
analysis by George and Bennett (2005:6), according to whom it investigates “the links 
between possible causes and observed outcomes” (ibid., p.13). For Collier (2011:2), PT is 
“the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research 
questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator.” It aims to understand driving forces 
behind political and social events and in so doing pays special attention to description, which 
is a fundamental tool of PT. This dissertation systematically examines diagnostic evidence in 
light of research questions and hypotheses, at the same time paying particular attention to 
description so as to understand driving motives behind the Africa-EU SSP.  
 
Collier (ibid., p.823) also contends that: 
Process tracing inherently analyses trajectories of change and causation, but the 
analysis fails if the phenomena observed at each step in this trajectory are not 
adequately described. Hence, what in a sense is “static” description is a crucial 
building block in analysing the processes being studied.  
 10 
 
Even though the Africa-EU SSP was established in 2000, it is still in progress. Therefore, this 
dissertation will analyse a dynamic process and “trajectories of change and causation.” PT not 
only observes change or sequence, but also takes a good picture of a specific event in the 
process. To describe a process, PT portrays key steps behind a social or political phenomenon 
(ibid., p.824), and will help to understand change behind the strategic partnership in the areas 
of peace and security between two continents and characterise key steps behind this 
partnership. 
 
PT is a significant method for testing theories in which a case is addressed in a wide-ranging 
manner. The method of PT scrutinises histories, archival documents, official documents, 
interview transcripts, and other sources in order to find evidence for hypotheses (George & 
Bennett, 2005:6). In this research, it is used to focus on reasons the EU is sustaining an SSP 
with Africa and the motives behind its establishment. It will examine factors affecting the 
emergence of the Africa-EU SSP and sequence of events and apply them against the 
principles of the IR theories, realism, liberalism and constructivism. The relevance of the 
theories can be interpreted and extrapolations either confirmed as irrelevant or potentially 
noteworthy.  
 
According to Grinnell and Stothers (1988:219), “a research design is a plan which includes 
every aspect of a proposed research study from the conceptualisation of the problem right 
through to the dissemination of the findings.” It will also define key concepts, namely 
“strategic partnership”, “international organisation”, and “security”, prior to applying them to 
the topic. Understanding of the combined concept, SSP, will therefore provide a theoretical 
background for the research questions. 
Primary, secondary and tertiary sources will be used in this research project to find evidence 
in support of the hypotheses. Primary sources are formal documents that include key materials 
of international organisations and governments (McNabb, 2004:475), and include official 
documents published by the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the European 
Parliament, the Western European Union, the AU, the IGAD, the SADC, and the ECOWAS. 
Burnham, Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry (2008:188) state that if the primary documents are 
inaccessible, the subject is impracticable. Primary sources will provide the firsthand 
information for the evolvement of the SSP between Africa and the EU. The first 
categorisation of the evidence in this research project will consist of primary sources.  
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Secondary and tertiary sources of the study will consist of research papers, books, journal 
articles, African, and European newspapers, government reports, and MA, MPhil and PhD 
theses. Pierce (2008:80-1) points out that secondary and tertiary sources provide secondhand 
information, through analysis, synthesis, interpretations, and evaluation of primary sources. 
For Burnham et al. (187-8:2008), there is no perfect classification system that accommodates 
all kinds of documents precisely, however, the approach of the literature review of the study 
will start by assessing primary sources, followed by secondary and tertiary sources.  
 
1.5 OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
This study comprises ten chapters. The chapters will systematically provide evidence for or 
againsts the hypotheses drawn from the theoretical framework. The current chapter includes 
the introduction, the description of the research problem, methodology, and it outlines the 
general structure. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of international cooperation in 
IR theories and clarification of the concept of strategic partnership. Furthermore, it includes 
detailed information on methodology and research design. On the basis of theoretical insights, 
it examines and analyses why the EU pursues cooperation with Africa in the area of peace and 
security. Chapter 3 explores theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the security concept, 
and scrutinises the link between notions of security, development, freedom, identity, justice, 
and governance. In addition, this chapter investigates the relationship between the Africa-EU 
SSP and security values.  
Chapter 4 examines the historical background of the EU‟s foreign and security policy and 
objectives. It explores the challenges that undermine it and discusses whether it has enough 
power to establish a fair and genuine strategic partnership with. Chapter 5 evaluates the 
impact of colonial powers on security cooperation between Africa and the EU, particularly the 
interests of the former colonisers, including France, England, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and 
Germany in the Africa-EU security partnership, and how they play an important role in 
Africa‟s peace and security. Chapter 6 analyses the EU‟s foreign and security policy towards 
Africa. Importantly, it aims to discover the driving forces behind the Africa-EU SSP. 
Chapter 7 explores challenges and prospects that influence security in Africa, including the 
way challenges affecting security in Africa will shape the current SSP between the continents. 
Chapter 8 scrutinises African regional and sub-regional organisations‟ security policies and 
strategies, in particular those of the AU, the IGAD, the SADC, and ECOWAS. It examines 
the way in which Africa builds a strong regional security framework, and the impediments 
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that influence the African organisations‟ security policy. It discusses whether these 
organisations have sufficient power to work with the EU to build up a strategic partnership. 
Chapter 9 analyses security cooperation between Africa and the EU and examines a series of 
socio-political, economic and geo-strategic issues behind it. The final chapter concludes the 
study by providing a summary and evaluation of the main points raised throughout the study 
and implications for the Africa-EU partnership in the fields of peace and security. It will also 




 STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND THEORETICAL 
 FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUALISATION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent rapidly rising global issues have led social scientists to seek new paradigms in which 
to understand and analyse the new challenges that accompany them. There are many 
contending theories, however, no consensus has been reached between IR theorists as to 
which are more important or stronger, with each having strong and weak points. In this study, 
selected theories have been chosen which deal with international security cooperation 
between states or international organisations, namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism. 
In the twenty-first century, international actors have become more interdependent in tackling 
global challenges and threats, with no state or international organisation able to solve the 
complicated issues of the new millennium on its own. This situation necessitated strategic 
partnership among actors across a wide range of issues, and increased the importance of 
international organisations cooperating in order to resolve global issues more effectively. 
Furthermore, historical and economic relations between different actors play an important role 
in developing the concept of strategic partnership, however, whether the weak actors will 
benefit as much as the more powerful partners from international rapprochement remains 
questionable. This chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual framework to be used in 
understanding the research questions more deeply, including clarification of the key concept 
of strategic partnership. It concludes with a synthesis of the theoretical and conceptual 
analyses.  
2.2 REALISM AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP  
Realism is perhaps the oldest and one of the most influential theories of IR, its roots reaching 
back to the writings of Thucydides (460-406 BC) and Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), in, 
respectively, The Peloponnesian War, and The Prince. Regarded as “timeless wisdom” by IR 
scholars, many, such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, developed it as the dominant 
IR theory in the post-World War II era and in USA foreign policy during the Cold War. 
Realist theory is divided into different categories, namely classical realism, liberal realism, 
neorealism or structural realism and neoclassical realism.  
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Machiavelli (1532:80) believed that protecting the interests and security of the kingdom was 
paramount, and that working together with the different kingdoms to maintain peace and 
security was impossible due to the tendency of human nature to wage wars and engage in 
conflicts. Furthermore, the “prince” must not govern the kingdom in accordance with moral 
principles, but must be rational when doing so (ibid., p.100). From a Machiavellian 
perspective, building cooperation between Africa and the EU is not easy because the EU 
focuses on its own interests instead of common interests, developing its foreign and security 
policy in accordance with its political and economic interests rather than moral 
responsibilities. Thucydides also emphasised that the concepts of power and security were 
important for a state‟s survival, expressing that in Melian dialogue:  
…the standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact 
the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept. … By conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the security of 
our empire… (1954:402-403).  
Morgenthau, a prominent realist scholar, in Politics Among Nations (1967), expanded the 
borders of realist theory, his most important contribution to which is summarised by four key 
terms: human nature; power; national interest; and the balance of power. He stresses that 
wars, conflicts and political instabilities are the result of a strand of human nature that is 
selfish and has a tendency to dominate a weak actor. A powerful state has a rational foreign 
policy to minimise potential risks and maximise national interests, but its interests will depend 
on its power (p.7). In addition, the balance of power is an essential element for maintaining 
peace and security between states (p.161), and “the realist theory of international politics is 
the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Statesmen think and act in terms of interest 
defined as power” (p.5). Morgenthau, like Machiavelli, separates politics from moral 
principles because he looks at the concept of politics rationally, defining international politics 
as “a struggle for power” and opposing the idea of security partnerships between states or 
international organisations. He points out that conflict of interests and the struggle for power 
between states will continue indefinitely. 
Neorealism, or structural realism, emerged as a new form of classical realism, developed by 
Kenneth Waltz in his Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. Kegley (2009:30) 
holds that whereas classical realists examine the behaviour of states at the individual level of 
analysis, neorealist theorists examine it at the global level of analysis. There is a distinction 
between classical realism and neorealism, with the latter claiming that wars, conflicts, 
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insecurity, and aggression are the result of the structure of international systems rather than 
human nature, and that the latter is no longer enough to explain the structure of the former. In 
the light of neorealist theory, the emergence of cooperation between Africa and the EU could 
be seen in terms of changing the structure of international systems. Neorealist scholars define 
international structure and international relations in terms of anarchy,
3
 and believe that states 
perform in terms of self-help and pursue their national interests due to a lack of international 
government to provide peace and security.  
The lack of a central government engenders more insecurity and violence in the world, as well 
as a security dilemma among states (Waltz 1979:102,187). Such conditions compel states to 
arm themselves in order to establish protection from any kind of potential threat. According to 
Waltz (1979:105), international structure does not allow them to cooperate in the maintenance 
of international peace and security among states or international organisations because “the 
state of nature is a state of war.” So long as a self-help system that is a result of an anarchic 
system continues, international cooperation will be impossible (ibid., p.111). Waltz (1979:88-
97) defines international political structure around three important principles: (1) ordering 
principles; (2) the character of the units, and (3) the distribution of capabilities. Structures 
have a power which affects behaviours of actors, thereby punishing or rewarding them, and 
they control behaviours of actors within a system “through socialisation of the actors and 
through competition among them” (p.74). According to Waltz (p.89), structure is the most 
important feature of international politics, and a bipolar world structure is more stable than a 
multipolar one (pp.171-2). States‟ interests and aims are clearer and there is a certainty and 
calculation of the interests and dangers in the former. He gives as an example the Cold War 
era, however, states‟ interests and aims are unclear in a multipolar world structure and they 
cannot easily define dangers threatening them. Uncertainty and miscalculation are the causes 
of wars and conflicts.  
According to Jervis (1986:61-68), wars are the most important elements exposing the idea of 
SSP. Meanwhile, they lead to the birth of hegemonic or dominant powers, which in turn 
increase antagonism and discrepancy in the world. On the other hand, Jervis only sees the 
emergence of strategic partnership among actors in terms of the possibility of wars and 
conflicts. In contrast, international structure is changed and the new threats and challenges 
                                                 
3
 Anarchy is defined as a situation in which there is no international government to maintain global peace, 
security or stability in a neorealist context.  
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replace wars and conflicts. Jervis (1986:58) asserts that international security cooperation
4
 
among states or international organisations is problematic under international anarchic order 
and the security dilemma. The twentieth century became an unsuccessful one in terms of 
achieving international security cooperation due to the lack of an international government 
(organisation) or the provision of global peace, security and stability worldwide. More 
importantly, he (ibid., pp.62-76) highlights factors that have impacted on the notion of the 
international security cooperation:  
(a) Offense-defence balance: Offensive policies of states deter international security 
cooperation and increase the security dilemma, while defensive policies do not have a direct 
effect on security cooperation among states or international organisations. A balanced 
relationship between the two types of policy can facilitate the appearance of international 
mutual security cooperation; (b) International changes in world politics: States realised that 
wars are costly and destructive, and history shows that rather than bring about global peace or 
security they lead to more conflict and destruction. Establishing international security 
cooperation is seen as an important basis for world peace; (c) Transparency and timely 
warning: International security cooperation may serve as a watchtower from which to follow 
what states are doing and how they are behaving, and so help to predict and take measures 
against potential threats. However, a feeling amongst weaker powers that they are being 
exploited by the stronger ones can negatively affect the establishment of such cooperation. 
Another factor creating the notion of the international security cooperation is domestic 
developments of states. 
Gilpin (1981:186-9) exposes a considerable relation between realist theory and hegemony 
when he states that an asymmetric power relationship brings challenges and opportunities for 
hegemonic actors within the international political system. Their aims are to increase benefits 
to themselves by dominating weak actors through economic, political, and military influence. 
Gilpin (1981:192) explains the ambition of hegemonic or dominant powers as “expand or 
die”, yet they share some responsibilities with weak actors to control the fields of military 
power in their politics. Domestic developments, such as economic conditions, are also 
important to hegemonic powers, as the result of the international structure, in particular 
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disequilibrium in the world. It is anathema to global peace and security because by nature its 
tendency is toward strong countries dominating weak ones and increasing their own gains. 
The acts of hegemonic powers also cause the emergence of new international political 
systems in world politics (ibid., p.192). Gilpin stresses that establishing a fair strategic 
partnership between a dominant and weak actor is impossible, and so long as hegemonic 
struggle continues in the world, the status quo will persist and even strengthen.  
2.2.1 Critiques of Realism  
Today, realist theory has still been accepted as one of the most effective by IR theorists, and 
has been employed for many years by policymakers. For example, the Cold War era and the 
USA invasion of Iraq in 2003 are the most important examples supporting the principles of 
realism. However, it has both weaknesses and strengths. Critics contend that the nature of IR 
has changed and the concepts of power, security and national interest are no longer sufficient 
to explain world politics, whilst realism does not clarify the structure of international 
relations, which is changeable and thus dynamic. To understand international structure it is 
important to explore factors that affect the materialisation of cooperation among international 
organisations (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 2001:94).  
Critics have argued that realism ignores the importance of moral principles, cultures, 
ideologies and human rights, which are a substantial part of the contemporary world. 
Moreover, it does not draw attention to the current challenges of the world, such as refugees, 
poverty, economic disparities and political disquiet (Sutch & Elias, 2007:61). Rather, realism 
sees states as having to increase their power in order to protect national interests, but it cannot 
draw the borders of power concretely so the concept becomes vague. At the same time, 
realism does not seek to explain why a strong actor pursues a partnership with a weak one.  
Critics also argued that realism tries to understand the behaviour of states or international 
organisations within an international anarchic system (Solomon, 2001:45-46), but this raises 
difficulties because there are many other factors, such as economic and political 
developments. At the same time, cooperation is not only about peace and security but also 
about finding an answer to international threats and challenges. Realist scholars have also 
been criticised for having been Eurocentric, that is putting the interests of Europe ahead of 
wider global considerations. Realist scholars alleged to believe the principles of American 
social science (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 2001:96) and do not consider the problems of less 
developed countries (LDCs).  
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Critics contend that the realist school of thought ignored studies of conflict resolution and 
management, conflict transformation and post-conflict reconstruction (Viotti & Kauppi, 
1999:86-87), but conflict resolution and management mechanisms of the African 
organisations and the EU have been significant in developing effective security cooperation. 
Realist theorists, it was contended, could not unite on international issues and became divided 
over various ones, such as the USA intervention in Vietnam, nuclear weapons and the USA 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Kegley, 2009:31).  
2.3 LIBERALISM AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP 
As with realist theory, liberalism has a long history, dating back to the writings of John 
Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Adam Smith. Liberalism has also had a profound impact on IR 
and has been known as the “leader of the opposition.” One of the leading IR theories after 
World War II, liberalism gained more strength with the emergence of the United Nations 
(UN). In the meantime, Western countries have strengthened their thesis of a “New World 
Order”, with assumptions during the 1990s (Dunne, 2005:186). There are many different 
types of liberal theory, the most influential ones being economic liberalism, neo-liberal 
institutionalism (often referred to as neoliberalism or liberal institutionalism), idealism, and 
regime theory.  
According to Burchill (2005:112-125), wars and conflicts can be eliminated by democracy, 
free trade, and collective security, which act as an insurance of international peace and 
security. In liberal thought, undemocratic states create wars and conflicts to extend their 
power and interests and remove the possibility of international cooperation among actors. 
Liberal theory also posits that human nature does not have a tendency to create wars and 
conflicts, but on the contrary seeks out cooperation and peace between people. Liberalism 
also supports human rights, equality, freedom of expression, and democracy before the law. If 
citizens select their own government democratically and freely, strong incentives should 
occur for international cooperation (ibid., pp.112-125). Democracy not only creates 
international cooperation, but also contributes to economic, social and political development 
among states. Significantly, democratic states prioritise democratic solutions rather than 
military methods in order to resolve their domestic problems, and value moral considerations 
and the human dimension. Liberalism stresses that national interests should help to increase 
international cooperation among actors rather than recourse to military power. Mutual 
responsibility and accountability have also emerged as a result of liberal democracy, and have 
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become the most important features of international cooperation. Furthermore, domestic 
factors of states are important in the creation of international cooperation (Burchill, 2001:81).  
Dougherty and Phaltzgraff (2001:6,479) assert that political and economic elements play a 
strategic role in affecting global economic policy and international cooperation. Moreover, 
there is a strong link between politics and economics, with political actions having a direct 
impact on economic structure. In other words, political and economic systems of states are 
behind decisions to play a global role and cooperate with various actors. More importantly, 
states and international organisations that have economic and political power can trigger 
international cooperation and shape it easily (Ibid., pp. 6,479).  
Neoliberal institutionalism suggests that international relations consist of cooperation and 
conflict. Contradictory elements are divided from each other, but international organisations 
can diminish the latter by focusing on the former (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 2001:68). For 
instance, the basic responsibilities of the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the 
Western European Union (WEU), and the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) are to eliminate wars and create international cooperation among states and 
institutions. After World War II, the notion of international cooperation appeared in Europe to 
make Europe safer and protect it from potential dangers. European states firstly reinforced 
their political and economic infrastructures, then increased international cooperation among 
states.  
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are known as the founders of the neoliberal institutional 
school of thought, with its three prominent aims being to: (1) strengthen the role of 
international organisations to address global issues more effectively; (2) create collective 
security; and (3) reinforce the principles of international law. Neoliberal institutionalists also 
draw attention to the concept of harmony of interests that focuses on the mutual nature of 
international cooperation. Harmony of interests contributes to international peace and 
security, and increases international cooperation in security fields (Genest, 2004:124-128). 
Former USA President Woodrow Wilson emphasised the importance of collective security in 
his famous Fourteen Points speech on the 8
th
 of January 1918, according to which collective 
security could be established through international organisations that promoted international 
peace and international law (ibid., pp.138-141). Kupchan and Kupchan (1995:54-59) argue 
that collective security has two significant advantages: “providing more effective balancing 
against aggressors and promoting trust and cooperation among actors.” 
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Figure 1:   Conditions of international cooperation of neoliberal institutionalism 
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Figure 1 (above), based on Keohane (1989), illustrates the increasing relevance of neoliberal 
institutional theory against the two important conditions of mutual interests and institutional 
variation. International cooperation among actors materialises if only mutual interests exist, 
whilst institutional variation affects the behaviour of states in world politics. If institutional 
variation is fixed, it cannot shape or affect international politics. In other words, the 
emergence of cooperation depends on both mutual interests and institutional variation, so any 
theory of international cooperation should consider the impact of international organisations 
on world politics.  
Cooperation in peace and security may be challenging if it happens between two different 
actors. The notion of security cooperation not only includes peacekeeping operations but also 
social, economic and political, even psychological dimensions. According to Nye (2005:44-
47), there are three forms of liberal theory: economic, social, and political. Economic relations 
between states are highly important in preventing wars and identifying mutual interests. For 
example, increasing economic relations between the USA and Japan prevented wars and 
created many opportunities between them after World War II. The second strand of liberal 
school of thought is social relations, the increasing of which can reduce the possibility of wars 
and create many opportunities. For example, peace, security and stability in Europe emerged 
as a result of post-war measures towards unification. The last strand of liberal theory is the 
role of international organisations in keeping peace and security and creating international 
cooperation in world politics. In particular, the role of international organisations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security has so far increased in the twenty-first 
century (ibid., pp.44-47). 
Keohane (1984:6-13) asks whether international cooperation is possible without hegemonic or 
dominant powers, and argues that while hegemonic power can facilitate international 
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cooperation, it is not a prerequisite for international cooperation or the emergence of 
cooperation. A hegemonic power must have a strong army to be able to protect its economic 
interests, because these are related to security concerns. In addition, hegemonic powers keep 
their gains through international organisations, and therefore create and support them (ibid., 
pp.6-13).  
Figure 2:   Harmony, cooperation, and discord 
 (before adjustments   Each actor‟s policies    Each actor‟s policies  
 of policy are made)   (pursued without                 (pursues without  
regard for     regard for the 
the interests of others)                 interests of others) 
are regarded by                  are regarded by 
others as facilitating    others as hindering 
the attainment of                   the attainment of  
 their goals.     their goals.     
 
                                                                                                                               Are attempts made 
to adjust policies?  
 
                                                                                                                               yes                     no  
              
                                                              
                                                      Do actors‟ policies  
                                                      become significantly         
                                                     more compatible with 
                                                      one another? 
             
                                                        yes           no 
 
 
(before adjustment                          HARMONY                               COOPERATION          DISCORD                                    
have been made)  
 
Source: Keohane, (1984:53). 
Keohane underlines the importance of the concepts of harmony, cooperation, and discord to 
explain international cooperation. The concept of cooperation is one that belongs to political 
science, but the concept of harmony is not a political one. The term “international 
cooperation” includes negotiations, bargaining, threats, promises, rewards and punishments. 
Cooperation only emerges when there is a possibility of wars and conflicts, and international 
cooperation “takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded 
by its partners as facilitating realisation of their own objectives, as the result of a process of 
policy coordination” (ibid., pp.50-3): 
Cooperation must be distinguished from harmony. Cooperation is not automatic, but 
requires planning and negotiation. It is a highly political process inasmuch as patterns of 
behaviour must be altered, a process that involves the exercise of influence. And influence 
is secured not only with the aid of persuasion and prestige but also through the use of 
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resources, principally economic resources under conditions of complex interdependence, 
and military resources when conflicts of interest are very sharp and uses or threats of force 
are efficacious (Keohane, 1989:11). 
According to Lamy (2005:213), the contents of mutual interests have been expanded. Since 
the end of the Cold War era, new security challenges have emerged and, as a result, security 
threats have become more complex and so have necessitated international cooperation. While 
mutual interests are playing a strategic role in cooperation between Africa and the EU, the 
question of “who gains more from mutual interests (interdependence) or international 
cooperation?” remains problematic. In addition, mutual interests have increased the 
realisation of interdependence among various actors. Waltz (1970:220-23) states that the 
concept of interdependence means mutual respect and mutual dependence. States that are 
greatly interdependent on each other have intensive relations in political, economic and social 
fields. Furthermore, these states reduce inequalities between themselves but there are many 
issues and a high possibility of conflicts between them. According to Waltz (1970:206), the 
concept of interdependence marginalised international politics. Nye (2005:198), however, 
expresses that “interdependence” refers to situations in which actors or events in different 
parts of a system affect each other. According to Nye (2005:197-8), “interdependence” is a 
“fuzzy term”, and ambiguous in that: 
We are all in the same boat together, therefore we must cooperate, therefore follow me but 
the boat we are all in may be heading for one person‟s port but not another‟s, or that one 
person is doing all the rowing while another steers or has a free ride.  
Figure 3 (below) depicts the distribution of power as a pyramid. According to Nye (Korea 
Times, 14 September 2009), at the top, states that are superpowers in the military fields 
remain and are generally unipolar. For example, the USA remains a global military 
superpower. In the middle there are no unipolar, bipolar systems or hegemonic powers, only 

















Source: Adapted from Nye (Korea Times, 14 September 2009). 
At the base are many complex global threats and challenges, such as international terrorism, 
drug trafficking, proliferation of WMD, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, poverty, 
climate change and conflicts. In this category, no state or international organisation can 
resolve these common problems on its own. Therefore, powerful states or organisations need 
to strengthen international cooperation through international organisations if they are to 
address these challenges and accomplish their goals. To this end, powerful actors should 
reinforce weak organisations worldwide in order to manage international problems 
collectively. Thus, power is distributed by powerful states to non-state international, regional 
or sub-regional actors in world politics. Nor is there a hegemonic power, unipolar, bipolar, 
and multipolar system in this category, because of these complex issues.  
2.3.1  Critiques of Liberalism 
Even though liberalism made a unique contribution to IR theories, like realist theory it has its 
weaknesses. For example, there are both internal and external reasons in the appearance of 
security cooperation between Africa and the EU. Critics of neoliberal institutionalist theory 
argue that it does not take into account external pressures for international cooperation, and 
that it overemphasises harmony of interests. Liberalism also ignores human nature, which has 
a tendency to wage wars and conflicts. For example, the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Iraq 
war in 2003, conflicts between India and Pakistan (Genest, 2004:128-30) were the result of 
“human nature.” In particular, liberalism does not pay attention to the strategic partnership on 
security matters between Africa and the EU.  
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Critics argue that neoliberal institutionalist theory overemphasises international cooperation 
among actors (Baurmann, 1996:140-1), and imply that collective security is problematic. The 
international community cannot play an effective role in maintaining peace, security and 
prosperity in world politics. For instance, the UN failed to prevent wars and conflicts in 
Rwanda, DRC, Somalia, Sudan, and Burundi (Genest, 2004:130-132). The critics of 
liberalism contend that it could not detect the borders of its concepts, with for instance those 
of democracy, equality, natural rights, justice and law appearing vague (Sandel, 1984:28). The 
realist critique of neoliberal institutional theory argues that its scholars misinterpret the realist 
assumption, particularly international anarchy, and do not see the real problems that hamper 
international cooperation among actors. Even though liberalism has been criticised, it does 
offer a unique insight into the issues of international cooperation and remains one of the most 
influential theories of IR. 
2.4 CONSTRUCTIVISM AND STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP  
Constructivism has become one of the leading IR theories since the end of the Cold War era, 
as the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union increased scholarly attention to it 
(Kegley, 2009:39-49). Constructivism traces its origins to the scholarship of the Italian 
scholar Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), according to whom, “the natural world is made by 
God, but the historical world is made by Man.” Whereas human beings can create peace, 
security, and international cooperation for its development, they can also make wars and 
conflicts that aggravate the world. Constructivism is also inspired by sociology and 
philosophy, for example, Anthony Giddens, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber, indicating the 
interdisciplinary nature of the approach. Alexander Wendt particularly seeks an answer to the 
question of “how IR theories can be constructed” (Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004:52), asserting 
that “constructivism is not a theory of international politics. It clarifies the differences and 
relative virtues” of other IR theories (Wendt, 1999:6,193). According to Wendt: 
Constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following 
core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for inter-national political theory; 
(2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) 
state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, 
rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics (Wendt, 
1994:385). 
Meanwhile, for Steele (2007:25), constructivism is “a loose paradigm of related 
interpretations which share certain assumptions with realists and liberals.” Nevertheless, 
constructivism profoundly diverges from the paradigms of realism and liberalism. According 
to neorealism and neoliberalism, “power” and ”national interests” come first and are the most 
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important elements in IR. Thus, they are materialist theories in IR, even in neoliberal 
institutionalism (Wendt, 1999:92).  
Material factors are shaped by human consciousness and identities play a significant role in 
constructing interests and actions of international organisations: “Identities are the basis of 
interests” (Wendt, 1992:396-8). Threats and challenges are socially constructed, not given. In 
this respect, international cooperation can be affected by ideas and interests. Constructivism 
especially explores the ontological and epistemological features of realist and liberalist 
theories. It is not an anti-realist or anti-liberalist theory, nor is it either pessimistic or 
optimistic about international cooperation among actors. It only claims that understanding of 
international politics depends upon inter-subjective knowledge and interpretations of social 
and material factors (Adler, 2005:92).  
Price and Reus-Smit (1998:1791-2) assess constructivism holistically. Constructivist theory 
examines three crucial ontological features with regard to the social world and its effects on 
international politics. The first is that material elements get their meanings from human 
activities. Without human beings, material elements do not make sense. The second is that 
identity has a power to affect world politics. For example, there are ideational elements behind 
international sanction policies of states or international organisations. The question of “why 
some states and the UN imposed sanctions on South Africa during the apartheid regime” can 
be understood by exploring the importance of identities of states or international 
organisations. The third feature is that states‟ agencies and social structures are bound 
together, with normative or ideational elements exploring the meaning of identity. 
Constructivism tends to link subject and object and knowledge and power in international 
politics. 
According to Kratochwil (1989:5-6), interpretation of the social world and norms is very 
important in helping understand world politics and resolve global issues effectively. For 
example, building a common language and a shared knowledge is vital for a successful 
strategic partnership. In addition, the success of international cooperation depends upon the 
emergence or creation of a common identity between actors, but this is not easy for actors 
because according to international organisations, doing so for cooperation will restrict their 
sovereignty (Wendt, 1992:417; 1994:385). Sovereignty is one of the most important features 
of international organisations wishing to establish a common identity. International 
organisations that are not sovereign cannot increase their interests and play an active role in 
international cooperation (Wendt, 1994:388).  
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Since 1957, Europe has taken historical steps to create a common European identity, through 
the establishment of organisations such as the EU, NATO, and the OSCE. This also gives 
strength to the EU as an international actor in world politics. Unlike the EU, Africa has 
struggled to establish an African identity, despite many attempts. Most importantly, the 
establishment of NEPAD, the AU, and active roles played by sub-regional organisations in 
resolving the problems facing the continent are evidence of a strong hope or desire to do so.  
2.4.1   Critiques of Constructivism 
The neorealist critiques of constructivism contend that constructivism did not understand 
anarchy very well, therefore it could not analyse it properly. International norms cannot 
reduce uncertainty in international politics or create international cooperation under an 
international anarchic order. At the same time, social interactions cannot help to bring together 
actors to make up cooperation in such a system (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007:172-3). 
Constructivists overstate the role of identities. Though beliefs, cultures, and historical ties are 
of great importance in the emergence of cooperation among the two different actors in the 
case of the EU and Africa, political and economic factors are also crucial. Constructivists fail 
to balance a sensitive relationship between social elements and material elements but, despite 
the critiques of constructivism, it has provided a unique insight into the understandings of the 
theories of IR and can be used to explain the SSP between Africa and the EU. Table 1 (below) 













Table 1:   A summary of realist, liberal, and constructivist theories on international 
cooperation  
 
Source: Own compilation 
According to the realist approach, making a genuine strategic partnership between Africa and 
the EU in the fields of peace and security is difficult because the EU focuses on its own 
security concerns and economic interests while cooperating with African organisations. 
However, according to the liberalist tradition, international cooperation is possible between 
Africa and the EU. The Africa-EU SSP can also strengthen economic and social 
infrastructures of African states. In addition, establishing a strategic partnership among Africa 
and the EU is necessary to fight against global threats and challenges such as international 
terrorism and immigration issues. The Constructivist view points out that historical relations, 
norms, identities, and ideas can have a positive impact on development of the SSP between 
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Africa and the EU. The EU‟s historical relations are important in building up an international 
collaboration in the areas of peace and security with African organisations.   
2.5 UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS: THE CASE OF THE SSP 
Concepts have an essential role to play in shaping peoples‟ thoughts, and are an instrument 
that gives direction to thinking, analysing and understanding. Vital for interpreting ideas or 
notions, they also play a critical role in making sense of the discipline of IR. Without 
conceptualising ideas or notions, it is very difficult to understand or analyse what is 
happening in world politics. For example, an understanding of the concepts of security and 
diplomacy is crucial to comprehending the Cold War era. In this section, the concepts of 
“strategic partnership” and “international organisation” as understood in this dissertation will 
therefore be clarified. 
2.5.1 The concept of strategic partnership 
Today, the use of the term “strategic partnership” is not usually employed consciously or 
carefully. Even though it has been frequently used by international organisations such as the 
UN, the EU and NATO, it has not yet been clearly defined. Meanwhile, the clarification of 
the concept of strategy is vital to understanding it. According to Clausewitz (1943:117-118), 
strategy is “the use of engagements to attain the object of the war. Strategy maps out the plan 
of the war”, and includes “politics and statesmanship.” There are two important elements that 
have disclosed strategy: material forces, which have physical, mathematical, geographical and 
statistical elements; and moral and mental forces, which include a leader‟s intellectual 
capacity and strength of character. The latter, moral and mental forces, are the last step of 
strategy and are more significant and complicated than the former, material forces. A 
successful strategy requires a clear objective and a strong mind. If a strategy does not take 
into consideration moral and mental factors in a war or operation, then, Clausewitz argues, 
defeat will be inevitable. These factors also constitute the theory of the art of war, with all 
elements serving as pre-conditions for strategy and relating to each other at all times 
(Clausewitz 1943:124-125). Particularly, grand strategy is a noteworthy term for states and 
international organisations, which is a system in which actors manage their material and 
moral resources effectively and strategically (Hart, 1967:333-6).  
 
 In the African context, the concept of “strategy” has changed, expanding greatly since the 
establishment of the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD) in 2001 and the 
AU in 2002. In particular, the AU and sub-regional organisations have played significant roles 
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in attempting to bring peace, security, and stability to parts of Africa. Today, strategy has 
broad and differing meanings in different parts of Africa, for instance as cooperation among 
states in the fields of security, health, economy, education, and technology. It also involves 
international cooperation with actors beyond the continent, and comprehensive and effective 
planning for resolving the problems facing African states. However, working to undermine 
the idealism are structural problems in Africa, such as corruption, poverty, HIV/AIDS, and 
underdevelopment. 
In the European perspective, strategy is more aligned with development and it was based on 
an understanding that peace would depend upon mutual trading and economic partnership. 
Moreover, changes in social, economic, and political life in the EU have expanded its borders 
and the solid relationship between strategy and security was consolidated in 2003, with the 
approval of the European Security Strategy (ESS).  
As the UK has perpetuated tensions within the EU regarding its willingness to cede 
sovereignty on a wide range of competencies, including currency and defence, so differences 
exist within the AU, notably a wish by the late Kaddafi of Libya to develop a “United States 
of Africa”, and less grandiose aims by South Africa. Despite the differences in emphasis 
between and within the AU and the EU, however, or perhaps related to them, there is a strong 
relationship between the two continents, based not least on economic and historical ties. The 
legacy of colonialism cannot be ignored, and when the EU makes a strategy for Africa it 
invariably takes into consideration its complex historical background. In the twenty-first 
century, states and international organisations have thus changed their diplomacy and strategy 
according to new developments in the world. Particularly, the first Europe-Africa summit in 
Cairo in 2000, the adoption of the “EU Strategy for Africa” in 2005, and the second EU-
Africa summit in Lisbon in 2007, have significantly impacted on strategy. The developing 
relationship between Africa and the EU since 2000 has changed the content of the term 
“strategy”, and invested it with a new dynamic. 
Broadly, the term “strategic partnership” can be defined as an intensive relationship in a wide 
range of cooperation between actors to attain common goals with mutual respect and trust. 
Generally, it has many dimensions, which include security, politics, economics, energy, and 
technology. Whereas a strategic partnership focuses on many things, it can only deal with a 
particular field. Importantly, one that dwells on a particular area, such as security issues or 
economic issues, can be more effective and successful (Grevi, 2008:161).  
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The components making up strategic partnership among actors are geo-strategic positions of 
states, common interests and willingness, as well as mutual respect, accountability and trust. 
International common instruments such as supervisory, legislative, and judicial authority 
should be established for affecting a strategic partnership. Drawing on these premises, the 
recognition of sovereignty of states, institutionalisation of the common instruments and a 
smooth coordination and communication with common instruments are therefore vital (Balon, 
2002:139-145; Grevi, 2008:158). According to a report published by the Strategic Partnership 
Study Group in 2002, the core principles of the notion of strategic partnership are: (1) 
Development of strong social and economic strategies; (2) Leaving behind of ideological 
views and biases; (3) Creation of a common vision between actors; (4) Knowledgeable, 
effective and strong leaders and (5) Reinforcement of “civil dialogue” (2002: II-IV). 
Whereas “knowledgeable, effective and strong leaders” make powerful pronouncements on 
their peoples‟ interests, uneducated, ineffective and weak leaders may be quiescent in 
working for the interests of the global powers. So, the concept of strategic partnership in the 
area of peace and security between Africa and the EU remains problematic. The other and 
important conceptual problem about this partnership is that while the EU deals with this 
partnership according to its economic and political interests, Africa cannot make a clear 
definition of this partnership that undermines the international role of Africa in world politics. 
Both African and the EU leaders need to define it in terms of mutual interests and purposes, 
and mutual respect. 
It is worth noting that bilateral and multilateral relations between actors are key features in the 
emergence of strategic partnership. While multilateralism requires three or more actors to 
tackle common issues effectively, bilateralism needs only two. After World War II, whereas 
multilateralism became a very important strategy in developing strategic partnerships between 
actors in international relations, unilateralism lost its significance. In particular, the 
emergence of international organisations such as the UN, the EU, the AU and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) strengthened a multilateral international structure on the world 
stage, ostensibly designed to address global challenges and threats confronting the world. 
However, the multilateral international system has also given rise to conflicts of interest 
amongst the great powers which, despite their strength, have had to consider diplomatic 
means to establish and strengthen relationships between each other (Grevi, 2008:150).  
Today, global threats and challenges are becoming increasingly complicated. A  multipolar 
world has replaced a bi-polar one, with terrorism, transnational organised crime, climate 
 31 
change, illegal migration, and a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the 
leading challenges in the twenty-first century. In particular, an SSP has become the most 
critical matter between Africa and the EU in recent years, due to conflicts that have damaged 
Africa‟s socio-economic and political developments, and affected  and economic interests of 
the EU. According to the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa (2005:2), the EU is still  highly 
dependent on Africa‟s natural resources and it is its largest trading partner. For instance, the 
EU imports 85 percent of its vegetables, fruit and cotton from the continent (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2006:5). 
The term “strategic security partnership” has a narrower meaning than the term “strategic 
partnership.” Whereas the latter includes social, economic, political, diplomatic, and military 
dimensions, the former focuses on peace and security, and it has become a sensitive concept 
in recent years in international affairs. It can be described as cooperation in the fields of peace 
and security to sustain and promote peace, security and stability among actors. Political 
dialogue, equality, justice, mutual confidence, mutual accountability, solidarity, common 
interests and responsibilities, interdependence, and ownership are at the core of the term 
“strategic security partnership.” To develop a common strategic culture is a prerequisite for 
the success of an SSP between Africa and the EU. Even though both actors have recently 
taken common steps to reinforce it, a common strategic culture has not yet matured, and it 
remains a vulnerable and critical partnership because of the fragility of many African 
governments and the history of colonialism.  
2.5.2 The concept of international organisation and the SSP 
 
Today, even though international organisations have played a very important role in 
maintaining peace, security, and stability in the world, they have become more complex. It has 
been claimed they “make the impossible possible by doing what governments can not or will 
not” (Karns and Mingst, 2004:230), whilst for Archer (2001:33) they act “as a formal, 
continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or 
nongovernmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common 
interest of the membership.” According to Claude (1971:4), an international organisation is “a 
process; international organisations are a representative aspect of the phase of that process 
which has been reached at a given time.” Significantly, the number of international 
organisations increased after the Second World War.  
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From a historical viewpoint, the notion of international organisation dates back to Immanuel 
Kant‟s Perpetual Peace (1795), in which he argues for the establishment of a common 
constitution by which states would share as an effective international mechanism for 
preventing wars (McCloughry, 1957:7-16). The “League of Nations” that followed World 
War I could be seen as an initial step in this direction, and was in some ways a precursor to the 
United Nations, aiming at international peace and security. Smaller societies had emerged to 
fight against slavery in the United States, England, and France in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and these had paved the way for larger international organisations in the 
following centuries (Karns & Mingst, 2004:224). One of these, the Concert of Europe, was 
established by the powerful European states, Austria, Prussia, the Russian Empire and the 
United Kingdom, in 1815 to solve common problems of great powers following the 
Napoeonic Wars, and to promote the idea of international organisations. Furthermore, Russia 
organised important international conferences to prevent wars and maintain international 
peace, security, and stability between 1899 and 1907, known as the “Hague System.” It also 
advanced the development of the notion of international organisations (Claude, 1971:24-30). 
 
Three other important developments in history contributed to the birth of international 
organisations. First, increasing global relations among states engendered some issues 
regarding trade controversies in the nineteenth century. This situation particularly pushed the 
states to establish a common association in order to discuss and resolve their common 
problems. Second, with the establishment of international postal communication in the 
nineteenth century, before the Universal Postal Union (UPU) in 1878, some disagreements 
regarding postal delivery rates among member states had emerged. Subsequently, the member 
states of the international postal communication attempted to resolve their common problems 
by creating a common mechanism. Third, commercial relations among powerful states 
increased interdependence in world politics in the nineteenth century. Therefore, powerful 
states tended to establish international institutions to protect their common interests within one 
legitimised entity. Trade relations among states particularly played a significant role in the 
reinforcement of the notion of international organisations. More importantly, powerful states‟ 
roles in the nineteenth century had a great impact on the creation of international organisations 
(Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:2-4). 
 
Historical events in the twentieth century saw a marked development and institutionalisation 
of international organisations in world politics, particularly the First and Second World Wars. 
Karns and Mingst (2004:224-30) also point to four important factors: (1) the effects of 
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globalisation and interdependence; (2) international conferences held under the auspices of 
the UN and the role of non-state actors; (3) technological developments; and (4) the end of the 
Cold war and spread of liberal values across the world. President Woodrow Wilson‟s 
“Fourteen Points” in 1918 provided early inspiration for the establishment of international 
organisations, emphasising their importance in maintaining international peace, security and 
stability, and resolving international disputes. Woodrow Wilson is known as the father of the 
League of Nations, set up in 1919 (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:16-18), although the 
USA did not become a member for reasons of international self-interest and balance.  
 
Political and economic developments, particularly integration movements in Europe in the 
1960s, had a major influence on the emergence of regional and sub-regional organisations on 
different continents, such as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989, and ECOWAS in 1975 (ibid., pp.213-5). According 
to Mazzeo (1984:240-1), international organisations have four critical functions: 
(1) to protect local traditions, cultures, and values; (2) to protect local peoples‟ interests from 
global dangers; (3) to promote their own peoples‟ living standards and socio-economic and 
political cooperation among people; and (4) to form a bridge between different regions and 
continents. 
 
The behaviour of member states of regional and sub-regional organisations is an important 
factor in making them strong and fructuous actors in their regions (ibid., pp.240-1), with three 
elements having a significant impact on their development: ideology, technology, and 
nationalism. The first two of these played an important role in maturing cooperation amongst 
developed countries, whereas the third had a more influential impact on Africa and developing 
countries (ibid., p.3). This dichotomy again poses the question as to whether regional and sub-
regional organisations can make a difference to peoples‟ lives and sustain peace, security and 
stability.  
 
In an African context, the notion of regional and sub-regional organisations can be said to 
date back to Jamaican-born journalist and political agitator Marcus Garvey‟s weekly 
newspaper, Negro World, his founding of the Universal Negro Improvement Association 
(UNIA), and poems written in the1920s, including:  
 
“Hail! United States of Africa-free! Motherland most bright, divinely fair! State in 
perfect sisterhood united. Born of truth, mighty thou shalt ever be.”  
 
 34 
The writings of Garvey (1889-1948) provided inspiration for much of the Harlem 
Renaissance and “Back to Africa” movement that encouraged African Americans to return to 
Africa, particularly Liberia. It also created the idea of Pan-Africanism, and in this respect the 
idea of the establishments of the Pan-African organisations, such as, OAU, and ECOWAS, 
SADC, IGAD, and currently the AU. (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:215-6). The 
notion of regional and sub-regional organisations was also institutionalised in Africa during 
the nineteenth century, based on racial struggle and turning to independent struggle during the 
twentieth century. The role of the Pan-African Congresses (PACs) had a significant effect on 
materialising the idea of regional organisations, as the participants emphasised the importance 
of political and economic cooperation among the African states. On the other hand, financial 
and political constraints have weakened African regional and sub-regional organisations in 
tackling Africa‟s structural problems (Karns & Mingst, 2004:200-4).  
 
International organisations have three important features: (1) independence of member states; 
(2) equal rights of member states and rules; and (3) presence of a legitimised structure. 
Independence of member states is a prerequisite for international legitimation, for without it 
hegemonic or imperialist powers can emerge and use the international organisation for their 
own global interests. Likewise, the principle of equality of member states and rules in 
international organisations is important in resolving member states‟ common issues effectively 
(Archer, 2001:36-7; Armstrong, Lloyd, & Redmond, 2004:2-4; McLean, 2000:161-2). 
 
There are significant aims amongst international organisations to increase cooperation and 
tackle global challenges and threats in the twenty-first century, therefore, they are of great 
strategic importance in world politics. Particularly, states place much importance on joining 
them so as to protect their own interests and legitimise their policies in international affairs 
(McLean, 2000:187-8). International organisations largely emerged to resolve the complicated 
issues of contemporary world politics (Claude, 1971:6), on the other hand, the critical question 
remains as to whether the sovereignty of member states is weakened by joining them (Claude, 
1971:5; McLean, 2000:187-8). According to McLean (2000:187), they restrict the behaviours 
of states and therefore sovereignty. The next section will designate the hypotheses derived 
from the theoretical framework. 
  
2.6 HYPOTHESES 
As Silverman (1997:46) points out, hypotheses have a theoretical background, but require 
conceptual clarity and appropriate research and data collection to be tested. This dissertation 
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provides a theoretical and conceptual framework for a deeper understanding of the research 
questions, testing the hypotheses and providing clarity of the concept of strategic partnership 
on the basis of empirical insights.  
Realist theory holds that international politics is a struggle for power and actors behave in 
terms of power and national interests on the international scene. In an anarchic system, 
international cooperation is not easy. The question of who will gain more from international 
cooperation is a dilemma. In addition, human nature has a tendency to engage in conflicts, 
instabilities, and insecurity. The more powerful concentrate on their own security and interests 
at the expense of the weaker or of common interests. In view of realism, the SSP between 
Africa and the EU is related to a struggle for power. The partnership will deepen an 
asymmetrical power relationship between the two continents. In a liberal approach, however, 
values can increase international cooperation among actors.  
Neoliberal institutionalism contends that international organisations can promote international 
peace, security, and stability, and at the same time reduce uncertainty and inequality among 
actors. This theoretical framework reveals that economic interdependence between Africa and 
the EU has played a significant role in establishing an SSP. The concept of international 
security has changed in the twenty-first century and many complex global threats have 
appeared that threaten the interests of powerful actors on the world stage. This includes 
international terrorism, conflicts, climate change, and migration. No state or international 
organisation can solve global threats and challenges. Therefore, making strategic partnership 
between Africa and the EU has been necessary to effectively combat global threats and 
challenges. From a constructivist viewpoint, ideas, beliefs, cultures and common identities can 
also play a significant role in shaping international affairs. Historical ties have affected the 
development of security cooperation between Africa and the EU. 
Understanding and interpreting concepts correctly is crucial for identifying issues in IR. In this 
respect, this chapter has analysed the critical concepts of “strategy” and “strategic 
partnership.” These pave the way for a better understanding of the meaning of SSP between 
Africa and the EU. The concept of strategy has profound military, social, economic, 
diplomatic, political, technological as well as psychological connotations. The aims of strategy 
are to increase the interests of the states and to tackle the issues effectively. The most critical 
point for the notion of strategy is a relationship between national and global strategy, with the 
success of the latter depending on the strengths of the former. Weak and ineffective national 
strategies cannot serve the interests of their countries, and powerful strategies can use weak 
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strategies for their global interests. The second important point for the concept of strategy is 
that states and international organisations have to take into account the components of a 
strategy holistically, these being willingness, power, physical, economic, diplomatic, and 
psychological features of actors.  
When a continental actor develops a strategy in order to serve its interests and become a 
powerful global actor, it should first consider the features of internal parameters of its 
constituent countries, otherwise strategies can engender marginal results. Actors should not 
devise their strategies under global pressure, as they would not then serve the interests of 
states. On the contrary, they would benefit the global powers. In this respect, African leaders 
need to deal carefully with the components of the concept of strategy to be able to clarify their 
own concepts. Trust, solidarity, mutual responsibility, and mutual interests are the key features 
of the concept of strategic partnership. In the contemporary world, the best strategic 
partnership is the modern partnership model that deals with the question of “how we can 
equally and fairly intensify our relationship and common interests” (Eisler, 1994:33-34). The 
aims of the concept of strategic partnership are to increase living conditions of people by 
accomplishing defined aims and removing inequalities between the countries.  
The concept of strategic partnership has a more profound and comprehensive connotation than 
concepts of strategy and partnership. The notion of strategic partnership includes social, 
economic, political, and military dimensions. Especially, internal parameters of actors such as 
economic and political factors play a significant role in shaping the notion of strategic 
partnership. Most importantly, the SSP not only considers security issues, but also socio-
economic and political problems. Security cooperation between Africa and the EU requires a 
multidimensional approach that considers all the elements that influence the concept of 
strategic partnership. On the basis of the theoretical framework and the concepts discussed, 
this dissertation formulates the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Mutual interests lead to the emergence of security cooperation between Africa 
and the EU. 
Hypothesis 2: The lack of cohesion and discrepancy between the EU members damages the 
development of the Africa-EU SSP.  
Hypothesis 3: The EU encourages to reinforce regional organisations on the African continent 
through the Africa-EU SSP.  
Hypothesis 4: The EU aims to spread its norms and values in Africa through the SSP.  
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Hypothesis 5: The EU aims to protect its material interests against the new emerging global 
actors in Africa, such as China, India and Brazil and increase its international power in world 
politics by creating an Africa-EU SSP.  
Hypothesis 6: Power imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the 
framework of the SSP.  
Hypothesis 7: The lack of a common African identity and African internal challenges  
undermine the success of the SSP.  
Hypothesis 8: The Africa-EU SSP makes African organisations more dependent on the EU. 
Hypothesis 9: Globalisation has induced incentives for the Africa-EU SSP.  
These hypotheses will be tested in the following chapters. Chapter 3 examines the concept of 
security and its implications for IR. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF SECURITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter established part of the theoretical framework for the research, around the 
concept of strategic partnership, particularly employing relevant theories of International 
Relations (IR), namely realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Whilst it sought theoretical 
perspectives on the question of why the EU pursues an SSP with Africa, this chapter 
completes the framework by exploring the concept of security and the interactions between it 
and its values, notably freedom, identity, justice, good governance, and development. The 
concept of security is somewhat ambivalent and has changed over time, particularly as 
understood by international actors. While the EU has certain approaches towards the concept 
of security, Africa has others. It is therefore necessary to develop a concept of security that 
supports and reflects the interests of both in order to establish fair security cooperation. 
Moreover, the relationship between security and the preservation of traditional values has 
been a critical one for the twenty-first century. A balance must be struck between 
peacekeeping and peacemaking on one hand, and freedom, justice, good governance, 
development and identities on the other.  
3.2 CONCEPTUALISING SECURITY 
Security plays a very dynamic, sensitive, and profound role in IR, having changed and 
expanded throughout history. It has been easily influenced by technological, scientific, social, 
economic, and political developments, and now has social, economic, political, and military 
dimensions. As two different international actors, the EU and Africa have their own 
approaches to security, with each looking to safeguard its own political, economic and 
historical interests.  
The concept of security is a Western, mostly American, one that arose in the post-World War 
II era (Azar & Moon, 1988:1). Traditionally, it rests on the realist school of IR, which accepts 
that a system that reaches out internationally necessarily involves a wider struggle for power. 
Azar and Moon stressed that at the end of the previous century the international environment 
was becoming more complicated, therefore the concept of security had to include economic, 
technological, intelligence, diplomatic, military and other forms of security. It naturally 
engenders many complex and hard questions, and hence it is widely contested, with no 
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universally accepted definition (Buzan, 1991:15-16). As Schultze (1973:429-30) states, “the 
concept of security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide 
variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies 
whose nature we can only dimly perceive.” The diversity of perspectives in the following 
definitions substantiates this:  
 “The concept of security goes beyond military considerations. It embraces all aspects of 
the society including economic, political and social dimensions of individual, family, 
community, local and national life. The security of a nation must be construed in terms 
of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities of 
life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all 
fundamental human rights” (African Leadership Forum, 1991:23). 
  “An instrumental value that enables peoples some opportunity to choose how to live. It 
is a means by which individuals and collectivities can invent and reinvent different ideas 
about being human” (Booth, 2005:23). 
  “Security is primarily about the fate of human collectivities” (Buzan, 1991:19). 
  “Part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and 
international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of vital 
national values against existing and potential adversaries” (Trager & Simonie, 1973:36). 
 “Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high 
expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur” (Bellany 
1981:102). 
  “The ability to preserve the nation‟s physical integrity and territory; to maintain its 
economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, 
institutions and governance from disruptions from outside; and to control its borders” 
(Brown, 1983:4). 
 “Security–insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities-both internal and external-
that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both 
territorial and institutional, and governing regimes” (Ayoob, 1995:9). 
The concept of security has been significantly broadened since the end of the Cold War and 
the bipolar international system that sustained it. The very restrictive connotation had then 
included a nuclear threat and international economic crises, such as that in the 1970s 
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(Mathews, 1989:162). Today, the content of the concept of security has been dramatically 
transformed from the military to non-military connotations, including international terrorism, 
transnational organised crime, illegal migration, climate change, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), drug trafficking, conflicts that threaten regional and international 
peace and security, and global epidemics such as HIV/AIDS and malaria. Buzan (1991:140) 
states that international threats of today have diffuse, uncertain, and unorthodox features. Non-
military threats cannot be easily predicted or prevented “objectively.” They can threaten the 
security of any states at any time or place. Hence, global threats and issues of today have been 
accepted as unpredictable and subjective by the international community. Wolfers (1962:147) 
describes the concept of security as an “ambiguous symbol”, while Rothschild (1995:55) 
places it into four categories: 
In the first, the concept of security is extended from the security of nations to the security 
of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals. In the 
second, it is extended from the security of nations to the security of the international 
system, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the 
nation to the biosphere… In the third operation, it is extended horizontally, or to the sorts 
of security that are in question… the concept of security is extended, therefore, from 
military to political, economic, social, environmental, or „human‟ security. In a fourth 
operation, the political responsibility for ensuring security… is diffused in all directions 
from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to 
regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organisations, to public 
opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market.  
 
Non-military threats have been mostly ignored by IR scholars, despite being more important 
than military ones (Ullman, 1995:19). Peoples‟ and states‟ needs, interests, and concerns have 
changed over time, as has the concept of security, but of most importance is whether actors 
can respond to the new threats and issues effectively. Walt (1991:213) points out that non-
military threats that weaken the security of states and individuals have been the most 
dangerous security issues of today. Nevertheless, for Hough (2004:2), there have been both 
non-military and military threats to the security of states and individuals. Hence, while 
policymakers and IR scholars pay more attention to the former, they should not ignore the 
importance of the latter. They are both important.  
International actors realised that no single actor could tackle complicated security issues of the 
twenty-first century on its own, therefore, establishing strategic partnership between different 
actors has been necessary to resolve effectively the new global threats and challenges. 
According to the ESS, the EU must cooperate with international organisations to increase its 
own security and international security. On the other hand, the concept of security varies from 
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state to state and from continent to continent. In this respect, Africa faces greater security 
challenges than the EU, through such issues as poverty, HIV/AIDS and malaria, corruption, 
the legacy of colonialism, refugees, fragile socio-economic and political structures, and 
conflicts. Since the first EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000, security cooperation between the 
two continents has intensified. In particular, the EU has spent a large sum of money on 
strengthening this cooperation with Africa.  
Buzan (1991:19) and Baldwin (1997:13) have argued for the concept of security to be 
examined at three levels. Firstly, the individual level is related to protecting security of 
individuals; secondly, the national (state) level is related to strengthening social and political 
solidarity within the state; and thirdly, the international level is about sovereignty of the state. 
Conflicts, economic and political crises threaten the future of the concept of security in Africa. 
At the same time, the future of the concept of security in Africa depends on Africa‟s own 
capacity to implement or maintain it.  
The concept of security has been used in a very narrow way in Africa, including in relation to 
military threats. The concept needs to take on “human security”, that is, it should focus on 
how the living standards of people can be improved. The EU‟s concept of security towards 
Africa focuses on good governance, human rights, freedom of the media, social and economic 
development, and democratisation. In addition, the concepts of dialogue, sanctions, and 
financial aid have been very important components of the EU‟s concept of security to resolve 
security issues in Africa. However, it is debateable whether the EU‟s concept of security 
towards Africa has made a difference to peoples‟ lives in Africa to date.  
There is then a marked difference between the EU‟s concept of security and Africa‟s. For 
Ayoob (1995:6-8), Europe regards it as “protection from external threats of the EU‟s vital 
interests and core values.” Importantly, it has the three prominent components: “its external 
orientation, its strong links with systemic security, and the correspondence of state security 
with alliance security.” Azar and Moon (1988:8-12) also argue that the concept has three 
critical dimensions: security environment, hardware, and software. Security environment is 
vital for eliminating external threats, hardware is related to military power of a state, while, by 
contrast, security software concentrates on political legitimacy, integration among the states, 
and reinforcing policy capacity of the states. The security issue does not look like the other 
issues, but is instead very complicated, risky, and costly. Thus, there is a need to balance the 
concept of security and its other critical dimensions, such as development, justice, and 
identity.  
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3.3 SECURITY AND ITS ELEMENTS AND VALUES 
This section scrutinises the importance of security and its values. Security plays a key role in 
the development of states, as without it there cannot be freedom, justice, good governance, or 
development. Also, without security, societies cannot keep their values, language, culture, and 
religions. In the current age, maintaining peace and security has been the most important 
objective of states and international organisations. On the other hand, it has been difficult for 
states because it has been related to a wide range of policies, including socio-economic and 
political developments, both domestic and international. At the same time, establishing a 
balance between security and its values has been a necessary condition for socio-economic 
and political progress. Furthermore, the question of how much attention the Africa-EU SSP 
pays to the interactions between security and its values will be investigated.  
3.3.1 Security and freedom 
Sustaining security and widening freedoms have ostensibly been the most substantial 
objectives of the states in the twenty–first century. The notion that “there cannot be freedom 
without security” has been significant in reinforcing the relationship between the two 
concepts, both of which are considered essential for development. The balance between the 
two is vital for establishing strong security cooperation between Africa and the EU, as well as 
the maintenance of international peace and prosperity in the world, but understanding of it 
varies from country to country. For instance, while the USA and Israel interpret the balance 
between these values in accordance with terrorism (Donohue, 2008:59-60), it has a different 
meaning both in the EU and Africa. From the EU perspective, the balance is related to 
protecting fundamental rights, fighting many kinds of discrimination, removing physical 
borders between the EU member states, and tackling terrorism, crime and corruption. 
Importantly, the aim in achieving such a balance is to increase the power of “democracy” in 
the EU countries. At the same time, it has changed in accordance with global changes and the 
strategic interests of the EU (Hix, 2005:346-7, 359). From an African perspective, seeking a 
balance is mostly associated with preventing conflicts, and tackling structural problems and 
crises, such as wars, corruption, poverty and HIV/AIDS.  
Both the EU and Africa have different approaches towards balancing security and freedom, 
which many states have adopted in terms of terrorism since the 9\11 attacks on the USA. 
Taking aggressive measures to prevent terrorist attacks is the foremost approach, however, in 
doing so, many individual rights have been restricted and freedom interpreted according to 
often ad hoc security issues. The second, seemingly conflicting approach is to expand and 
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protect individual rights. In this way, the states take measures against terrorist attacks by 
increasing their own citizens‟ individual rights (Donohue, 2008:60). According to Goold 
(2007:45-7), the 9/11 attacks on the USA and the 7 July 2005 attacks on the UK respectively 
have increased the gap between security and freedom in the world. Particularly, the individual 
rights of the minority groups living in the USA, the UK and in the West have been highly 
constricted. In exacerbating fears and mistrust between people, it has immeasurably damaged 
the delicate balance between security and freedom.  
Ferge (1996:14) argues that while it is difficult to establish a balance between security and 
freedom in underdeveloped societies, it is easier to create it in developed societies. An 
example of this dichotomy occurred when the USA failed to find a balance between security 
and freedom during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Christian Science Monitor, 3 June 2004). 
Despite a wide range of supposed justifications offered up for the illegal invasion of a 
sovereign state, the USA could bring neither security nor freedom to the Iraqi people, in many 
cases widening the imbalance and creating new security threats to the USA itself and to the 
Middle East. The security of the USA and freedom of Iraqi people are not related, with both 
countries having different social, economic, and political structures (ibid., 3 June 2004).  
According to a report (3:1994) published by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), freedom has three important categories. The first is freedom from want; the second is 
freedom from fear; and the third is freedom to live in peace and dignity. With some 
overlapping and ambivalence of conceptual definition, the principle of freedom from fear in 
large part refers to the prevention of conflicts, wars, crime and what some call “terrorism”,
5
 
the principle of freedom from want refers to social, economic and political freedom and rights 
of individuals; and the principle of freedom to live in peace and dignity refers to protecting 
and strengthening fundamental rights. Both security and freedom are thus invariably bound 
together. While security is increased by states, freedom should not be restricted. They are 
supposed to exist together in a peace, thus, security cooperation among Africa and the EU 
ought to focus on the balance between freedom and security for making it an effective 
partnership.  
 
                                                 
5
 Desmond Tutu (New Black Magazine) famously alluded to one man‟s terrorist being another man‟s freedom 
fighter. The highly problematic term is understood here to refer to the killing of civilians by militant groups or 
individuals whose political and/or religious views, insofar as they are clearly articulated or permitted to be, do 
not conform to those of the respective hegemonic powers against whom they are waging bloody conflict. 
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3.3.2   Security and identity 
Identities, whether in terms of religion, region, language or values, can play either a negative 
or positive role on security development (Lerche & Said, 1970:210-11). It is important to 
consider the security-identity nexus when trying to grasp the EU-Africa SSP. While the same 
identities may play a positive role in sustaining peace and security, different identities may 
play a negative role. It is known that the EU and Africa have different and complex identities, 
not least in terms of region, language, ethnic structure and cultural features. It is thus essential 
to determine how the EU should take into consideration African identity when it builds 
security cooperation. 
The relationship between security and identity is complex and there can be an asymmetrical 
power relationship between various identities (Pettman, 2005:168;174). Pettman (2005:171) 
states that identity can contribute to the enhancement of peace and security, but for Wiberg 
(1993:107) security and identity issues affect each other negatively. Just as the Cold War era 
cannot be understood without understanding the identities of the two superpowers and their 
conflicting identities (Fierke, 2007:80), so the impact of that ideological struggle on African 
identity in world politics needs to be taken cognisance of. After World War II, Western 
European states attempted to establish a “common identity” in order to prevent conflicts and 
wars and to develop social, economic and political relations.  
However, the end of the Cold War brought only a brief respite in European conflict. While the 
Western countries had largely subsumed centuries of strife in the successive federalising 
agencies of the EU and its forerunner institutions, the Bosnian War (1992-95) saw identities 
playing a destructive rather than constructive role in the Balkans. When coupled with the 
notion of “national sovereignty”, identities have two aims, namely, to keep peace and security 
or to destroy the others (Fierke, 2007:82-3). As the EU continues to negotiate its way through 
a complex melange of historically formed identities, any constructive role it has in 
establishing a genuine security cooperation with Africa must also take heed of that continent‟s 
own patchwork of identities.  
It is important to note that keeping identity is vital for developing independent policies. The 
question of who defines African identity is essential if the rationale behind the partnership is 
to be grasped. As Enloe and Zalewski (1995: 282-287) argued, “Identity determines how you 
are treated, what is expected of you, and what you expect of yourself.” Security issues also 
reflect complex identities of the societies. Importantly, identities ask this question “what do 
we perceive of as threats to us?” (ibid., pp.282-287). For the EU, meanwhile, it would be a 
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challenging task to establish an SSP with Africa without considering some form of shared 
African identity.  
3.3.3 Security and justice 
There is a strong link between security and justice, for without the former there cannot be the 
latter. Both are necessary for social, economic, and political stability. An effective and fair 
judicial system in a country is imperative for sustaining peace and security. While insecurity 
destroys the economic and political structure of a country, it also damages the development of 
a fair judicial system (Department for International Development, 2009:75). Importantly, the 
SSP between Africa and the EU is not only about keeping international peace and security in 
Africa and in Europe, but also about promoting democracy, human rights, and justice. In 
Africa, conflicts or wars are often accompanied by torture, detention, arbitrary arrests, war 
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. All these are threats or challenges to 
fundamental human rights on the continent, hence, security cooperation between Africa and 
the EU should take into consideration the complementary connection between security and 
justice. 
Today there are still many African countries that have unstable social, economic and political 
structures that threaten fundamental human rights. Creating an effective and fair judicial 
system in Africa is indispensable for maintaining peace and security and for establishing 
genuine strategic partnership with the EU. It is worth noting that states that have a fair justice 
system can easily and more effectively sustain peace and security as well as contribute to 
international security. Bassiouni (1996:12) argues that justice plays a key role in attaining 
peace and security. When people go to work or school they must believe that both security 
and justice systems are working effectively.  
Without security and justice, other services cannot be provided adequately, less so other 
services, because these are closely connected to socio-economic and political mechanisms of 
a state. Therefore, building a balance between security and justice is a challenging task in 
fragile countries. In addition, corruption, mismanagement and poverty weaken development 
of the relationship between security and justice in Africa. Particularly, as stated by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2007:15), reinforcing the 
principle of accountability is fundamental for providing effective security and justice services. 
In addition, good governance contributes to the development of security and justice services. 
States that do not have a good governance system cannot provide effective security or judicial 
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services to their citizens. Besides, roles of civil society are critical in improving security and 
justice services. 
In Africa, many states lack capacity-building in terms of delivering good security and judicial 
services to their citizens, which overshadows the establishment of a balance between security 
and justice. It is also necessary to emphasise that security and judicial systems cannot be 
enhanced by outside donations alone, but rather African countries should first mobilise their 
own resources in this direction. The Africa-EU SSP ought to consider geo-political and geo-
economic conditions of the African states to build a good balance between security and 
justice. The questions of “who actually provides justice and security, and for whom justice 
and security are being provided” are critical to establishing a complementary relationship 
between security and justice (OECD, 2007:6).  
3.3.4 Security and governance 
Security and good governance are essential for social, economic, and political stability. 
Building a strong relationship between security and governance has been one of the most 
important preconditions for establishing a genuine strategic partnership between Africa and 
the EU. Attention to the link between security and governance has dramatically increased in 
world politics in recent years. International actors such as the UN, the EU, and AU pay a great 
deal of attention to the significance between these two critical values so as to preserve 
international peace, security and stability. In particular, good governance plays a key role in 
maintaining peace and security in conflict-affected countries. Generally, the notion of good 
governance has been mostly connected with democratisation. In this respect, the principles of 
transparency, accountability, the rule of law, and the active participation of the citizens in 
politics are accepted as a core of good governance (Hussein, 2005:28). 
Nkiwane (2003:53) emphasises that states that have a good governance system can maintain 
peace and security more effectively than those that do not. Each African state has a different 
character in terms of governance and security. Developing a governance system in accordance 
with the country‟s political, social and economic features is highly important to contribute to 
peace and security in conflict-affected countries. Whether international pressures to 
strengthen a balance between security and governance in African countries can be an asset is 
questionable. Recent and current crises in some African states, such as Somalia, Sudan, the 
DRC, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, have also been closely related to the lack of a strong link 
between security and governance. 
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There are three main factors affecting the balance between security and governance in Africa. 
First, the role of international actors, the legacies of colonialism, and the leadership of African 
statesmen. During the Cold War era, the bipolar international system shaped world politics, 
including Africa‟s international affairs and the security and governance of African states. 
Domestic challenges of African states, such as poverty, corruption, and mismanagement, also 
weaken the relationship between security and governance. Therefore, establishing a good 
balance between these two important values has been affected by world politics as well as 
internal political developments in Africa (Sawyer, 2004:94-95). Importantly, a strong 
leadership under the umbrella of the AU would play a key role in enhancing the security and 
governance nexus in the African countries and helping in bringing about the emergence of 
true security cooperation with the EU.  
Regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa have recently paid attention to the 
significance of this balance by establishing in 2003, within the AU, the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM), one of the important objectives of which was to prevent potential 
conflicts or wars by strengthening the governance system in African states.  
3.3.5 Security and development 
The interactions between security and development have changed over time. Duffield 
(2001:35-42) asserts that the relationship between security and development was politicised 
and marginalised during the Cold War era. The superpowers, then the USA and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or „Soviet Union‟), used aid policy to strengthen their 
strategic positions with their alliances. Moreover, limited actors were engaged in affecting 
security and development, but today different actors are involved in the development-security 
nexus, including NGOs, universities, think-tanks, private and government organisations, and 
military institutions. Hence, the relationship between security and development has become 
more important in recent years. The content of the notions of security and development is also 
very important for the development-security nexus. In the past, the two concepts had very 
specific and narrow meanings, but today their meanings go beyond military operations and 
economic progress. Therefore, the relationship between security and development touches 
upon economic, social, military and political progress (ibid., pp.35-42).  
The security-development nexus has been connected with hard policies and soft policies of 
the states. While the former focus on reinforcing the military strength of a state, the latter pay 
attention to the welfare and security of the citizens. Importantly, militarised countries tend to 
prefer hard policies to balance security and development, while, on the other hand, 
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democratised countries tend to use soft policies (ibid., pp.10-3). In addition, fragile countries 
do not have a clear policy to strengthen a balance between security and development, and 
states that enjoy a good balance between security and development can play an active role in 
resolving international issues. A good balance between security and development can have a 
positive impact on domestic as well as international developments. The question of whether 
the SSP between Africa and the EU will take into account a balanced relationship between 
security and development remains controversial. The balance ought rather to focus on the 
welfare and security of the citizens of both Africa and the EU for making this partnership an 
effective global initiative.  
According to Deger and West (1987:2-16), the roles of international actors influence the 
development between security and development in LDCs. Furthermore, inequalities and 
injustice between North and South have also shaped the link between security and 
development in the world. The former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (Mail & Guardian, 7 
October 2004) declared that “we know that poverty and instability lead to weak states which 
can become havens for terrorists and other criminals…”, a point made by Simpson (2006:1-3) 
in underlining that poverty, fragile or failed states, and violent conflicts threaten the security 
of the North. At the same time, they destabilise the balance between security and 
development. It can be said that poverty and mismanagement in Africa weaken security and 
development. Hence, the SSP should be supported with structural reforms by the African 
leaders, such as radical social, economic and political adjustments. 
3.4 SYNOPSIS  
This chapter has provided an overview of approaches to “security” and explained the 
interactions between security and its elements and values, namely freedom, identity, justice, 
governance, and development. It argued that constructing a common security concept is 
necessary for creating a common future and building an SSP between the two continents. The 
challenge is how Africa and the EU, with their different political and economic features, will 
establish a common security concept for strategic partnership. There is no universally 
accepted definition of security, rather it is still viewed as an ambivalent concept. Furthermore, 
it has a very dynamic meaning within the field of IR, having changed over time. Importantly, 
concepts also mirror the features of their own time. For example, security was mostly related 
to the bipolar system during the Cold War era, with a narrow meaning that included a nuclear 
threat and the security of the state.  
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With the end of the Cold War era, the international system has changed. A multilateral global 
system has replaced the bipolar system and new international security threats and challenges 
have emerged in world politics. The 9\11 attacks and increasing globalisation have also 
broadened the concept of security. The new, unclear, non-military, and unpredictable security 
threats, such as international terrorism, climate change, drug trafficking, illegal migration, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), environmental disasters and global 
pandemics like HIV/AIDS have emerged. In other words, the security threats and challenges 
of the twenty-first century have been changed. Compared with the Cold War era, when there 
was a mutually defined and clear security threat, this new complexity has affected the future 
of security in international affairs and made it very problematic and complex. Today, the 
concept of security has social, economic, political, diplomatic, technological and 
environmental dimensions, which this chapter concludes that the Africa-EU SSP should take 
into consideration. 
It is clear that traditional solutions to the security challenges of Africa did not bring any 
lasting peace and security. On the contrary, they escalated the violent conflicts and wars on 
the continent of Africa. Trying to understand Africa‟s security issues with the EU‟s security 
concept may be regarded as a waste of time and energy. Africa needs to create its own 
security concept to find a comprehensive solution to its security threats and challenges. 
Without creating a concept that reflects Africa‟s security issues, Africa neither becomes 
successful in resolving its domestic security challenges nor maintaining the SSP with the EU 
effectively. In addition, it is important to note that success of the SSP of Africa depends on its 
successes in resolving its own domestic socio-economic and political challenges. If status quo 
continues in Africa, the EU is likely to strengthen its economic and political interests under 
the newly evolving SSP.  
The Africa-EU strategic partnership on security matters should not only consider security, but 
also the other matters that affect the security issues. There is a strong link between security 
and its values, namely freedom, identity, justice, governance, and development. Without 
security, there cannot be development, justice, freedom or democratic governance. It could be 
said that if there is a secure environment in a state, the other components of the state could 
exist peacefully and work effectively. At the same time, it is compulsory to balance between 
security and its values so as to establish a fair SSP among Africa and the EU. However, the 
question of how this partnership will construct a balance between security and its values 
remains unclear.  
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According to realism, actors do not trust each other whilst setting up a cooperation. Each 
defines its partnership in terms of its own security concerns and economic benefits, nor is 
there a possibility to create a fair cooperation between a strong actor and a weak actor because 
the EU has a tendency to use Africa while building a partnerhip. The realist view expresses 
that the concept of security has a narrow meaning and concentrates on the “security of state.” 
However, a liberalist approach sees the concept of security as focussing on “human security.” 
Furthermore, it points out that it is likely to make a genuine cooperation between Africa and 
the EU because both actors are confronted by common challenges and threats. So, both actors 
need to cooperate in order to combat common challenges. At the same time, collaboration 
among Africa and the EU in a wide range of activities, can also contribute to peace and 
security. Common threats such as conflicts, wars, international terrorism, and climate change 
damage not only economic and political interests of Africa but also the interests of the EU 
members. Since 2000, the EU has begun to develop new security policies towards Africa. 
Establishing strategic partnerships in different areas with different actors has beeen an 
important foreign and security policy for the EU, to contribute to global peace and security 
and to keep its political and economic interests. For example, the EU created the APF in 2004, 
under the leadership of the AU, so as to reinforce conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution capacities of the African organisations. It funded €740 million for this facility. In 
addition, the EU allocated  €100 million in 2007 to strengthen the APSA. Particularly, the 
APF has been playing a significant role in consolidating the African organisations‟ peace and 
security mechanisms and creating an SSP with Africa. Also, the EU has contributed to 
sustaining peace and security in Darfur/Sudan, the Great Lakes Region/DRC, and CAR, as 
well as in Western Africa. The EU has also conducted 10 peacekeeping operations in conflict 
areas in Africa since 2003. This supports hypothesis 1, that “mutual interests lead to the 
emergence of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.” 
Constructivism states that common identities, values and norms are an asset for making 
strategic partnership between different actors. However, it is difficult to establish a 
cooperation among the states that have different identities and values. According to 
constructivism, having different identities and values is a disadvantage for the establishmet of 
cooperation in the areas of peace and security between Africa and the EU. For instance, 
different identities in Europe conflicted with each other and played a negative role in keeping 
peace and security during the Bosnian War (1992-1995).  
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THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY  
POLICY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU has undergone regular 
development. In particular, the new challenges of the twenty-first century have forced the 
members of the EU to speak with one voice on international issues and to resolve them 
effectively. However, different types of challenge have been affecting the development of the 
CFSP, which remains one of the EU‟s most controversial political spheres. This chapter 
examines the CFSP of the EU and its objectives. The historical dynamics of the CFSP play a 
major role in developing the notion of security cooperation, so it is first necessary to 
understand the background.   
4.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
The end of World War II had an extensive impact on global history. With millions killed, it 
caused profound geopolitical and geostrategic changes in global affairs. For instance, the 
USA and USSR emerged as two superpowers, while new international organisations emerged, 
such as the UN, the WB, the IMF and the WTO. In Europe, the most significant political 
changes related to the unification endeavours of a divided western Europe, that through 
various metamorphoses ultimately led to the creation of the European Union (EU), with its 
own foreign and security policy. Meanwhile, in the military dimension, North Atlantic Treaty, 
signed in April 1949 by the USA, Canada, and western European countries, had formalised 
the USA‟s role in maintaining peace and security in Europe (Smith, 2009:29). 
The domestic dynamics of Europe had a great impact on the creation of the EU‟s foreign and 
security policy. Most importantly, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman‟s historical 
proposal, which saw the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in May 
1950, became a turning point. The ostensible goal was to end disputes between France and 
Germany over the contentious mineral resources of Alsace Lorrain, and create peace and 
prosperity on the continent. Archer (2000:162) states that the ECSC can be viewed as a 
“peace project”, and through its expansion to the Common Market and European Community, 
has continued to develop its economic and political dimensions. While conflicts and wars 
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aggravated Africa‟s economic, social and political stability after World War II, Europe made 
significant efforts to change its history. 
Figure 4:   Current map of the European Union 
 
Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html 
Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the subject of sovereignty within member states has been 
the greatest obstacle to developing the CFSP. Against the threat of communism, the USA 
wanted to rearm West Germany in 1950, but France rejected this, proposing instead to 
establish a European army under the European Defence Community (EDC). In May 1952, a 
treaty was signed to set up the EDC, however it did not come into force because the French 
Parliament did not ratify it, due to debates over sovereignty. Likewise, French president 
Charles de Gaulle‟s endeavour, named The Fouchet Plan (1961), to strengthen the political 
unity of Europe, was a failure because of perceptions also regarding national sovereignty held 
by the member states (Hoffman, 2000:190).  
Part of the sovereignty debate relates to historical traditions that serve as barriers to greater 
integration. Many critics upheld NATO as sufficient defence against aggressors, particularly 
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before the end of the Cold War, while as Gnesotto (2003:1) points out, the EU does not have a 
clear CFSP because some of the member states have special economic, political and military 
relations with neighbouring countries, and their former colonies. In the case of the UK there is 
also a “special relationship” with the US, as well as economic and political ties with members 
of the Commonwealth. Traditionally, France, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal 
and Germany have deep interests with former African colonies, and hence wish to preserve 
relations with them, independently and strongly, rather than creating collective policies 
towards Africa under the competencies of the EU.  
The complexity of relations between the European institutions, especially between the CFSP, 
the WEU and NATO, has been one of the greatest challenges to developing the CFSP. These 
two factors have also undermined the international role of the EU (Hurd, 1994:428; White, 
2004:13-15). In December 1969, the Heads of State and Government of the EC convened for 
the “Summit of the Hague,” which brought considerable and concrete achievements, 
especially in the areas of economy, enlargement and foreign policy. Since 1957, this had been 
viewed as the most historic European summit, reinforcing political cooperation within the 
member states (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:153-4), and establishing foreign policy 
cooperation among member states. In October 1970, the foreign ministers proposed to 
develop “European Political Cooperation (EPC)” in the Luxembourg Report, and to increase 
cooperation on foreign policy, leading to the creation of the EPC. Essentially, the EPC is 
known as a predecessor of the CFSP of the EU (Leonard, 2005:259), and it brought a more 
comprehensive and systematic approach towards the CFSP, which aimed to speak with one 
voice on foreign and security affairs. It also gave due consideration to all aspects of security, 
not only political and economic, whilst emphasising for the first time that creating a common 
defence policy among the members was important. 
In spite of its weaknesses, the EPC was to play a noteworthy role in shaping the notion of the 
EC/EU‟s foreign policy until 1992 and the Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) (Salmon, 1992:233-36). It was developed and expanded in the 
Copenhagen Report in July 1973 and the London Report in October 1981, emphasising that 
political cooperation should “become a central element in the foreign policies of all member 
states” (1981:61-2). The EPC was formalised in the Single European Act (SEA) in February 
1986, which amended the EC/EU treaties in the most effective and comprehensive reform 
since 1957. The strategic significance lay in the establishment of a European Common 
Market, and the facilitation of speaking with one voice on international issues among the 
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members. Title III of the SEA constructed a framework for the EPC, stating that closer 
political cooperation was necessary for the Community‟s security. To this end, “political and 
economic aspects of security” were to be considered, in particular technological and industrial 
developments, as vital for securing a European identity. 
The SEA was a prominent step in strengthening the notion of cooperation between the EU 
members. According to liberalism, increasing strategic partnership among the actors in a wide 
range of activities can remove the possibility of wars and conflicts and reinforce peace and 
security. This can also play a remarkable role in developing social, economic, and political 
development. However, without cooperation, conflicts and wars can emerge and threaten 
political and economic stability. The SEA shows that liberalism has predictions applicable to 
European integration.  
  
According to Regelsberger (1993:271-72), EPC was a first and concrete step in establishing a 
common foreign and security policy among the EC/EU members. However, when member 
states wished to pursue their own national foreign policies, this undermined the mechanism of 
the EPC. Importantly, defence and security fields were excluded from discussion in the EPC, 
with some members insisting on discussing them in EPC and others proposing to do so 
through NATO or the WEU. These differences weakened the capacity and effectiveness of 
the EPC (Smith, 2009:32). Prior to 1990, members could not deal with Africa‟s peace and 
security. Hence, before 1990 the notion of an SSP with Africa was largely determined by 
commercial and historical interests.  
The end of the Cold War provided opportunities for radical change in global history, with 
challenges to many traditional concepts. Particularly, it brought major changes in Europe‟s 
foreign and security perceptions. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the 
unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar international system, 
and the end of the threat of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, all had a profound 
impact on internal and external historical developments, forcing European leaders to re-
examine and rethink policy. The paradigm shift was from a perceived threat of communism to 
the new above-mentioned threats. Despite these issued having existed during the Cold War, 
they were now brought to the forefront of discourse in order to preserve the confrontational 
polemic upon which capitalism and nationalism thrives (Denitch, 1990:17).  
When European leaders came together to sign the TEU at Maastricht in February 1992, it was 
to extend and strengthen the Community. It brought substantial structural changes for the 
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Community, such as the creation of the European Union and a basis for a single currency. 
Significantly, the Treaty established the three important pillars of the EU, namely: the 
European Community (EC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice 
and Home Affairs (JHA). Title V of the Provision on a CFSP in the TEU at Maastricht 
established five objectives: (a) To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the Union; (b) To strengthen the security of the Union and its member states 
in all ways; (c) To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act 
and the objectives of the Paris Charter; (d) To promote international co-operation; and (e) To 
develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
The Maastricht Treaty (TEU) paved the way for establishing the notion of the SSP with the 
objectives of the CFSP, which were “to preserve peace and strengthen international security 
and to promote international cooperation” (Title V of the TEU). On the other hand, the 
national foreign policies of the members towards NATO and the WEU have continued to 
weaken the CFSP and the Union. Particularly, the conflicts in former Yugoslavia (Croatia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo) demonstrated that the CFSP of the Union was very weak and the USA 
and NATO were still influential actors in European security.  
Furthermore, the conflicts showed that the EU was not ready for genuine security cooperation 
with Africa, and there was a long and hard journey to create it. If the project of the EU 
attained success, its content might be going beyond this. Even though the Treaty dealt with 
preserving international peace and security, it did not facilitate active involvement in 
sustaining international peace and security in the world, largely because of the regional 
conflicts in Europe and the various national foreign policies of the members. The historical 
developments indicated that the birth of the notion of security cooperation is related to 
internal and external developments in Europe and in the world.  
Its international role was also criticised for being passive during the 1994 outbreak of 
genocide in Rwanda. The deficiencies of the CFSP in post-conflict Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
compromised its international role and raised harsh criticism. While some scholars stated that 
the EU was a soft or civilian power, some argued that it could not be a military power at all, 
and would continue to remain a normative power unless it creates a solid military power aside 
from NATO. Kjeldsen (2007:51) wrote that while the EU was an effective and strong 
international actor in “low politics”, it was not an effective actor in “high politics.” According 
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to Manners (2002:253), the EU had played a major role in establishing its norms in the world, 
such as democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms, and respect for human rights, and 
therefore should be regarded as a “normative power.” According to Kjeldsen and Manners, 
the EU is a soft power in world politics, however, it is not an influential global actor on global 
security concerns. Democracy, human rights, free trade and the rule of law can reinforce the 
notion of strategic partnership and contribute to international peace and security. Furthermore, 
universal norms and values can bring solution to global challenges.  
 
According to Jones (2001:430), the EU is an “economic giant but it is a political pygmy.” 
McCormick (2008: 13-22) also points out that the international position of the EU had not 
been clearly defined. Common to these writers, the question is begged as to what kind of 
international organisation the EU is, in terms of world affairs. In concluding that the EU was 
the largest donor to the developing countries in the world, Warleigh-Lack (2009:84-5) found 
its development policy questionable. Development policy, he argues, reflected its self-
interests and aims to preserve its trade interests with African states. In addition, it did not aim 
to establish SSP with Africa in order to make a difference to Africa‟s economic or political 
life, but rather it used its economic power to sustain its historical interests on the continent. 
However, according to Pirozzi (2009:19-21), the EU not only supports peace and security in 
Africa, but also strengthens democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. For instance, the 
EU has authorised 10 peacekeeping operations in order to sustain peace and security in the 
conflict areas of Africa since 2003.  
In June 1992, the Ministerial Council of the WEU had adopted the Petersberg Declaration in 
order to strengthen Europe‟s security structure. According to the Declaration, the WEU would 
actively be involved in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management 
tasks, including peace-making. Specifically, it placed a great deal of attention on reinforcing 
Europe‟s defence system and NATO rather than maintaining international peace and security 
beyond Europe. It can be argued that the EU did not develop the precedent of a strategic 
partnership in the areas of peace and security, in particular with Africa outlined in the 
Petersberg Declaration. Alternatively, it could be viewed as a notable step in establishing 
peacemaking and peacekeeping tasks. 
The reappearance of war in Europe revealed that the EU needed to make substantial revisions 
to the CFSP. The 15 members of the EU signed the Treaty of Amsterdam in October 1997, 
making large changes to consolidate the EU as well as the architecture of the CFSP. 
Importantly, the Treaty created the institution of a “High Representative for the CFSP” and 
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the “Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit” (PPEWU). The former Secretary-General of 
NATO, Javier Solana, was appointed as a first High Representative in October 1999, a 
position he held until December 2009, when succeeded by Catherine Ashton who combines 
this function with Vice-Presidency of the European Commission.  
Despite the weaknesses of the CFSP, the desire to strengthen it has continued greatly. Former 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac, 
held a Franco-British Summit in St. Malo in December 1998, in which they agreed in the St. 
Malo Declaration to draw attention to the solidarity among the member states of the EU and 
the establishment of a common security policy. According to the Declaration (1998:1), “the 
Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces in 
order to respond to international crises.” This was a strategic step for the Union, intensifying 
the capacity of the CFSP. Particularly, the three important points mentioned by France and 
Britain were solidarity among members, creating a military force for the Union, and a 
common security policy. Even though the Franco-British Summit in 1998 focused on 
preventing peace and security in Europe, it made little contribution to the development of the 
notion of a strategic security partnership with the expression of “in order to respond to 
international crises.”  
The post-Kosovo War in 1999 revealed that the CFSP would not work effectively without a 
military component, and that the USA would continue to remain the strongest element in 
European security. In addition, the success of the CFSP would require greater political 
unification among the member states on international issues. Gordon (1997:131) saw the 
elements that impaired the power of the CFSP and gave the following recommendations: 
France needs to claim a greater role for Europe as political cover to come back into the 
Alliance; Germany needs to show progress toward European political unification to 
reassure its elites and to convince its public to accept monetary union; Britain wants to 
show a strong role for the WEU to forestall calls to give the EU a defence role; and the 
U.S. administration needs to be able to claim to Congress and the public that the 
Europeans are now prepared to shoulder more of the defence burden of transatlantic 
defence. 
Title V of the CFSP of the Treaty of Amsterdam added the expression of “external borders” 
concerning international security. According to the related objective of the CFSP (Treaty of 
Amsterdam, 1997:7), the EU should “preserve peace and strengthen international security, in 
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; including those on external 
borders.” According to the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997:7), the expression of “external 
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borders” has three critical meanings. First, the CFSP must be a more effective player in 
keeping peace and security. Second, it should begin to engage in conflicts and wars outside 
Europe. Third, the EU should develop pro-active foreign diplomacy to prevent conflicts or 
wars on the continent of Europe. Inserting such an expression into the Treaty of Amsterdam 
was historic in leading to the creation of the notion of a strategic partnership in the fields of 
peace and security.  
The European Council Summit held in Cologne in June 1999 underlined the significance of 
the St. Malo Declaration, and agreed that the EU should implement the “Petersberg tasks.” 
Significantly, the Cologne European Council established the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) to strengthen the CFSP of the Union, in particular in the fields of civilian and 
military capacities of the EU. It also stressed that international security issues could only be 
resolved with closer cooperation between the countries. It gave expression to a “strategic 
partnership” with the Western Balkans, Russia, Japan, and the Middle East, and may therefore 
be viewed as a major step to reinforcing the notion of security cooperation. The Cologne 
meeting of the European Council proved that there was a strong link between a culture of 
common security strategy among the members and the emergence of a notion of an SSP. The 
determined desire to set up a common security strategy within the EU pushed for 
development of its strategic partnership with different actors.  
The European Council met again in Helsinki in December 1999, making some critical 
decisions to develop the CFSP. To this end it agreed that the “EU must be able to deploy 
within 60 days by 2003 and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 
persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.” Second, it established new political and 
military structures in the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee 
(MC), and the Military Staff (MS). The Helsinki European Council‟s strategic decisions about 
the EU‟s military capabilities became a turning point in European history. Mainly, it stressed 
that if NATO did not want to engage in international conflicts or wars, the EU would have to 
play a leading role in maintaining international peace and security in areas of conflict around 
the world. In its establishment of an autonomous mechanism for effective involvement in 
international crises, and to develop the notion of a strategic partnership independently without 
using NATO assets, “Helsinki” thus became a significant milestone.  
The EU entered the millennium facing challenges and responsibilities. The borders of the 
CFSP of the Union in the twenty-first century have started to change dramatically. 
Particularly, the 9\11 attacks on the USA, terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, and 
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London in July 2005, have had a great impact on the changing of security perceptions in the 
EU. When the concept of security only included military threats during the Cold war era, it 
contained non-military threats after 2000, such as international terrorism, transnational 
organised crime, illegal migration, climate change, and drug trafficking. At the same time, 
balance between security and its values has been more important for maintaining peace and 
security. European leaders placed much attention on the concepts of “diplomacy” and 
“multilateralism”, and realised that the mechanisms of diplomacy and multilateralism must be 
strengthened to prevent or remove new threats. According to liberalism, international 
cooperation between different actors is necessary to increase democratic values and to fight 
against new challenges. Without international collaboration, states are not able to resolve new 
threats. In this regard, the EU has made significant efforts to foster its strategic partnership 
with Africa in the areas of peace and security since 2000,  the year of the first Africa-EU 
Summit in Cairo. The EU committed itself to strengthening security cooperation with Africa 
at this summit. To this end, the EU established an APF in 2004 in collaboration with the AU 
in order to reinforce strategic partnership with African regional organisations. 
Realism stresses that building a true cooperation between different actors is not easy because 
actors have different security concerns and economic interests. When the USA made a 
decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the European countries split into different views. Whilst 
France, Germany, Belgium, and Austria opposed the invasion, Britain, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and several Eastern European countries supported it. Likewise, some EU 
members played active roles in opposing the Libyan War of 2011. The US-led invasion and 
the Libyan War of 2011 again showed that the CFSP of the Union lacked a common security 
and foreign vision among members. The EU‟s pursuit of different national policies on 
international issues have damaged both the CFSP and the reinforcement of strategic 
partnership on security matters with Africa.  
In 2002 and 2003, the Constitutional Treaty brought changes to the CFSP to enable it to speak 
with one strong voice on the international stage. One of the most notable changes under the 
Constitutional Treaty is the establishment of the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs.” 
Furthermore, the enlargement of the EU has created new challenges and opportunities. On the 
1
st
 of May 2004, the EU accepted 10 countries as new members, namely the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Malta, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Poland. In 
addition, Romania and Bulgaria were accepted as members on the 1
st
 of January 2007. The 
EU currently has 27 member states, with Turkey, Croatia, Iceland and Macedonia awaiting 
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membership. The adoption of the new countries was a milestone in the history of Europe, 
adding to its strength as regional and global actor. On the other hand, it also brought more 
international responsibilities to the EU to sustain international peace and security. 
The ESS has developed the concept of security widely, and the EU has started to play a 
leading role in maintaining peace and security in conflict regions around the world since 2003, 
particularly in Africa. For example, it has taken strategic steps to keep international peace and 
security in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eastern Chad and the North-East of the 
Central African Republic (CAR), Somalia, and Sudan. Furthermore, it has strengthened 
regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa. Since the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the EU 
has particularly attached importance to strengthening regional organisations in Africa. It can 
be said that the perceptions of liberalim are playing a strategic role in developing relations 
between the EU and African organisations. Liberalist views point out that cooperation 
between different actors can reduce the possibility of uncertainty and increase economic and 
political cooperation. In doing so, the EU has strengthened the APSA to fight against global 
threats and challanges. It supported the AU Mission in Sudan\Darfur (AMIS II) in 2005-2006 
and allocated €300 million for AMIS II. The EU also established the African Peace Facility 
(APF) in 2004 within the framework of the AU to cooperate with African organisations in the 
fields of peace and security more effectively and sent €740 million to the regional 
organisations in Africa through the APF. Table 2 gives an overview of the evolution of the 












Table 2:   The evolution of the CFSP of the EU 
 
Source: Own compilation 
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In December 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon renamed the new established function as a “High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. In 2009, the Treaty 
of Lisbon was ratified by all the members of the EU and it came into force on the 1
st
 of 
December 2009. Most importantly, the EU appointed its first president of the European 
Council (EC) to increase the EU‟s international role under the Treaty of Lisbon. In spite of 
efforts by the EU to consolidate the CFSP, the South Ossetia War in the Caucasus in 
August 2008, between Russia and Georgia, proved that the EU still had deficiencies to 
anticipate and prevent wars and conflicts in the neighbouring countries of the EU. The 
CFSP exposed weaknesses in the EU strategic security field that had persisted throughout 
its development. 
4.3 THE EU’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OBJECTIVES  
The EU‟s foreign and security policy objectives have been playing essential roles in deveping 
the EU CFSP. There are six important EU foreign and security policy objectives, namely: (1) 
increasing regional cooperation; (2) developing effective multilateralism; (3) countering 
terrorism; (4) preserving international peace and security; (5) promoting democracy and good 
governance; and (6) promoting human rights. 
4.3.1 Increasing regional cooperation  
Enhancing regional cooperation among the member states of the EU has been the most 
consequential foreign and security policy goal of the EU since its establishment. After World 
War II, the founding members made a historic decision to establish the EC under the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957. According to the European leaders, the best way to prevent wars and conflicts 
and create prosperity in Europe was to strengthen regional cooperation. Smith (2009:76) 
defines regional cooperation in Europe as “all efforts on the part of (usually) neighbouring 
countries to address issues of common interests.” To this end the EU has been regarded as the 
most successful regional cooperation project, especially in economic and political fields in the 
world (Acharya & Johnston, 2007:245; McCormick, 2008:12; Smith, 2004:165), despite 
disagreements between the members on some foreign and security policy spheres.  
According to liberalism, human nature does not have a tendency to make war or conflict and 
international cooperation among the nations can bring many opportunities for the development 
of countries. At the same time, strengthening regional cooperation is a prerequisite for the 
maintenance of international security. Consequently, the EU has made history by increasing 
regional cooperation among the EU members and, therefore, many regions or continents 
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including Africa and Asia have been inspired by the EU. Since 2000, the EU has also made 
efforts to consolidate regional cooperation in Africa through African organisations, including 
the AU, the IGAD, and the ECOWAS. It can be said that the Africa-EU SSP has an aim of 
increasing regional cooperation on the continent of Africa.  
Particularly, the EU has been using its economic power to reinforce regional cooperation in 
Africa. For instance, the EU has earmarked €740 million for consolidating regional 
organisations of Africa since 2004. In addition, in 2007, the European Commission donated 
€10 million to strengthen the IGAD (IGAD, 2007:7). The EU allocated €258 million to 
support the ECOWAS‟s economic and integration activities in the region between 2002 and 
2007 and also donated €116
6
 million to reinforce the capacity building of SADC and its 
regional and economic integration efforts. However, it is not clear whether or not the EU will 
increase regional cooperation in Africa thereby making donations to regional organisations of 
Africa. 
Regional cooperation in Europe began under an economic project and its borders have 
gradually broadened from economic cooperation to foreign and security policy cooperation. It 
has also many benefits for the member states, as well as the candidate countries, encouraging 
them to improve their democratic systems and create economic opportunities (Armstrong, 
Lloyd & Redmond, 2004:195). Significantly, it brought together France and Germany, 
traditional enemies and the cause of over a century of warfare. The consequent entente 
became a valuable example for former adversaries embracing peace, security, and prosperity. 
Strategically, the USA supported a strong regional cooperation project of the EU, since in 
some respects a strong and united Western Europe was in the USA‟s interest, in particular 
against the threat of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the USA has been watchful of any 
growing European economic strength that might threaten USA hegemony. The same may also 
apply to military growth. 
The EU‟s regional cooperation project has also protected aspects of the EU‟s common history, 
culture and values, including those that have spread over the colonies, such as democracy, 
good governance, human rights and individual freedoms (ibid., p.195). According to Smith 
(2009:80-2), the regional cooperation project in Europe has two essential planks, namely 
                                                 
6
See the Communiqué EU-SADC Double Troika Ministerial Meeting, 11 November 2008, Doc. 15597/08 




“self-interest” and “altruism.” The concept of self-interest refers to strengthening the EU‟s 
international role and its economic interests in the world. From this point of view, the EU has 
attempted to create a strong strategic partnership among its members and prosperity in Europe. 
It was perhaps beyond its scope to establish a strategic partnership with the rest of the world, 
or to contribute to international peace, security and prosperity unless this coincided with its 
own economic interests.  
Altruism has led many regions in the world to be inspired by the EU‟s regional cooperation 
project. The regional cooperation project brings the countries together and opens many 
opportunities that push them to develop. Most importantly, increasing regional cooperation 
helps to prevent wars and conflicts (ibid., pp.80-82). According to the 2003 ESS, wars and 
conflicts threaten the EU‟s peace and security as well as international security, so that the EU 
should promote the strengthening of regional cooperation in the world, particularly regional 
and sub-regional organisations in Africa.  
4.3.2 Developing an effective multilateral diplomacy  
One of the most prominent foreign and security policy objectives of the EU, multilateral 
diplomacy, is defined by Kegley and Wittkopf (2004:477) as “a cooperative strategy of 
working with allies or with collective problem-solving institutions to face threats from another 
actor or global problem.” The EU committed itself to reinforce its multilateral diplomacy in 
order to play a more active role on the world scene in the 2003 ESS, the significance of which 
was to conceptualise multilateralism as an “international order based on effective 
multilateralism.” The goals were to enhance “international society, well functioning 
international institutions and a rule-based institutional order” (European Council, 2003:9). 
According to the 2003 ESS, “the EU‟s security and prosperity increasingly depend on an 
effective multilateral system. The EU is committed to upholding and developing International 
Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter.” 
The strategy underlines that “key institutions in the international system” such as the UN, 
WTO, IMF and the WB, were notable for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Furthermore, it stressed that regional organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, 
NATO, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the AU, Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), and Southern Common Market (SCM), were also of importance in 
developing international law and resolving the common threats effectively.  
The end of the Cold War era that shaped international relations brought significant changes to 
world history, particularly in the replacement of a bipolar system by a  multipolar one, and the 
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emergence of multilateral diplomacy. This became a strategic means to resolving international 
issues effectively, notably the new threats and challenges, making the UN the most effective 
global actor in preserving international peace and security and reinforcing its multilateral 
diplomacy on the international stage. As a prominent part of the multilateral system of the EU, 
it has also attempted to increase its relations with important global actors, such as the USA, 
Russia, China, India, and Brazil, as well as the Islamic world. In particular, “the transatlantic 
relationship” remains the most prominent strategic relationship for the EU. However, the deep 
division between the “Europeanists” and the “Atlanticists” within the EU member states on 
foreign and security policies has sometimes undermined its pro-active foreign policy, 
especially over the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (ibid., p.312), and even during the Libyan War of 
2011. On the other hand, a strengthening of strategic partnership with Russia has been 
connected to the former superpower‟s nuclear and energy power resources, as with China, the 
fastest growing trading actor in the world. The EU‟s strong historical relations with Africa 
compel the EU to strengthen its multilateral diplomacy with the African organisations.  
4.3.3 Countering terrorism  
Terrorism has been one of the major post Cold War challenges to the EU, because it threatens 
political, economic and social infrastructures, and is “more diverse, less visible and less 
predictable” than communism, and is viewed as a “growing strategic threat to the whole of 
Europe” (European Council, 2003:3). A problematic concept, the Council of the European 
Union (2002:1) clarified terrorism as:  
seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or international 
organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing 
or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of 
a country or an international organization.  
In the ESS, “terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected with electronic networks, and 
are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.” In addition, proliferation of 
WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime are seen as a substantial 
component of terrorism. Since the 9\11 attacks on the USA, the EU has intensively 
cooperated with the USA and the UN, as well as the other important global actors, in 





4.3.4 Preserving international peace and security  
According to the 1993 Maastricht Treaty (TEU), one of the most prominent foreign and 
security policy objectives of the EU was “to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security”, after which it developed its CFSP in order to play a more active role in keeping 
international peace and security in the world. The 2003 ESS highlights that “the EU should be 
ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” To this 
end, the EU actively started to involve in international peacekeeping operations, for instance 
deploying forces in Afghanistan, East Timor, Kosovo, Georgia, Iraq, Guinea-Bissau and the 
DRC. At the same time, the EU appointed Special Representatives (EUSRs) to conflict areas 
such as the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Great Lakes. Regional conflicts undermine 
political, economic and social infrastructures of the states and threaten the EU‟s interests 
directly and indirectly. In addition, conflicts can create insecurity, injustice and poverty. 
Therefore, international peace and security are a precondition for political, economic and 
social development.  
Dealing with international peace and security has been complicated for the EU and 
international organisations, and hence a multilateral framework has increasingly been 
considered imperative. The EU has been working with the USA, the UN, and other 
organisations and actors on peace and security initiatives, including in Africa, and in so doing 
has consolidated African regional and sub-regional organisations, including the establishment 
of an African Peace Facility with €740 million in 2004 through the AU. It has contributed to 
maintaining peace and security in Darfur/Sudan, the Great Lakes Region/DRC, and CAR, as 
well as in western Africa.  
4.3.5 Promoting democracy and good governance  
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty (TEU) stated that “developing and consolidating democracy and 
the rule of law” were objectives of the CFSP of the EU. Firstly, promoting democracy and 
good governance would protect human rights; secondly, democratic systems would not 
become enemies with each other. Conflicts and international terrorism were the result of a 
lack of democracy and good governance. Thirdly, promoting democracy and good governance 
was essential for political, social and economic development, as well as the interests of the 
EU (Smith, 2009:151-3). However, the concepts of democracy and good governance remain 
ambiguous and contentious, thus affecting the policies of the EU and Africa towards 
democracy and good governance. 
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Keukeleire and MacNaughtan (2008:224-5) state that promoting democracy and good 
governance was not only important for the CFSP but also vital for the EU‟s identity. As a 
normative power, the EU pays a great deal of attention to spreading democracy and good 
governance in the world, however it does not have a consistent policy towards these concepts 
and its policy varies from region to region. For example, while the EU has various foreign 
policy towards China, it has a different policy for Iran and Palestine (ibid., pp.224-5). Even 
though Hamas won the democratic elections in Palestine in 2006, the EU did not recognise it 
as a democratically elected government.  
It has been argued that the EU‟s economic, political, and strategic interests in the world have 
shaped the EU‟s democracy and good governance policy worldwide. The EU has also made 
an effort to strengthen democracy and good governance in developing countries, for instance 
through the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, where democracy and good governance were 
underscored as essential elements for sustainable development in both the EU and Africa. On 
the other hand, the question of whether the EU would promote democracy and good 
governance in developing countries, with its financial aid policy, remains controversial.  
4.3.6 Promoting human rights  
Promoting human rights is regarded not only as a strategic priority for the EU, but also as a 
moral responsibility. Respect for human rights is also viewed as a key to keeping security and 
stability. The EU has a wide range of tools to promote human rights across the world, such as 
promotion of democracy and good governance, diplomatic and economic sanctions, bilateral 
and multilateral dialogues, and financial aid, even peacekeeping and peacemaking assistance. 
The EU set up guidelines on human rights in 2007, in particular on capital punishment, torture 
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, human rights dialogues, 
child soldiers and armed conflict, and human rights defenders (Council of the European 
Union, 2007: 33). Importantly, following the end of the Cold War, the EU started to promote 
human rights as a strategic means for European integration, as well as for increasing economic 
cooperation in the global arena. However, it has been argued that the EU lacks a common 
vision for the promotion of human rights and partically develops its human rights policies 
according to its economic and strategic interests (Gropas, 1999:10, 23-4). 
For instance, whilst the EU has a human rights policy towards Russia, it has a different 
strategy towards China and Africa. For instance, the EU imports 50 percent of its gas and 30 
percent of its oil from Russia (Monaghan, 2006:1). The EU is heavily dependent on Russia‟s 
natural resources, therefore, this affects the EU foreign and security policy towards Russia 
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(Balfour, 2008:2: Smith, 2009:130). The EU‟s inconsistent human rights policy in the world 
also undermines its international credibility and damages the evolution of security cooperation 
with Africa. Though the protection of human rights is one of the most important CFSP 
objectives, the EU‟s human rights diplomacy remains somewhat limited and ineffective 
worldwide. For example, massive violations in the Balkans, Rwanda, Zaire, Nigeria, Burma 
and East Timor showed the EU‟s lack of power to prevent them.  
4.4 EVALUATION 
The end of the Cold War had a major impact on the fundamental concepts of security, power, 
and strategic partnership. At the same time, it brought many structural changes in the world, 
for instance the replacement of a bipolar international system by a  multipolar one. 
Importantly, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany, and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union had a great impact on the foreign and security policy of the EU. European 
leaders began to take strategic steps to reinforce their common foreign and security policy, 
signing the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1992, and thus bringing many changes to the EU, 
especially the creation of the CFSP. It can be said that the Treaty was the first and most 
significant strategic step in establishing the CFSP and the notion of an SSP.   
However, some obstacles, such as different national policies of the member states within the 
EU, sovereignty of member states, and disagreements between the various European 
institutions, including the CFSP, the WEU, and the NATO, have jeopardised the effectiveness 
of the CFSP of the EU. Therefore, developing a common foreign and security policy has 
always been the most difficult political field on the EU‟s agenda. Meanwhile, this situation 
has had a negative impact on the progress of the notion of a strategic partnership with 
different continents. Hence, the EU could not develop a proactive foreign and security policy, 
unanimously, to stop the wars in former Yugoslavia or genocide in Rwanda. After the 
conflicts and the wars in former Yugoslavia, the European leaders declared that without 
securing Europe first, the EU would not contribute to world peace.  
Furthermore, the EU‟s foreign and security policy objectives have been playing key roles in 
developing the Africa-EU SSP. Promoting human rights, democracy and good governance are 
amongst the most important objectives of the EU‟s foreign and security policy. Liberal theory 
contends that promoting fundamental rights and freedoms can consolidate the notion of SSP 
and reinforce world peace and security. However, disregarding them can lead to political and 
economic instabilities and wars. Since 2000, many new developments have emerged in global 
politics, encouraging the CFSP of the EU to speak with one voice on international relations, 
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and look for solutions to the accompanying new threats. The ESS in 2003 was a significant 
strategic step in advancing security cooperation with different continents, as it underlined the 
necessity to build up institutional relations with different regional and sub-regional 
organisations, and so prevent conflicts and wars. For instance, the EU deployed its first 
civilian and military peacekeeping operations in Africa in 2003. In addition, it has made 
extensive institutional agreements with African regional and sub-regional organisations. In 
this regard, the establishment of an African Peace Facility is an important example of the birth 
of security cooperation with Africa. In particular, the EU strengthens its security cooperation 
in Africa through African organisations, such as the AU, the IGAD and the ECOWAS. The 
predictions of liberalism have been playing significant roles in shaping the EU‟s policy 
towards the SSP. EU policymakers believe that making the African organisations strong and 
effective can boost peace, security and stability and increase economic and political 
cooperation between the two continents. So, the SSP also aims to increase institutional 
relations between Africa and the EU. 
However, the EU‟s controversial foreign and security policy implications have also 
undermined the effectiveness of the CFSP and the reinforcement of strategic partnership. 
Establishing a strong SSP with Africa is not an easy task, requiring more consistent EU 
foreign and security policy objectives, and a more united CFSP. In spite of some structural 
challenges, however, the EU has taken determined steps to make a solid partnership in the 
fields of peace and security with Africa, the future of which will partically depend on the 
strategic steps of the EU. If the EU shapes its strategic partnership with Africa in accord with 
its political and economic interests, it would weaken its global power and not sustain peace 
and security in Africa. Rather, it would contribute further to dividing Africa.  
According to liberalism, increasing international cooperation between different actors can 
contribute to peace and security and spread over universal values, such as human rights, the 
rule of law and democracy. Reinforcing cooperation can also increase interdependence among 
the actors. The Africa-EU SSP has two important aims, the first of which is to maintain peace 
and security in Africa, the second to spread liberal values in Africa. Liberalism stresses that 
cooperation can be easy among the states that share the same values, however, it can be 
difficult among the states that do not have the same values. Therefore, spreading universal 
values in Africa is one of the most important aims for the EU to increase strategic partnership 
in a wide range of activities, such as economy and security.  
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Regarding Hypothesis 4: “the EU aims to spread its norms and values in Africa through the 
SSP”, following the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the EU boosted its strategic partnership with 
African organisations in the areas of peace and security to spread over the principles of 
liberalism in Africa and to fight against global threats and challenges more effectively. 
According to the ESS adopted by the EU members in 2003, conflicts and wars have occurred 
as a result of lack of rule of law, human rights and democracy. The EU should disseminate its 
norms, values and ideas in order to sustain global peace and security through the 
establishment of strategic partnerships with different actors across a wide range of fields. The 
ESS underlines that the EU should strengthen its institutional relations with African 
organisations by creating different strategic partnership models. To this end, the EU 
established the APF through the AU to launch a security cooperation with African 
organisations in 2004 and allocated €740 million for it. One of the most important aims of the 
APF is to spread the European values and norms on the continent of Africa and to strengthen 
African organisations. This provides evidence for hypothesis 4. Making African organisations 
strong and effective is in the interest not only of the continent of Africa, but also of the EU. 
Liberal views point out that regional organisations can also increase social, economic, and 
political cooperation, however, while ineffective regional organisations can fail to fulfil their 
purposes, strong and effective ones can make difference in changing their society. In 2005-
2006, the EU donated €300 to strengthen the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur, and 
supported the AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur politically.  
 
The main idea behind the creation of the EC in the 1950s was to build peace and security by 
establishing a strategic partnership among the members of the community in economic areas. 
The establishment of strategic partnerships with different states has become a significant 
strategy for the EU since the EC was created, designed to promote its norms and values 
throughout the continent of Europe. To this end, the EU has deployed 10 peacekeeping 
operations since 2003 in conflict areas throughout Africa and supported African 
organisations‟ peace and security mechanisms both politically and financially. For instance, 
the EU has supported the AU peacekeeping operation in Sudan during the conflict. 
Significantly, a constructive pattern of AU-EU collaboration on peace and security appeared 
during the Darfur conflict. The EU members‟ interests, security concerns, and integration 
movement played a significant role in creating this pattern of security cooperation between 
Africa and the EU.   
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Nevertheless, the EU lacks a consistent foreign and security policy in the world. In particular, 
its economic and political interests have shaped its foreign and security policy towards 
different actors. While the EU has a certain foreign policy with Russia, it has a different 
policy with Africa due to its various economic and political interests. For example, the EU 
imports 50 percent of its gas and 30 percent of its oil from Russia (Monaghan, 2006:1), which 
is affecting the EU‟s relations with Russia. Likewise, some EU members have strong political 
and economic interests with North Africa. For instance, some of the EU members sold 
weapons to the value of €343.7 million to Libya in 2009,
7
 the most important members being 
France, Italy, the UK, and Germany. The EU‟s contradictory security policy in the world 
weakens its international credibility and development of security cooperation with Africa.  
 
Hypothesis 2 is “the lack of cohesion and discrepancy between the EU members damages the 
development of the Africa-EU SSP.” For instance, while France has different interests in its 
former colonial countries in Africa, the UK has also different ones. This undermines the 
success of security partnership between Africa and the EU. It should be noted that while 
France plays a leading role in the EU peacekeeping operations in Africa, the other members 
remain passive and ineffective because of their different geo-economic and geo-political 
interests. The Libyan War of 2011 revealed that disagreement between the members of the EU 
remained the most significant issue. The South Ossetia War in the Caucasus in August 2008 
between Russia and Georgia provided evidence that the EU members did not have sufficient 
capacity to develop effective security mechanisms to anticipate and prevent wars or conflicts 
in its neigbouring regions. Furthermore, the EU members could not develop a common 
security strategy when the USA invaded Iraq in 2003. While some EU members, such as 
France and Germany, resisted the USA-led invasion of Iraq, some, including Britain, Italy and 
Denmark, supported it. These examples demonstrate that the EU members lack common 
foreign and security policies when faced with global issues. This provides evidence for 
hypothesis 2. 
Divergence between the EU members and its different institutions has had a negative impact 
on evolving the Africa-EU SSP. At the same time, the lack of unity and solidarity between the 
EU members on foreign and security policies undermines the development of the EU CFSP 
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and its global power. For example, the Bosnian war (1992-1995) showed that the EU did not 
have enough capacity to sustain peace and security in conflict areas. Likewise, its passive role 
during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrated that the EU was not ready to be a global 
power. Making a consistent CFSP among the EU members is a prerequisite for making long-
term and successful strategic partnership models with Africa. This also confirms hypothesis 2. 
Chapter 5 will assess the impact of colonial powers on the Africa-Europe SSP. Mainly, it 
investigates the interests of the former colonisers including France, England, Portugal, 
Germany, Italy, and Belgium in security cooperation between Africa and the EU. This chapter 




THE FORMER EUROPEAN COLONIAL POWERS’  
SECURITY POLICIES TOWARDS AFRICA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the colonial period, Africa has played a strategic role in world politics, the second 
largest continent comprising 55 countries with a collective population of over one billion. It 
provides raw materials for the former colonial powers and therefore plays an important role in 
their economic development. At the same time, it is one of the most significant continents in 
the world in terms of natural resources and strategic position. Europe has strong historical, 
economic, and political relations with Africa, and throughout the history of colonialism, the 
former European colonial powers have developed various economic and political relations. 
Economic and political interests of the former colonial powers have thus necessitated revision 
of the Africa-EU SSP. Realist theory emphasises that security relations between global actors 
and weak actors are strongly related to global actors‟ economic interests. This chapter deals 
with the former European colonial powers‟ security policies towards Africa and discusses 
how both realist and liberalist predictions have been applicable in the former colonial powers‟ 
security policies in Africa. 
5.2 FRANCE’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA 
France has “special” economic and political relations with Francophone African countries, 
dating back to the 19
th
 century, and retains its military bases in Gabon, Senegal, the Ivory 
Coast, Djibouti, and the Central African Republic. France‟s security policy towards Africa has 
changed according to its economic, political and strategic interests. It has been linked with the 
concepts of change and continuity. For instance, during the apartheid regime, the French 
government strengthened its economic and political relations with South Africa and opposed 
the UN‟s embargos of the pariah state, even encouraging Francophone African countries to 
increase their economic and political relations with it.  
Additionally, France‟s international power and position has also shaped its security policy 
towards Africa, seeing it become a member of the Group of Eight (G8) and one of the largest 
economic powers in the world. It is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and at 
the same time has been playing a significant role in European integration. Significantly, it is a 
nuclear power and a member of various security organisations, for instance NATO and the 
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OSCE (Renou, 2002:5-8). Approximately 240,000 French citizens live in different countries 
of Africa, where French companies operate, such as Total, Areva, Accor, Bolloré, Bouygues, 
and Elf Aquitaine. In turn, Africa provides raw materials, such as uranium, natural gas and oil 
to France, which is still highly dependent on these for its technological industries. France also 
has special agreements with many African countries in the fields of defence and military 
power. France is the largest trading partner for the African countries within the EU members
8
. 
When France‟s exports to Africa in 2007 were 30,393 million dollars, its exports to Africa in 
2008 increased to 36,878 million dollars. As shown in Table 3, France‟s economic relations 
have significantly grown each year.  
Table 3:   France’s overall trade with Africa (2006-2008) (in million dollars) 
   
 
                                                      Exports                                                   Imports 
                                            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
                                                 2006          2007             2008              2006              2007            2008                        
                                    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 France                                   26,344       30,393          36,878            24,763           28,198         38,354                 
 Africa excl. South Africa      24,240       28,177          34,482            23,767           26,957         36,945                              
 Sub-Saharan Africa               11,341       13,184          15,278             9,195            11,443         15,640  
 Sub-Saharan Africa               9,237         10,968          12,882             8,199            10,202         14,231       
 excl. South Africa 
 South Africa                          2,104          2,216            2,396               996               1,241            1,409            
 
 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009.  
 
Nevertheless, the global economic crisis of 2007 has had a negative impact on the growth of 
France‟s economic relations with Africa, with both exports and imports falling. France‟s 
exports to Africa in 2009 were €17.163 million and its imports to Africa were €14.312 
million.
9
 France‟s economic relations have relatively started to increase in 2010, with its 
exports to Africa increasing to €19.516 million and imports to €16.452 million. France was 
also the largest of the EU‟s exporters to Africa, with €20 billion  in 2010.
10
 
According to Hansen (2008:1) and Martin (1995:9-14), the main aims of France‟s security 
policy towards Africa are to protect French economic and political interests and citizens  and 
provide intelligence for the French government. The Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the 
collapse of the authoritarian regime in the DRC, formerly Zaire, in 1997 weakened France‟s 
security policy towards Africa (Renou, 2002:11-3). New developments in Africa forced 
                                                 
8
 See the detailed report for France‟s economic relations with Africa published by EUROSTAT, Revival of EU 
27 trade in goods with Africa, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010.  
9
  Ibid., pg. 1.  
10
 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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French policymakers to re-define security policy in Africa, particularly after the Cold War. 
The bipolar international system in world politics and spread of communism in Francophone 
African countries had been the main threat for the French interests during this era, leading 
France to increase its social, economic, and political relations with former colonial states in 
Africa against the threat of the Soviet Union.  
After the Cold War, the concept of security has appeared to change, and now includes the new 
threats, mentioned above. Particularly, conflicts and wars in Africa began to threaten regional 
stability and especially France‟s economic interests after the 1990s, as democratic movements 
emerged. A new political rivalry between France and the USA arose in Africa after the end of 
the Cold war. Wary of what it perceived as imperial ambitions of the USA, France saw these 
new developments in Africa as a threat to its economic and political interests (ibid., pp.11-3).  
Financial aid programmes are also seen as a momentous component of France‟s security 
policy towards Africa, for instance strengthening the authoritarian regime of President Paul 
Biye in Cameron in 1992 with a pledge of 436 million dollars of aid. After the 1990s, France 
also started to support the concepts of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, due to its 
changing interests in Africa and in the world (Martin, 1995:6-17; Ogunmola, 2009: 234-8; 
Renou, 2002:13-7; Touati, 2007:9-12). In recent years, France has claimed that the UN 
Security Council should include one African country to reflect and support the continent‟s 
interests precisely. However, its support for Africa at the UN Security Council remains 
somewhat rhetorical.  
The emergence of the regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa also affected France‟s 
security policy. For example, France was opposed to the establishment of the ECOWAS 
(Renou, 2002:19-22) created by the Treaty of Lagos, in 1975, the aims of which were to 
reinforce economic relations amongst the members, to create an economic integration in 
western Africa and to create a common security system. At the same time, it included a 
peacekeeping force, and in 1995 ECOWAS played a critical role in stopping the Liberian civil 
war. France established its own security institution, known as the Reinforcement of African 
Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programme in 1998. RECAMP included Francophone 
African countries, the USA, the UK, Belgium, and five Anglophone countries. This provides 
evidence against hypothesis 3, which is “the EU encourages to reinforce regional 
organisations on the African continent through the Africa-EU SSP.” France‟s economic and 
political relations with Africa have influenced its institutional relations with the continent. 
Meanwhile, the establishment of the RECAMP also shows that France is pursing its own 
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individual security policy in Africa, and one that is undermining the development of the EU 
CFSP. This also strengthens  hypothesis 2.     
Furthermore, the current economic crises also influenced France‟s security strategy in Africa, 
causing France to close down two military bases in Central Africa (Mehler, 2008:28-33). 
France also plays a large role in the international organisations, including in the UN and the 
EU, to keep its strategic influence in Africa. For example, it took a leading role in the EU 
peacekeeping force, which is the Artemis Operation, in the DRC in 2003, and has made a 
major contribution to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
Since the post-independence era in Africa, France has institutionalised its relations with 
African states, and has organised Franco-African summits since 1973, in order to strengthen 
its social, economic, and political relations with Africa. The 25th took place in Nice between 
the 31
st
 of May and the 1
st
 of June 2010, in which France underlined that establishing a 
strategic partnership based on equality, solidarity and mutual respect was necessary for 
combating the common threats facing both continents and enhancing their interests. 
Importantly, France agreed to strengthen Africa‟s security system through regional and sub-
regional organisations, and in so doing pledged €300 million between 2010 and 2012 to 
African states and organisations. It also agreed to train 12,000 African troops to reinforce 
African peacekeeping operations in that time. Meanwhile, the former French president, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, in his opening speech, argued that the spread of liberal concepts, such as 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law was essential for the maintenance of peace, 
security, and stability in Africa. It seems that France is changing its relations with Africa 
according to global developments and its political and economic interests, supporting 
hypothesis 3. It can be said that the evidence for this hypothesis is somewhat mixed.  
According to assumptions of realism, making a true strategic partnership between France and 
Africa is problematic because France is aiming to increase its economic interests and security 
concerns while cooperating with Africa. Liberal views stress that cooperation between Africa 
and France is essential to fight against the new global threats and challenges. Liberal values 
can reduce the possibility of uncertainty, therefore, spreading liberal principles in Africa is 
crucial for removing the possibility of conflict and wars. Conflicts and wars have also 
threatened France‟s economic interests on the African continent. After 2000, France began to 
play a more active role in African politics and supported liberal principles, starting to put more 
pressure on its former colonial African states to show respect for liberal ideals. There are three 
important factors affecting France‟s new foreign and security policy towards Africa. First, 
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conflicts and wars directly damage France‟s economic and political interests in Africa. 
Second, the new emerging actors such as India, Brazil, China and Turkey have begun to 
establish new strategic partnerships and increase their economic and political relations with 
African states and organisations. Third, dictatorial regimes have begun to lose their power in  
African states over the last decade. 
It is important to note that France is playing the greatest role in developing security 
cooperation between Africa and the EU. For example, it took a leading role in establishing the 
APF in 2004 to cement African organisations‟ security structures. Moreover, France played a 
leading role in an EU peacekeeping operation in Africa in 2003, named Artemis Operation in 
the DRC. France‟s increasing involvement in peace and security also confirms hypothesis 3. 
Based on the above, it can be said that France‟s economic and political relations with Africa 
have been one of the most important factors in evolving the Africa-EU SSP. While the EU set 
up an SSP with Africa, France is reinforcing its international position and also protecting its 
increasing economic interests. In particular, its economic relations have been increased with 
Africa, as shown in Table 3 (above). 
 
Even though France‟s security policy towards Africa has changed since 2000, due to its 
changing economic and international interests in Africa and in the world, it still does not take 
into consideration internal challenges of Africa, nor focus on resolving the continent‟s 
structural, economic or political problems. However, these threats of the new millennium 
have led French policymakers to recognise that security cooperation with Africa is the best 
way to protect France‟s economic and political interests.  
5.3 THE UK’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA  
Like France, the UK has strong economic, political, and historical ties with Africa, in 
particular with Anglophone African countries. The presence of a “Ministry for Africa” in the 
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is evidence of Britain‟s maintenance of robust 
historical and economic relations with the continent. Whilst France colonised 20 African 
countries in the region of West and Central Africa, the UK colonised a similar number in the 
region of West and sub-Saharan Africa. The UK does not have permanent military bases in 
Africa, however it has special military cooperation agreements with some strategic African 
countries, especially South Africa. 
There are many private British and government companies operating in over ten African 
countries, the largest being British Petroleum, Marconi, Lonrho, ICI, British Petroleum, 
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Unilever, and banks, such as Barclays and Standard Chartered. In addition, Britain
11
 has 
special economic, political and historical relations with South Africa, and the total rate of its 
exports and imports running at over 40 percent, making it one of the most important 
commercial partners for the UK in Africa and in the world (Ero, 2001:66). Africa has been a 
significant trade market for it, particularly South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Angola, 
Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia. Debt-relief and financial aid programmes are also among 
the most important strategies of British foreign policy to maintain the strength of its historical 
relations with Africa.  
It can be argued that the British security policy towards Africa has widened and deepened 
since 2000, but also that it has remained contradictory. The Blair government continued to 
sell weapons to Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and the Ivory Coast (Porteous, 
2005:295-6), and increased its military cooperation with the government of South Africa. 
Importantly, Britain has been actively involved in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone 
since 2000. The reasons for Britain‟s military involvement in this country are to protect the 
British economic interests and citizens and to protect the government of Sierra Leone (Ero, 
2001:56-7).  
The British government (2001:13-5) published a report entitled The Causes of Conflict in Sub-
Saharan Africa in March 2001, analysing and focusing on security challenges in Africa. The 
report significantly made a link between the British security policy towards Africa and 
dynamics affecting security on the continent. According to the report, conflicts and wars in 
Africa have causes that are “root”, “secondary”, and “tertiary.”  
The root causes are: (a) a wide gap between the rich and the poor, or inequalities between 
different groups or people; (b) the lack of strong political structures of the states that have 
caused conflicts and led to the emergence of corruption, ethnic conflicts, and weak political 
and civil institutions; (c) economic crises that have aggravated violence; (d) the legacy of 
colonialism that has a profound impact on conflicts; and (e) struggles for natural resources 
that have led to violence. The secondary causes are: (a) unemployment, lack of education and 
population pressure; (b) the abuse of ethnicity; and (c) availability of arms. The tertiary causes 
of conflicts are: (a) regional and interlocking conflicts; (b) the conflict cycle; (c) lack of 
guarantors for peace-making and peacekeeping; and (d) misplaced humanitarian assistance.  
                                                 
11
 See the detailed report for the UK‟s economic relations with Africa published by EUROSTAT, Revival of EU 
27 trade in goods with Africa, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010.  
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Meanwhile, the report (2001:22) states that the British security policy for Africa should focus 
on: (a) small arms and light weapon control; (b) encouraging investments and strengthening 
economic structure in conflict areas in Africa; (c) preventing the abuse of natural resources; 
(d) supporting development; (e) supporting security sector reform programmes; and (f) 
supporting the concept of African ownership through African regional and sub-regional 
organisations, and playing a more proactive role in international organisations for the interests 
of Africa. The importance of the report lay in its widening of the concept of security, 
particularly the British security policy towards Africa. It linked the British security policy 
towards Africa with social, economic, political, environmental, and physiological elements.  
Attacks on the London transport system on the 7
th
 of July 2005 strengthened a notion 
formulated after the 9\11 attacks on the USA that international terrorism was the greatest and 
most unpredictable threat to Britain‟s national interests. A post-9/11 and 7/7 assumption of 
neoliberal approach arose, based on interdependence between actors in combating a perceived 
common threat to the West and the rest of the world. The concept of strategic partnership 
became a strategic priority for the foreign affairs of Britain, which began to play a more 
proactive role in international organisations, including the EU, the UN, WB, and the IMF, in 
order to eradicate the roots of international terrorism. Attention focused on so-called “failed 
states”, conflicts, regional instabilities and organised crime in the world, in particular in 
Africa. Hence, the British security policy for Africa was defined in terms of international 
terrorism by British policymakers. Furthermore, the UK increased its relations with African 
regional and sub-regional organisations, especially with the AU, and sought solutions with 
them against international terrorist attacks. This is also providing evidence for hypothesis 3. 
The challenges of the twenty-first century have threatened Britain‟s economic and political 
interests in Africa. The SSP between Africa and the EU became crucial for protecting 
Britain‟s economic interests in Africa, in particular, and the EU‟s interests, in general. At the 
same time, the Africa-EU SSP has become a significant tool for the UK to combat 
international terrorism more effectively.  
5.4 GERMANY’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA  
Even though Germany hosted the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, which regulated European 
colonialism in Africa, it did not pursue an active foreign policy towards Africa until the end of 
the Cold War. Germany had not colonised as much land as had France and Britain, and its 
colonial states only included South West Africa (now Namibia), German East Africa (now 
divided as Tanzania, Rwanda, and Burundi), Togo, and Cameroon. During the colonial period 
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its policy was similar to that of other colonial powers in Africa. After the First World War, 
Germany lost its all colonies in Africa, but unlike the French and British security policies 
towards Africa  it could not maintain its economic and political relations with African states 
after the First World War, due to domestic developments in Germany, such as unification 
between East and West Germany. Nor did Germany have as strong political and economic 
interests in Africa as France or the UK. While the concept of continuity applies to French and 
British security policies for Africa, it is not applicable to the German one. As Golaszinski 
(2007:6) points out, Germany did not develop a consistent African strategy towards Africa, 
leaving its security policy for Africa inactive. 
Mair (1998:21) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union and unification of Germany in 
1989 had a significant impact on the German security policy towards Africa, however 
Germany‟s political relations with African countries remained limited, in proportion to its 
economic interests. For example, the total of Germany‟s imports and exports to the Sub-
Saharan African countries was less than 2 percent in the 1990s, and has not changed 
substantially since. Germany‟s exports and imports have been predominantly with South 
Africa and Nigeria, while the first priority of the German security policy for Africa had been 
to protect its own citizens in its old colonial African states. During the Rwandan genocide of 
1994, Germany did not play a proactive role in preventing it, and generally played a passive 
role in maintaining peace, security and stability in conflicts and wars in the Great Lakes 
Region. It can be said that German involvement in conflict prevention, resolution, and 
management was limited, and that political relations with African organisations were not solid 
(ibid., p.32).  
After the 1990s, Germany developed a wider security policy towards Africa, seeing the new 
threats after the end of the Cold War as including organised crime, money laundering, drug 
smuggling and conflicts (Hofmeier, 2002:59-62; Mair, 1998: 23-5). Importantly, the new 
security policy of Germany paid more attention to conflicts and wars in Africa, and 
underlined that conflicts can lead to the emergence of different kinds of challenges for the 
interests of Germany and Europe, including mass emigration into Europe (ibid., pp. 59-62; 
ibid., pp. 23-5). Another significant changing security perception of Germany towards Africa 
was that if inequalities between North and South widened too far, a new Cold War could 
emerge, giving rise to new international problems (ibid., pp. 59-62; ibid., pp. 23-5).  
Meanwhile, Germany has become one of the EU‟s largest donors to African countries. 
 82 
Golaszinski (2007:9) states that after 9\11, the thesis “without security no development, 
without development no security” became the first priority of the German foreign and security 
policy towards Africa. Germany has supported the concept of African ownership, seeing the 
establishment of the AU, NEPAD, and the APRM as strategic steps in sustaining peace, 
security, and stability in conflict areas. Since 2000, the German security policy towards Africa 
has widened, with it taking conceptual and practical leads, particularly against the above-
mentioned threats of the twenty-first century. The 2007 German G8 Presidency was a very 
important event for developing its relations with Africa, initiating a Peace and Security 
Programme (PSP) in Africa, the aims of which were to address the roots of conflicts in Africa, 
to strengthen African capacity-building, and to support Africa‟s peace and security structure. 
It contributed almost €30 million to this programme and to a G8 Africa programme of 2008. 
Germany has actively begun to engage in crisis management in Africa in recent years. For 
example, it participated in a EUFOR mission to provide peace and stability in the DRC in 
2006, in peace operations in Liberia and Western Sahara, and on the Ethiopian-Eritrean 
border, as well as supporting the Darfur peace process. It was also involved in the EU mission 
to maintain peace and security on the coast of Somalia. Meanwhile, it has started to play an 
active role in preventing conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. This supports  hypothesis 3. 
After the EU members adopted the ESS in 2003, members of the EU increased their security 
cooperation with African organisations. According to the ESS, the EU should strengthen its 
strategic partnerships with different actors, including African organisations, in order to 
disseminate its norms and values, sustain global peace and security, and keep its interests. It 
has been argued that there is mixed motivation behind the creation of the Africa-EU SSP.  
Germany‟s economic interest has recently increased relatively in Africa, as for example it 
became the largest exporter of conventional weapons to African states between 2003 and 
2006, with an amount of $900 million. Meanwhile, its total trade reached €33 billion in 2008. 
Exporting energy supplies to African states has been one of the most substantial commercial 
activities of Germany in recent years (Cargill, 2010:33), to which end, Angolan President 
Eduardo Dos Santos made an official visit in 2009. It can be said that security interests of 
Germany in Africa have changed and widened. According to German policymakers, conflicts 
in Africa have been seen as the most dangerous threat to Germany‟s  economic interests. 
Regional stability in Africa has been linked with economic interests of Germany. Despite 
Germany not playing a dynamic political role in Africa, its involvement has improved 
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streadily. In this regard, developing security cooperation with Africa has been vital for the 
pursuit of Germany‟s changing international interests. 
 
5.5 ITALY’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA  
Italy‟s historical relations with Africa date back to the 19
th
 century, when Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Eritrea, and Libya were its colonies, all of which were lost after World War II. It particularly 
had special relations with East Africa, one of the strategic regions in Africa and the world. 
Since the colonial era, and throughout the Cold War, international actors, including the USA, 
USSR, Britain, and France, played an active role in keeping their geo-economic and geo-
political interests in the region. The strategic significance of East Africa can be summarised as 
(a) a key region for the Middle East; and (b) a strategic gateway for the Red Sea, the Atlantic 
Ocean and the Mediterranean (Commission of the European Communities, 2006:5). Conflicts 
and wars have been a fate of this region since the post-independence era, with political and 
military tensions between the states. The border wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and 
conflicts in Somalia have been chronic, and have threatened the regional stability of Africa 
and international security. The legacy of colonialism has damaged political and economic 
stabilities in East Africa, particularly the artificial borders it created. For instance, Sudan and 
Ethiopia have claimed that part of Eritrea belongs to them, threatening further confrontation 
in the region. While the countries spend a large amount of money on weapons from 
industrialised countries, they have ignored other challenges.  
Italy‟s security policy towards Africa has been premised on its own political and economic 
interests, particularly in East Africa. It has changed dramatically in accord with historical 
events, such as the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 9/11 events, and the 2007 
economic crisis. Having been marginalised by Italy during the colonial period (Novati, 
2008:2), in the post-independence era the military regimes took over the governments and 
aggravated social, economic, and political stability (ibid., p.4). During the Cold War, the 
bipolar international structure exacerbated regional stability in the Horn (Negash, Papa & 
Taddia, 2003:14). Italy‟s foreign and security policy for East Africa has begun to change 
since the end of the Cold War, following the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the area, and 
it has developed a different security policy towards Africa in accord with the changing global 
politics. 
The Italian government has recognised that conflicts and wars have begun to threaten the 
historical interests of Italy, so Italy should play a leading role in preventing them as well as 
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those in other regions of Africa. Italy views this region as a “natural area of its own influence” 
(Novati, 2008:15-7), while trade relations with Africa have increased, to the point where it is 
the fourth largest commercial partner on the continent (Cargill, 2010:33).  
 
When the new threats in North Africa emerged in 2011, Italy was overly concerned because 
of its significant geo-economic and geo-political interests
12
 in the region. At the same time, 
Italy has faced serious emigration problems and threats of international terrorism surrounding 
conflicts occurred in this region. Italy‟s role in starting the Libyan War of 2011, with the 
coalition powers, was therefore significant. Italy played a pivotal role in maintaining peace, 
security, and stability in Africa during the 2009 G8 Italian Presidency, but its increasing 
involvement in Africa‟s peace and security in recent years has not gone beyond its pragmatic 
approach.  
5.6 PORTUGAL’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA  
Portugal is the oldest former colonial power and has been present in Africa for almost 500 
years. It was the first European power to colonise territories in Africa and also the last 
European colonial power to relinquish formal control over them. Its colonial possessions in 
Africa, namely Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and 
Angola, played a momentous role in developing the Portuguese economy, providing raw 
materials and a protected market for Portugal. Portugal‟s strong historical and economic ties 
with its former colonies in Africa have continued, and it is worth mentioning that when 
Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in 1975, bloody civil wars erupted there. 
The Angolan civil war of 1975 to 2002 was one of the longest and the most destructive of the 
Cold War, claiming the lives of 500,000 civilians and displacing four million. The civil war in 
Mozambique also lasted a long time, from 1977 to 1992, with almost 900,000 civilians being 
killed and five million people being displaced (Leitenberg, 2006:77).  
Angola has been the most strategic country for Portugal since colonisation, leaving many 
Portuguese private companies in this country, including Portugal Telecom, Mota-Engil, Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos (CGD), Santander Totta, Banco Português de Investimento (BPI), Banco 
Espírito Santo (BES), Millennium BCP, and Galp Energia. Almost 70,000 Portuguese 
citizens work in Angola, which is becoming the largest trading partner after the EU (Gorjao & 
                                                 
12
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/01/eu-arms-exports-libya#data. See also the Official 
Journal of the European Union, twelfth annual report according to article 8 (2) of Council common position 
2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment 
(2011/C 9/01), 13.1.2011, C 9/1, pg. 160-161. 
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Seabra, 2010:4). At the same time, Angola is an important country in terms of producing oil 
in Africa and in the world, being the eighth largest oil exporting country in the world and a 
member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) since 2007 
(Government of Angola, 2001:11-2). Despite also being one of the world‟s largest diamond 
producing countries, its social, economic, and political infrastructures, as with other African 
colonies of Portugal, remain vulnerable. Particularly, poverty is still the greatest problem of 
Mozambique and Angola, in spite of the natural richness of these countries. As with the other 
former European colonial powers, the Portuguese security policy in Africa has been related to 
protecting and increasing its own political and economic interests, rather than those of the 
African people (Coelho, 2002:129). 
The Portuguese security policy for Africa has widened since 2000, with two historic EU-
Africa summits held during the Portuguese presidencies of the Council of EU. The Portuguese 
security policy for Africa has included international terrorism, the principle of democracy, 
mass migration, conflicts, peace-building, and conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution. A “Joint EU-Africa Strategy” was accepted by the EU and Africa at the second 
Africa-EU Summit held in Portugal in 2007. This followed the first EU-Africa summit, in 
2000, which was a turning point for changing relations between Africa and EU, underlining 
that establishing a fair strategic partnership between Africa and the EU was necessary to 
develop social, economic, and political relations. It also highlighted that developing relations 
between African regional and sub-regional organisations and the EU was essential for 
sustaining peace, security, and stability in Africa. The second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon in 
2007 also broadened its security policy towards Africa. Especially, it paid much attention to 
the root causes of the conflicts and acknowledged that Africa‟s future was closely linked to 
that of the EU, particularly in matters of security. Such a belief would be promoted through 
seeing the EU becoming more actively engaged in maintaining peace and security in Africa.  
Portugal sees that it can play a more effective role through the EU, the UN, the WB, and the 
IMF in sustaining peace and security in conflict areas in Africa, more so than it could on its 
own. In this spirit, Portugal and Angola have begun to support each other at the international 
organisations, including the UN and the EU, in the fields of the maintenance of international 
peace and security. For instance, Portugal supported the Angolan candidacy to a non-
permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the 2003-2004 session. Likewise, Angola 
declared that it would support the Portuguese candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council during 2011-2012. Portugal‟s security policy for Africa is based on 
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pragmatism, but while the notion of an SSP between Africa and the EU has emerged during 
the Portuguese presidencies of the Council of the EU, it has not led to a genuine strategic 
partnership with Africa.  
5.7 BELGIUM’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA  
Belgium had three colonial countries in Africa, namely the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) (formerly the Republic of Zaire), the Republic of Rwanda, and Burundi. The 
“scramble for Africa” was led by Belgian King Leopold II, in a policy towards Africa that 
was racially punitive and brutal. Millions of people were killed in the DRC during the 
colonial period, leaving the Belgian colony with many challenges in its colonies, including 
political instabilities and racism. As with other colonial powers in Africa, Belgium also 
marginalised its colonies and artificially delineated many ethnic groups. After relinquishing 
all its colonies in Africa in 1962, the Kingdom of Belgium retained strong economic and 
political relations with the old colonies in Africa. In particular, Belgium has had a special 
relationship with the DRC, one of the world‟s richest countries in terms of natural resources.  
The root causes of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 go back to the brutal and racial policies of 
the Kingdom of Belgium, with Belgium dividing Rwanda into the two main ethnic groups, the 
Tutsis and the Hutus. Whereas the Tutsis had a privileged social and economic position, the 
Hutus lived in poor conditions in the country. Significantly, the Tutsis had protected the 
interests of the Kingdom of Belgium in the country during the colonial period. When the 
Rwandan genocide erupted in 1994, and nearly one million people were killed, the 
government of Belgium played no role in stopping it. Ethnic conflicts and political 
instabilities have remained the greatest challenges to the former colonies of Belgium in Africa 
and have continued to threaten the future of the DRC and Rwanda to this day. On the other 
hand, Belgium has changed elements of its foreign and security policy towards Africa since 
2003, supporting peacekeeping operations of African regional and sub-regional organisations.  
5.8 EVALUATION 
The concept of security in the twenty-first century has been transformed, and the new century 
has brought both opportunities and challenges. Whereas the nuclear threat was the main 
challenge for the world during the Cold War, today the content of security includes a number 
of new threats. Meanwhile,  the 9/11 attacks on the USA had an impact on the former colonial 
powers‟ security policies for Africa. International terrorism became a major concern for the 
EU, leading it to increase its strategic relations with Africa‟s regional and sub-regional 
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organisations so as to eliminate the roots of international terrorism. The new threats and 
challenges increased the significance of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, so 
the former colonial powers adjusted their security policies towards Africa after 2000 and built 
up collaboration with Africa in the fields of peace and security.  
Gradual EU integration in foreign affairs and security may have increasingly forced EU 
member states to be driven less by their own immediate interests (e.g., economic ones) and 
more by adaption of a collective perspective that explicitly takes other motivations into 
account (such as crisis prevention and human rights). It seems that external factors, such as 
the increasingly shared perspeption of a global terrorist threat, may have further enhanced the 
drive for the EU to act towards Africa and, with this, another rationale has been 
“superimposed” on the individual policies of EU states towards Africa.   
 
According to the realist approach, international politics are defined in terms of interests. 
Global actors tend to increase their own economic and political interests while developing 
cooperation. This chapter found that economic and political interests of the former European 
colonial countries have influenced security relations with Africa, the EU being its largest 
trading partner. Liberalism and constructivism also have predictions to apply for the Africa-
EU SSP. According to the liberal approach, a strategic partnership among the actors is crucial 
to combating the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century. In addition, cooperation 
between the actors can bring opportunities to increase economic and political relations. 
Importantly, a strategic partnership can be made easily with the states that share the same 
political culture.  
 
After 2000, the new global developments affected the former colonial powers‟ security 
policies towards Africa. In particular, conflicts and wars, international terrorism and 
immigration issues have threatened the EU members‟ economic and political interests on the 
African continent. The former Europan colonial powers began to support liberal values and 
put more pressure on African states to transform their political systems after 2000. In this 
regard, the Africa-EU SSP has been a strategic tool to foster cooperation between the two 
continents and to increase the EU‟s global power. According to constructivism, norms, 
historical relations and common identities can have a positive impact on developing relations 
between different actors. Deep historical relations between Africa and the former European 
colonial countries have led to the emergence of different cooperation fields, such as security 
partnership between the two continents.  
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This chapter has found evidence for and against hypotheses 2 and 3. It has been argued that 
the former European colonial powers have mixed aims from the establishment of the Africa-
EU SSP. Importantly, economic and political interests of the former European colonial 
countries in Africa has been playing a significant role in emerging security cooperation 
between Africa and the EU. However, new threats and challenges, such as international 
terrorism, immigration issues, drug trafficking, and conflicts and wars have forced the former 
EU colonial countries to initiate such cooperation with Africa. The EU‟s enlargement has also 
had an impact on the emergence of Africa-EU SSP. 
 
Chapter 6 will evaluate the EU‟s foreign and security policy towards Africa, and examine 
domestic and international factors influencing the EU‟s foreign and security policy towards 
Africa. In addition, it will highlight the driving forces affecting the Africa-EU SSP.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE EU’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the EU‟s security policy towards Africa and evaluate this in the 
light of the hypotheses. Other global actors in Africa, such as the USA, China, India, Brazil, 
and Turkey, have consolidated their political and economic relations with both African states 
and organisations. For instance, the USA imports 22 percent of oil from Africa, compared to 
17 percent from the Middle East (Cargill, 2010:20). However, the new changing global 
structure in Africa has influenced the EU‟s foreign and security policy in Africa. At the same 
time, the new challenges, for example international terrorism and immigration, also affected 
the EU‟s foreign and security policy in Africa. This chapter will particularly examine which 
factors impinge on the development of the Africa-EU SSP. 
6.2 THE EU’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA  
During the first Africa-EU Summit, the Cairo Declaration and the Cairo Plan of Action were 
accepted by both African and European leaders, and a wide range of issues were handled. In 
the Cairo Plan of Action, the EU‟s new security policy towards Africa focused on (a) peace-
building, conflict prevention, management and resolution; (b) post-conflict assistance and 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; (c) terrorism; (d) small arms and light 
weapons; (e) landmines; (f) proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (g) conflicts in Africa. The 
Summit played a significant role in changing the EU‟s foreign and security policy for Africa, 
and it was the first time the EU, inter alia, had dealt with security issues facing Africa. More 
importantly, it paved the way for the establishment of security cooperation between the 
continents.  
In addition, there are other foremost historical events that influence the EU‟s security policy 
towards Africa, namely the Cotonou Agreement and the European Security Strategy. As noted 
above, the Cotonou Agreement was signed between the EU and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP countries) in June 2000, in Cotonou, Benin, and contributed to 
the birth of SSP between Africa and the EU. Though the Agreement mainly focused on 
poverty reduction, economic and trade cooperation, and integration of the ACP countries into 
the global economy, its approach did not constitute an entirely comprehensive security policy 
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towards the ACP countries. It did have a limited security scope, for instance referring to 
peace-building policies of the EU, conflict prevention and resolution.  
In 2005 a revised Cotonou Agreement dealt with international cooperation against terrorism 
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), followed in 2010 by another 
revision that brought a different perspective to the EU‟s security policy towards the ACP 
countries, underlining the interdependence between security and development. However, for 
all its revisions, the Agreement developed a global security policy rather than one specific to 
Africa. Its most important feature was that the EU linked the security concept with 
international economic and trade cooperation within the ACP countries. Especially, the EU‟s 
limited security strategies towards the ACP countries demonstrate that the prevention of 
conflicts and wars, and sustaining peace and security in the ACP countries, have become 
important political concerns on the EU‟s agenda in the new millennium.  
In the history of the CFSP of the EU, 2003 was momentous in the progress of the CFSP, as 
the European Council adopted its first common “European Security Strategy” in December, in 
Brussels, under the responsibilities of the EU‟s High Representative for the CFSP, Javier 
Solana. The title of the ESS was “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, and identified the key 
threats facing the EU, defined its strategic goals, and established its political implications 
towards Europe. The ESS highlighted that: 
Europe still faces security threats and challenges… Security is a precondition of 
development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; 
it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity 
impossible… In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our 
security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The 
development of a stronger international society, well functioning international 
institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective. We are committed to 
upholding and developing International Law (European Council, the European 
Security Strategy, 2006:1-9). 
 
The EU acknowledges itself as a global actor, however in so doing it has some global 
responsibilities, the most essential of which is to play a proactive role in maintaining 
international peace, security, and stability. According to the ESS, the key threats facing the 
EU were terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised 
crime. The ESS clearly states that “no single country is able to tackle today‟s complex 
problems on its own”, and refers to “the internal and external aspects of security”, both of 
which are strongly related to each other and not divided. In this context, the EU‟s security 
policy towards Africa has occurred as an external aspect of security, and it has started to 
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change with the ESS, namely clarified security issues, the new global threats facing the EU, 
and the new security strategies.  
The strategic objectives of the EU were drawn up by the ESS to consolidate security with its 
neighbouring countries to establish an effective multilateral system. One of the most 
indispensable new security policies of the ESS was that the EU should strengthen its relations 
with international and regional organisations in order to play a more dynamic role in the 
maintenance of international peace, security, and stability. The ESS provides the momentum 
for the establishment of strategic partnership with Africa in the areas of peace and security, 
intended to: (a) strengthen its relations with African regional and sub-regional organisations 
in Africa; (b) deal with poverty reduction, the lack of good governance, and the root causes of 
the conflicts and wars in Africa; and (c) use economic, social, diplomatic and political 
instruments to effectively sustain peace and security in Africa. 
However, the EU failed to draw up a tangible security concept with the ESS, nor is it clear 
how a vague security concept of the EU will make a contribution to international peace and 
security, in particular that of Africa. It can be said that the EU does not have a strategic 
security culture, as evident in the divisions that occurred during the USA invasion of Iraq in 
2003 among member states, and even in the Libyan War of 2011, which weakened the CFSP. 
This was a reminder of how it had failed to end the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s. 
Though the adoption of the ESS by the European Council was a milestone in creating a 
common security culture among the members of the EU, it is questionable whether the ESS 
has the power to make an effective security policy for the EU towards Africa. 
The EU divided Africa into three categories, so as to make its security policies more effective: 
(1) the Maghreb countries, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt through the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004; (2) the countries in East Africa, including 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and Uganda through the Strategy for the 
Horn of Africa in 2006; and (3) special bilateral relations with South Africa through the EU-
South Africa Strategic Partnership in 2007. 
The emergence of the ENP was notable in building up a new security approach and an SSP 
towards the Maghreb countries. It was established in 2004 and consisted of 27 EU member 
states, and 16 EU neighbouring countries, including the Maghreb countries. The fundamental 
objective was to strengthen socio-economic and political relations with neighbouring 
countries. Essentially, the ENP underlines the three important concepts relating to the EU‟s 
relations with its neighbours, namely security, stability, and prosperity. It is also one of the 
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crucial foreign policy instruments of the EU within the CFSP. The ENP built up two 
important security policies towards the Maghreb countries, namely to reinforce cooperation 
among its countries to effectively combat the new security threats and challenges, and achieve 
more political involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management. This also highlights 
the consolidation of EU civil and military capabilities in playing an effective role in the 
countries of Maghreb and other neighbouring countries of the EU.  
According to liberal theory, conflicts and wars can damage political and economic stability 
and spreading norms and values can reinforce political and economic infrastructure. The EU 
aims to strengthen economic and political relations with North Africa and to spread its norms 
and values through the ENP. Significantly, the EU imports 14 percent of its oil and 20 percent 
of its natural gas from North Africa.
13
 Therefore, the EU is highly dependent on natural 
resources of the North African countries and the concept of economic interdependence plays a 
significant role in developing the EU‟s security policy towards North Africa. Some of the EU 
members had significant relations with the ousted leader  Libya Muammer Gaddafi, for 
example,  France, Italy, the UK, and Germany, which sold weapons to the value of €343.7 
million to Libya in 2009.
14
   
Making the ENP strong in North Africa is in the interest of the EU, but a weak ENP cannot 
protect the EU‟s economic interests. The EU‟s political relations with North Africa have 
increased since terrorist attacks on New York, Madrid and London. At the same time, 
immigration has been one of the greatest issues of the EU in relations with North Africa. 
Spreading the principles of liberalism and defining its security policy for North Africa in light 
of “terrorism and immigration” do not make the EU a safe continent. On the contrary, this 
aggravates the EU‟s identity problem and makes its security strategy and partnership with 
North Africa  complicate.  
The EU strategy for Africa was adopted by the European Commission in Brussels, in October 
2005, entitled “EU Strategy for Africa: towards a Europe-African pact to accelerate Africa’s 
development”, the first time the 25 EU member states had accepted a common strategy 
regarding Africa. The strategy identified the EU‟s comprehensive security policy objectives, 
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namely to (a) “develop a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention”, (b) “cooperate in 
addressing common security threats”, (c) “support African peace-support operations”, (d) 
“disarm to break the conflict cycle”, (e) “sustain peace in post-conflict situations”, and (f) 
“tackle conflict resources.” The EU‟s proposal to establish a strategic partnership with Africa 
in the EU Strategy for Africa became the most significant moment in creating the notion of 
the Africa-EU strategic partnership in the areas of peace and security. 
Peace and security have been the most crucial matters in the 2005 EU strategy for Africa, 
inspired by a speech from former General Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan, in which he said: 
“we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without 
development…” (UN, 2005:6). The EU paid more attention to the relations between security 
and development in the new EU strategy for Africa. The EU  mentioned that the world had 
changed, and with it the EU‟s interests, and the pace of globalisation. The EU‟s common 
interests have played a major role in creating its new strategy for Africa, as well as security 
cooperation.  
2005 turned out to be an important year for the EU to cement its social, economic, and 
political relations with Africa, as it followed the October strategy, with another in December. 
Under the banner “year of Africa”, the European Council adopting a strategic plan in Brussels 
entitled “the EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership.” Importantly, this strategy 
outlined the official frameworks of the EU‟s security policy towards Africa. Nonetheless, it 
was a short-term strategy, timetabled from 2005 and 2015, with attention paid to reinforcing 
ties with African regional and sub-regional organisations, in particular with the AU. It also 
asserted that consolidating relations with the African regional and sub-regional organisations 
would play the greatest role in reinforcing the Africa-EU SSP. This supports hypothesis 3. 
With regard to the EU‟s policy towards East Africa, the EU has a strong historical and 
economic relationship with the countries in East Africa, especially with its geo-strategic 
location in Africa and in the world. According to the Commission of the European 
Communities (2006:5):  
… a prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region is in the interests of the countries 
and peoples of both the Horn of Africa and the EU. However, an uncontrolled, 
politically neglected, economically marginalised and environmentally damaged Horn 
has the potential to undermine the region‟s and the EU‟s broad stability and 
development policy objectives and to pose a threat to European Union security.  
Thus, the EU adopted a regional strategy towards East Africa in Brussels in 2006, entitled 
“Strategy for Africa: an EU regional political partnership for peace, security and 
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development in the Horn of Africa.” Even though making a security policy for East Africa is a 
challenging task for the EU, for complex reasons that include conflicts and wars in the region, 
it has been necessary. Consequently, it has developed a special political relationship with the 
sub-regional organisation in East Africa, which is the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD). Conflicts and wars damage the EU‟s economic interests in East Africa. 
Liberal approach contends that international cooperation between the different actors is 
necessary to prevent conflicts or wars and strengthen political and economic development. 
However, the realist view rejects the assumptions of the liberal theory, and agrees that the 
global actors only concentrate on their own economic interests and security. The realist 
scholars believe that “the realist theory of international politics is the concept of interest 
defined in terms of power. Statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power” 
(Morgenthau, 1967:5). Conflict of interests in East Africa has weakened the development of 
an SSP between African organisations and the EU. Also, cooperation between the EU and the 
IGAD is not working effectively for complex reasons. Accordingly, realism has been playing 
a predominant role in the EU‟s security polices towards East Africa and the conflict of 
interests has weakened the development of the Africa-EU SSP in East Africa. While a strong 
SSP in East Africa can increase the EU‟s economic and political interests, a failed SSP can 
lead to the emergence of new threats and challenges for the EU‟s economic and political 
interests. 
The EU‟s relations with South Africa are also of great importance for the improvement of 
security policy towards Africa. South Africa has an influential role at regional and 
international levels in sustaining international peace, security, and stability and has played 
significant roles in the establishment of the AU and NEPAD. A non-permanent member of the 
UN Security Council during the period 2007-2008, it again became a candidate for the non-
permanent membership of the UN Security Council between 2011 and 2012. Meanwhile, it is 
a member of the group of the G20, is the largest trading partner in Africa and one of the most 
important trading partners for the EU in the world. According to liberal thought this will 
increase peace and security. Both the EU and South Africa have developed a common 
security perception, including countering international terrorism, stemming the proliferation 
of WMD, fighting organised crime, and taking measures to reduce drugs and human 
trafficking. Though the EU‟s main relations with South Africa are based on economic 
cooperation, in particular through the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
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(TDCA) signed in 1994 and effective in 2004, cooperation between the EU and South Africa 
in the fields of peace and security has increased in recent years. 
The EU member states changed their security policies towards South Africa in line with their 
changing economic and global interests after the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, since 
when the EU has increased political dialogue with South Africa and opened the way for a 
strategic partnership. On the 17
th
 of October 2006, the Council of the EU adopted the EU-
South Africa Strategic Partnership, underscoring the main objective as being to promote 
liberty, peace, security and stability in Africa and in the world (Council of the European 
Union, 2007a:2). The process of the EU-South Africa strategic partnership is a significant 
asset for the development of the EU‟s security policy towards Africa, and has significantly 
consolidated the Africa-EU SSP.  
The most remarkable step for establishing strategic partnership in the fields of peace and 
security was the second Africa-EU Summit, held in Lisbon, Portugal in December 2007. 
Although this historic summit was supposed to have been held in 2003, there was a delay due 
to the emergence of a deep political crisis between the European leaders regarding the 
invitation of Zimbabwe‟s president Mugabe. After the Cairo Summit in 2000, the African and 
European leaders decided that the Africa-EU Summits would be organised every three years. 
Seen as playing a role in reinforcing social, economic, and political relations between the two 
continents, they have helped the EU develop new policies and strategies towards Africa in a 
changing world. The Lisbon Declaration and the Joint EU-Africa Strategy and Action Plan 
were adopted by the Heads of State and Government of Africa and the EU at the second 
Africa-EU Summit in Lisbon. Disagreement between the EU members concerning the 
invitation of Zimbabwe‟s president Mugabe to the next summit  led to a postponement of the 
second Africa-EU Summit, proving that discrepancy among the EU members weakens the 
development of the Africa-EU strategic partnership on peace and security. This provides 
evidence for hypothesis 2.    
The new Africa-EU Strategic Partnership consists of four main areas, which are (a) peace and 
security; (b) governance and human rights; (c) trade and regional integration, and (d) key 
development issues (Council of the European Union, 2007b:5). Setting up the partnership has 
been the priority among the other partnerships at the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Action 
Plan. Both sets of leaders at the second Summit agreed that sustaining peace and security 
were essential for good governance, development of human rights, trade, and regional and 
global integration.  
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Security cooperation between the two continents was institutionalised with the second Africa-
EU Summit in Lisbon in 2007 and strategic concepts were born, including civil society, 
African ownership, mutual responsibility and accountability, mutual confidence, equality, 
justice, human security, non-discrimination, and solidarity. Both sides claimed that the new 
strategic concepts would play key roles, in particular in the fields of security. However, the 
new values or concepts that emerged at the second Africa-EU Summit in 2007 were not 
effective politically in making a difference to Africa‟s peace and security.  
In particular, the joint Africa-EU Strategy underscored the common security challenges facing 
Africa and the EU, and the concept of interdependence. The core of the EU‟s security policy 
towards Africa lay in the global security threats and challenges, rather than Africa‟s structural 
problems. According to liberal perspective, collaboration between the actors is essential to 
fight the new threats and challenges effectively and increase economic interdependence 
among the actors. At the second Africa-EU Summit, 2007, the African and the EU leaders 
particularly paid more attention to the common security challenges and the significance of 
economic interdependence. The joint Africa-EU Strategy underlines that: 
While today's global environment has opened up new opportunities to enhance 
international peace and security, it has also come with new security challenges, which in 
a world of increasing interdependence and close links between the internal and external 
aspects of security, only can be addressed through concerted international action, 
including in a UN context. Issues relating to transnational organised crime, international 
terrorism, mercenary activities, and human and drugs trafficking, as well as the illicit 
trade in natural resources, which are a major factor in triggering and spreading conflicts 
and undermining state structures, are of particular concern (Council of the European 
Union, 2007b:7).  
 
The third Africa-EU Summit was held in Tripoli, Libya in November, 2010, the aim of which 
was to strengthen strategic partnership between the two continents, however it did not bring a 
new approach regarding the EU‟s new security policy towards Africa. Historic summits 
between Africa and the EU should be held in stable and democratic African countries rather 
than unstable and undemocratic countries. Undemocratic regimes in Africa would not 
contribute to the development of a fair and genuine strategic partnership between Africa and 
the EU. Rather, they can only focus on their own political interests instead of African peoples‟ 
interests while holding international summits between the two continents.  
 
 97 
Libya has been one of the most substantial members of OPEC since 1962, producing around 
1.7 million barrels of oil per day
15
, which account for 3.9 percent of OPEC members‟ output. 
Europe receives more than 85 percent of Libya‟s oil, with Italy, France, Spain, Germany and 
the UK among the main importers.
16
 In 2009, Libya was the primary African country 
exporting to the EU.
17
 The Africa-EU summits play an important role in evolving the notion 
of security cooperation. The EU has actively involved in peace and security in Africa since 
2003. The 9/11 attacks on the USA and the ESS adopted by the European Council in 2003 
had a significant impact on the development of the EU‟s foreign and security policy towards 
Africa. According to the ESS, the EU should create new strategic partnerships with African 
states and organisations so as to spread its norms and values and play a more dynamic role in 
keeping peace and security. This is because conflicts, wars, terrorism, state failure and 
organised crime damage the EU‟s economic interests in Africa, directly or indirectly. The EU 
has deployed 10 peacekeeping operations in the different parts of Africa since 2003, as shown 
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 See, Facts on Libya: oil and gas published by International Energy Agency (IEA), 21 February 2011, p. 1. 
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 See, the report published by the EU, EU-Africa Summit Revival of EU 27 trade in goods with Africa in the 
first nine months of 2010, STAT/10/178, 26 November 2010, p. 4. 
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Table 4:  The EU civilian and military operations in Africa 
 
Siradag, 2009:129-130. 
The EU allocated €300 million for the AU missions in Sudan in 2005 and 2006. Even though 
the EU did not authorise a peacekeeping operation in Sudan, its financial and political support 
played a critical role in strengthening the AU peacekeeping operation in Sudan. The EU‟s 
largest peacekeeping operation in Africa has been deployed in Chad and the CAR in 2008 and 
2009 (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), for which it earmarked €299 million. Importantly, the EU 
deployed its own peacekeeping operation for the firtst time in Africa named “EU military 
mission (Operation Artemis) in the DRC.” The EU Security Sector Reform Mission 
contributed to sustaining peace and security in Guinea-Bissau in 2008-9. Four of the EU 
peacekeeping operations are still running on the continent of Africa, two in Somalia, the 
others in the DRC. This appears to support the claim that the Africa-EU SSP is not only 
driven by its own economic and material interests, but also by a wish to create and maintain 
peace and security.  
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6.3 INTERNAL FACTORS SHAPING THE EU’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS 
AFRICA  
Internal factors that form the EU‟s security policy towards Africa are political, economic and 
historical. 
6.3.1 Political factors 
Political developments in Europe have had a significant impact on the advance of the EU‟s 
external relations. Since the establishment of its forerunner in 1957, remarkable events in 
Europe have occurred and played consequential roles in changing its foreign and security 
policy. One of the most important political moments in its history was the Treaty of European 
Union (TEU), signed in Maastricht in 1993, which created the EU. The CFSP was also 
created, intended to allow the Union to speak with one voice on international affairs. The most 
fundamental principles of the Treaty were “to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the 
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter”, and “to promote 
international cooperation.” The TEU was a strategic step in creating the EU‟s global policies 
and increasing its international role.  
The European Security Strategy highlighted that “Europe should be ready to share the 
responsibility for global security and in building a better world”. In this context, its common 
security strategy provided impetus to developing a global vision for the EU, in particular in 
the fields of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Since 2003, the EU has begun 
to take more responsibility for Africa, for instance deploying its first peacekeeping operation 
in the DRC in 2003, without support from NATO. It also amplified its political engagement in 
African regional and sub-regional organisations. As a result, changing political dynamics in 
Europe have had a momentous impact on the birth of security cooperation between Africa and 
the EU.  
6.3.2 Economic factors 
As discussed in Chapter 5, in more detail, each former European power has different 
economic interests with African countries, in particular the United Kingdom and France. 
Since the post-independence era, the EU has continued to pursue its economic interests in 
Africa through diplomatic means, such as bilateral agreements, conventions and summits. 
Since the signing of the first Yaoundé Convention in 1963, between the African states and the 
EC\EU, the EU‟s economic interests have been the priority in Africa, which is its largest 
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trading. The 2005 EU Strategy for Africa (2005:2) stated that the EU was still highly 
dependent on Africa‟s natural resources, for instance importing 85 percent of its vegetables, 
fruits, and cotton from the continent, making it the largest  trading partner for Africa 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006:5). 
The EU applied great pressure to African countries to sign the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs), to create a free trade area (FTA) between the EU and the ACP group of 
states, during the third Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli in 2010. This was in spite of the 
structural problems of many African countries remaining unsolved, and was symptomatic of 
the EU‟s contradictory policy towards Africa. The EPAs reflected the EU‟s inclusive 
economic interests with the African countries, and their pressure to sign them shows that 
economic relations between Africa and the EU remain critical to the EU‟s agenda. The notion 
of economic interdependence is of critical importance in improving the EU‟s relations with 
Africa. Liberalism posits that economic interdependence can increase prosperity among the 
states. However, the question of who gains more from this remains doubtful. Even though a 
new chapter was opened between Africa and the EU with the first historic Africa-EU Summit 
in Cairo in 2000, economic relations have been the most substantial item on the EU‟s agenda. 
Realism claims that though the global actors cooperate with weak actors, they focus on their 
own economic interests. As a result, the predictions of realism are applicable to shaping the 
EU‟s relations with Africa, in particular economic. Table 5 (below) shows that the EU has 
increased its trade volume since 2006 with Africa. While the EU‟s exports to Africa in 2006 
were 115,149 million dollars, they increased to 175,120 million dollars in 2008. However, the 
global economic crisis of 2007 has affected the EU‟s economic relations with Africa,  for 
example, its exports and imports to Africa dropping in 2009. While the EU‟s imports to 
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Table 5:   European Union’s overall trade with Africa (2006-2008) (in million  dollars)  
 
 
                                                       Exports                                                       Imports 
                                            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                              2006               2007             2008               2006                2007          2008                        
                                    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 EU (27)                              115,149         140,908        175,120          158,828            178,083      231,681  
 Africa excl. South Africa   90,137           112,822        145,224          135,213            149,378     198,807  
 Sub-Saharan Africa           62,490            75,444          89,579            67,198              79,074       100,766  
 Sub-Saharan Africa           37,478            47,358          59,683            43,583              50,369        67,892    
 excl. South Africa 
 South Africa                      25,012            28,086          29,896             23,615              28,705       32,874  
 
 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009  
 
6.3.3 Historical factors 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, in more detail, historical factors play a significant role in 
developing social, economic, and political relations between different countries or regions. 
The assumptions of constructivism are meaningful in this regard, holding that historical 
relations, ideas, images and shared knowledge can play pivotal roles in preserving 
international peace, security, and stability. However, the main challenge in improving social, 
economic, and political relations between Africa and the EU is its past. The EU does not have 
a positive image in Africa due to the brutal colonial history of some of its key members. 
Therefore, its history in Africa creates a physiological barrier to the development of a wide 
range of opportunities for both sides, especially the establishment of a genuine strategic 
partnership. Nor have the EU‟s economic interests in Africa primarily served the interests of 
Africa‟s people. 
The EU has begun to play a proactive role in keeping peace and security in Africa since 2000, 
in particular through the AU, NEPAD and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). 
Internal and external factors have affected the development of the EU‟s security policy 
towards Africa. For instance, international terrorism, immigration, organised crime, drug 
trafficking, conflicts and wars forced the EU members to take on more global responsibilites  
to fight against these threats and challenges. Particularly, conflicts and wars damage the EU‟s 
economic and political interests in conflict areas. Political developments in Europe have also 
had an impact on it, such as gradual EU integration in foreign affairs and security, which 
provided energy to strengthen the EU‟s security policy and to speak with one voice on 
international issues. It should be underlined that the adoption of the ESS by the European 
Council in 2003 was also important in presenting an influencial EU‟s security policy to 
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international observers. According to the ESS, the EU should strengthen its institutional ties 
with African organisations in order to keep peace and security and to spread its norms and 
values. To this end, the EU established the African Peace Facility (APF) in 2004 to sustain 
peace, security, and stability in the conflict zones of Africa, and deployed peacekeeping forces 
in the DRC, Chad and the Central African Republic. This supports hypotheses 3 and 4. The 
EU‟s initiatives were also related to its strong historical ties with Africa, encapsulating the 
significance of developing social, economic, and political relations between Africa and the 
EU, and playing an important role in creating the notion of strategic partnership in the areas of 
peace and security.  
6.4 EXTERNAL FACTORS SHAPING THE EU’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS 
AFRICA 
External factors that impinge on the EU‟s security policy towards Africa consist of the new 
emerging global actors in Africa; their role; the emergence of a new political climate in 
Africa; the 9\11 terrorist attacks on the USA; and globalisation. 
6.4.1 The new emerging global actors in Africa  
The new actors have actively strengthened their economic and political relations with both 
African governments and African organisations, such as with the AU, NEPAD, and the 
IGAD. Firstly, Africa is of great strategic importance to China‟s economic interests, with the 
latter importing 26 percent of its oil from Africa, with whom its total trade reached $72 billion 
in 2007, and $100 billion in 2008 (Alden & Alves, 2009:3-4). Though China‟s total trade with 
Africa decreased to $91.07 billion in 2009, because of the global economic crisis, it remained 





India has also increased its commercial ties with the African states. Whereas India‟s total trade 
with Africa was $25 billion in 2006-7, it was almost $45 billion in 2010 (Voll, 2010:7). 
Brazil‟s trading relations with Africa have also boomed significantly in recent years, the trade 
volume reaching $26 billion in 2008. While its imports from Africa increased to 39 percent in 
2007-8, its exports only increased to 18 percent in the same period (Trade Law Centre for 
Southern Africa, 2010:1). While Turkey‟s total trade with Africa was $16 billion in 2008, it 
reached $30 billion in 2010. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its political and economic 
relations with Africa since 2005, opening 15 new embassies in 2010, to reach the current total 
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of 27 (Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit, 2008:1-3). Turkey also announced 2005 as a “year 
of Africa” and set up a strategic partnership with the continent of Africa.  
Political instabilities in Turkey influence the development of the country‟s foreign and 
security policy towards Africa. For example, even though Turkey adopted its first policy 
towards Africa in 1998, entitled the “African Opening Action Plan of 1998”, the plan could 
not be implemented successfully because a coalition government, which destabilised 
economic and political growth in the country, was in power at that time. Since the ruling 
Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power in 2002, it has established new strategic 
partnerships with African states and organisations to make contributions to international peace 
and security and to increase economic relations with Africa. It can be said that political 
stability in Turkey has played a key role in developing economic and political relations with 
different regions and continents.  
The appearance of the new global actors in Africa, especially China, India, Brazil, and 
Turkey, has had an extensive impact on the global powers‟ foreign and security policies 
towards Africa. The new actors‟ engagement in Africa has particularly impinged on three 
important areas: (1) political relations between African states and the global actors; (2) 
economic relations between African states and the global actors; and (3) relations between the 
African regional organisations and the global actors. 
According to realism, the global actors aim to increase their own economic interests and their 
hegemonic power in the world politics. The roles of the new global actors in Africa have had a 
great impact on the changing of the EU‟s security policy. In particular, their increasing 
economic relations with the African states have affected the EU‟s traditional foreign policy in 
Africa substantially. The EU attached more value to the principles of liberalism with the 
changing political atmosphere on the African continent. In particular, the concept of strategic 
partnership became more important to the EU‟s foreign policy in Africa. As a result of the 
new conjectural structure, the EU has started to reinforce its institutional relations with the 
African organisations after 2000, including the AU, the ECOWAS, the IGAD, and the SADC. 
Hypothesis 5: “The EU aims to protect its material interests against the new emerging global 
actors in Africa, such as China, India and Brazil and increase its international power in world 
politics by creating an Africa-EU SSP.” The EU seems to have created different strategic 
partnership models to consolidate its economic, political, and historical relations with the 
continent of Africa against the continent‟s new emerging global actors. In this case, strategic 
partnership in the fields of peace and security was established between the two continents in 
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2007. This strengthens hypothesis 5. The EU established an SSP not only to increase its global 
power but also to keep its interests, to create new strategic partners, and to sustain peace and 
security. Therefore, there are different motivations behind the Africa-EU SSP, albeit economic 
and political interests have been the most important factors and elements driving it.      
6.4.2 The role of the global actors in Africa  
The role of the global actors, in particular the USA, Russia and Japan, has affected political 
and economic developments in Africa and in the world. These three countries have strong 
historical, economic, and political relations with the countries of Africa, therefore, they play a 
vigorous role in reinforcing the African regional organisations and security fields. For 
example, the USA established “the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM or 
AFRICOM)” in October 2007, with the aim of strengthening security cooperation between 
itself and Africa, and to address together the new challenges and opportunities (Ploch, 
2010:16). Most importantly, the USA imports 22 percent of its oil from Africa, and it has been 
estimated to reach up to 26 percent by 2015 (Cargill, 2010:20). According to a report 
published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), conflicts and wars have threatened 
global security and US strategic interests, therefore it should play an active role in keeping 
peace, security, and stability in the conflict areas.  
Likewise, Russia has recently consolidated its political and economic relations with Africa. In 
June 2009, the Russian president, Dimity Medvedev, made an historic visit to Egypt, Nigeria, 
Namibia, and Angola, during which political and economic relations were strengthened. 
Particularly, Russia‟s high technological power plays a significant role in relations with the 
African countries, in, for example, an important agreement with the Angolan National System 
of Satellite Communications and Broadcasting (ANGOSAT). The most important Russian 
companies operating in Africa are Gazprom, Lukoil, Rusal, Sintez, Alrosa, Renkova, Rosatom. 
In addition, Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, plays a pivotal role 
in the UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. 
Japan, meanwhile, as a member of the G8 group also has solid ties with Africa, firstly keeping 
its political relations in order to get their support for a non-permanent membership of the UN 
Security Council. Secondly, it hosts the Africa-Japan Forum every five years and has opened 
new embassies in recent years in Africa, including Botswana and Mali. Thirdly, it is greatly 
dependent on outside raw materials, including oil, gas, and metals, of which it sees Africa as a 
significant source (Cargill, 29:2010). The creation of the SSP not only consolidated the EU‟s 
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institutional relations with the African organisations, but it is likely also to have enhanced its 
global power amongst the global actors.  
6.4.3 The emergence of a new political climate in Africa 
According to structural realism, self-help and lack of international government cause conflicts 
and wars, therefore each state needs to arm and strengthen its military power in such a chaotic 
atmosphere. As noted above, with the end of the Cold War, the bipolar international system 
collapsed, to be replaced by a multipolar global system. In particular, the significance of 
multilateral diplomacy in world politics increased. After the Cold War, the principles of 
liberalism became fashionable not only in Europe but also in the rest of the world, including 
Africa. Many African countries changed their political systems and transformed to democracy 
from their authoritarian regimes. Hypothesis 4: “The EU aims to spread its norms and values 
in Africa through the SSP.” It can be said that one of the aims of the Africa-EU SSP is to 
enhance universal norms and values in Africa, because the lack of good governance and 
democracy threatens political and economic stability and the EU‟s interests in Africa. This 
supports hypothesis 4.  
Since 1990, integration movements have increased among the African nations, and more 
importantly, democratic movements have spread over the continent. After 2000, many African 
states were transformed from an authoritarian system to a multiparty system. In addition, the 
concepts of democracy, human rights, rule of law, civil society, and transparency have 
become popular in recent years in Africa. Significantly, the appearance of the new regional 
organisations in Africa, such as the AU and NEPAD, has brought hope to Africa that it can 
resolve its structural problems. The significance of the concept of ownership, solidarity, and 
regional integration has also increased under the new regional organisations in Africa. With 
the birth of the AU and NEPAD, the African leaders have begun to play more dynamic roles 
in resolving their common threats and challenges and creating new opportunities. For instance, 
the AU deployed peacekeeping operations in Burundi 2003, in Sudan 2004, and in Somalia in 
2005. Meanwhile, it has also reinforced its political relations with international organisations 
and global institutions and powers, such as with the UN, the WB, the USA and the EU. The 
new changing political climate in Africa has also influenced the global actors‟ traditional 
foreign and security policies towards the continent. The EU has developed its relations with 
the AU and the RECs, and the new political developments on the continent of Africa have had 
a remarkable impact on the emergence of the Africa-EU SSP.  
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6.4.4 The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States 
Countering international terrorism has been one of the most important matters for the 
international organisations and states since 2000. In particular, the 9\11 attacks on the USA 
provided Bush and his corporate interests with an opportunity to heighten and capitalise on 
increased security concerns in the world. The terrorist attack was a significant moment for 
world history, changing some traditional security approaches of the global powers. New 
dimensions of the concept of security have appeared and international organisations have 
become vital to remove the roots of international terrorism. While poverty, injustice, 
inequality, and discrimination have incited terrorism, so the concept of security has come to 




 of March 2004, international terrorists attacked Madrid, Spain, then on the 7
th
 of 
July 2005, London was bombed. The UN Security Council (2001:3) highlighted that without 
international cooperation, international terrorism could not be removed. At the same time, 
international organisations and global powers, including the UN, the EU, the AU, Japan, 
Canada and the USA, paid more attention to conflicts and wars in Africa. They reported that 
these had created many security challenges and threats for world security, such as 
international terrorism, drug and human being trafficking, political, economic instabilities, 
immigration and poverty. These threats and challenges threaten not only Africa‟s security but 
also international security.  
One of the most important reasons behind the birth of the Africa-EU SSP appears to be  
fighting against international terrorism and the removal of its root causes. International 
terrorism is one of the most substantial complex global challenges of the new millennium, 
both unpredictable and incapable of being defeated by one country alone. Therefore, 
international cooperation appears to be necessary for international organisations and states 
wishing to combat it. In particular, working with weak states and organisations has become 
crucial, also because undeveloped countries have potential to create many security problems 
for themselves and for the world. Hypothesis 1 is “mutual interests lead to the emergence of 
security cooperation between Africa and the EU.” The 9/11 attacks on the USA paved the way 
for the establishment of the Africa-EU SSP. International terrorism damages economic and 
political development of both African states and EU members. The idea of combating 
international terrorism played a significant role in the emerging  SSP with Africa, thus 
confirming hypothesis 1. Meanwhile, hypothesis 6 states: “Power imbalance makes 
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cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the SSP.” New threats 
and challenges of the twenty-first century, such as international terrorism, necessitated an SSP 
between African organisations and the EU, despite a power imbalance between the two actors. 
This provides evidence against hypothesis 6.  
6.4.5 Globalisation  
While globalisation provides many opportunities, such as social, economic and technological 
advances among states, it also creates many threats and challenges for the world. According to 
Karacasulu (2006:2), globalisation is an “integration of economic, social, and cultural 
relations across borders”, while for Keohane and Nye (2000:105) it is a “type of 
interdependence.” A recent example of the substantial new challenges facing the globalised 
world was the global economic crisis of 2007. Even though it started in the USA, it affected 
the entire world in a short time, and has had a profound economic impact on the world 
economic system, especially in Europe. For instance, Greece, Spain, the UK, Italy, and 
Portugal were among the European countries most affected by the global economic crisis of 
2007, which, combined with indiscipline in their economic systems, contributed to serious 
recession  in some. Hypothesis 9 in this study is “globalisation has induced incentives for EU-
Africa cooperation / the SSP.” The emergence of security cooperation between Africa and the 
EU is a crucial strategy in fighting the new global threats and challenges, and creating new 
opportunities for cooperation between the two continents. This strengthens hypothesis 9. It 
should be underlined that social, economic, political and technological developments affect 
the states easily and quickly in a globalised world.  
6.5 EVALUATION 
Realist thought stresses that creating a genuine international cooperation is difficult because 
global actors tend to increase their strategic importance while cooperating with weak actors in 
world politics. Global actors also focus on their own security concerns and economic 
interests. According to liberal views, actors can benefit equally from international 
cooperation. However, realism claims that actors do not benefit equally from a strategic 
partnership because global actors uses weak ones for the sake of their own economic and 
political interests. In this study, hypothesis 5 is “the EU aims to protect its material interests 
against the new emerging global actors in Africa, such as China, India and Brazil and increase 
its international power in world politics by creating an Africa-EU SSP.” This is partially 
confirmed by evidence presented above. 
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China is the fastest growing economy in the world, and has been making deep inroads into 
African markets, as well as reinforcing economic and political engagement in African 
countries and organisations. Other actors have also strengthened their political and economic 
relations with Africa, as this chapter explored. This can be a jeopardy for the interests of the 
EU on the continent of Africa, with its deep historical and economic ties. Africa is a key 
trading partner for the EU. There are internal and external factors that influence the EU‟s 
security policy. As an external factor, new global challenges damage the interests of the EU in 
Africa, but strengthen the notion of international cooperation. The Africa-EU strategic 
partnership on security matters can also be seen as a strategy to make clearer the threats 
facing the EU. It is a strategic investment for the future of the EU, and a project for predicting 
the future prospects, threats, and opportunities. The current strategic position of the EU may 
lead to the emergence of the establishment of security cooperation between Africa and the 
EU, but a strong political will is necessary for creating a strong strategic partnership between 
the two. 
 
As an important global actor, the EU has also deployed 10 peacekeeping operations in Africa 
since 2003, four of which are still operating in Africa. Especially, the EU peacekeeping 
operations on the African continent demonstrated that the EU remains an important strategic 
actor, despite the new emerging global actors in Africa. At the same time, conflicts, wars, 
political and economic instability can weaken economic interests. In addition, international 
cooperation is necessary for combating international terrorism, immigration issues and climate 
change. Hypothesis 1 is “mutual interests lead to the emergence of security cooperation 
between Africa and the EU.” Fighting against international terrorism, immigration problems, 
and drug trafficking has become the most important security concern for the EU members in 
recent years. This chapter argues that the EU has also attempted to create a strategic 
partnership with Africa in the fields of peace and security because, without cooperation with 
weak actors, it is impossible to remove new global threats. In this sense, hypothesis 1 is 
largely confirmed. 
This chapter discussed four important factors influencing the creation of Africa-EU SSP. The 
first and the most important is that the EU has significant economic and political relations 
with Africa, so it develops influential strategies to keep its interests. The second is that the EU 
aims to tackle unpredictable challenges more effectively. The third is that the EU wishes to 
play a more active role in maintaining international peace and security. The fourth is that the 
enlargement of the EU has forced it to increase its global responsibility. Importantly, external 
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threats, such as international terrorism, immigration issues, conflicts and wars, and political 
developments in Europe, have shaped the  pattern of cooperation between Africa and the EU 
on peace and security. Security cooperation between the AU and the EU during the Darfur 
conflict is an example of this pattern of cooperation between the two global actors. 
The next chapter will investigate challenges and prospects influencing security in Africa. It 
will discuss how challenges affecting security in Africa will shape the current SSP between 










This chapter critically analyses internal and external factors influencing security in Africa, the 
understanding of which is vital for answering the question of how Africa will play a pivotal 
role in establishing a successful SSP with the EU. Social, economic, and political factors have 
been affecting peace and security. In particular, internal problems not only weaken socio-
economic and political stability, but also undermine the international power of the continent. 
In this sense, there is link between internal and external developments. Whereas an actor 
facing internal challenges cannot contribute to world peace and security, another actor that 
solved its internal problems can play a leading role in the maintenance of international 
security.  
7.2 THE COLONIAL LEGACY  
Europe has deep historical relations with Africa, with social, economic and political interests 
dating back to the 15
th
 century. The colonisation of Africa created a complex relationship 
between the two continents, the legacy of which has continued to have a profound impact 
upon Africa‟s social, economic and political fabrics, in particular security. The systematic 
colonisation of Africa started with the Berlin conference in 1884-5, in which the UK, France, 
Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and Spain emerged as major European colonial powers 
(Gedlu, 2007:298-302), but which for Africa were "traumatic changes" in its history 
(Mohammed, 1985:69-73). The importance of this conference was that the European colonial 
powers together made an official plan to divide Africa and started on a journey to colonise it. 
The main character of the European colonisation in Africa was based on the exploitation of 
African national resources and manpower (Gedlu, 2007:302). Horvath (1972:46) depicts 
colonialism as “a form of domination and exploitation - the control by individuals or groups 
over the territory and/or behaviour of other individuals or groups.”  
Colonial states established their own social, economic and political systems to gain social, 
economic, and political hegemony over Africa. The colonial powers divided Africa without 
regard for ethnic territories or groups, and created artificial states, boundaries and ethnic 
divisions to strengthen their self-centred colonial policies (Boahen, 1996:310; Throup, 
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1995:238). According to Throup
20
 (1995:242), the most destructive colonial legacy was the 
creation of the artificial African states (Rodney, 1995:297-8). Ethnic conflicts remain one of 
the most dangerous threats for socio-economic and political developments in Africa, with 
many states affected by them, including Somalia, Sudan, the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, and 
Burundi. Stopping ethnic divisions and strengthening social, economic and political unity 
within the states is a prerequisite for building up genuine security cooperation between Africa 
and the EU.  
The colonial powers did not develop the notion of democracy or sustainable democratic 
institutions in order to increase the interests of African people during the colonial period, and 
as a result the legacy is one of a complex string of social, economic, and political variations 
that emerged in the post-independence era (Thomson, 2000:13-14). From a theoretical point 
of view, neo-liberal institutional theory holds that setting up democratic institutions is 
indispensable for establishing a strong strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, but 
while the EU has a strong democratic structure, Africa does not. The neo-liberal institutional 
view may not be applicable to the SSP between Africa and the EU. Colonialism made 
Africa‟s political structure weak and fragile, and the EU‟s colonial history has thus been the 
greatest barrier to achieving genuine cooperation in the fields of peace and security with 
Africa. This supports hypothesis 7, i.e. “the lack of a common African identity and African 
internal challenges undermine the success of the SSP.”  
From a different point of view, the apartheid regime is also seen as a different form of 
colonialism (Moleah, 1993: XI). Appearing in South Africa in 1948, until it ended in 1994, it 
provided for the minority, the whites, who made up less than 17 percent of the population. 
Concentrated social, economic, and political power was vested in the white minority, while 
the majority black population lived in very poor conditions. As Landsberg (2004:19) 
emphasises, the regime deliberately created deep inequality between white and black, and did 
little to alleviate poverty, both of which conditions are still felt intensively today. The rate of 
unemployment in the country is still high and poverty remains the greatest issue. 
“Xenophobic” attacks threatened social and economic development, in particular in May of 
2008, in which 62 people were killed (Mail & Guardian, 31 May 2008). The ostensible 
motives were given as resentment against an influx of black African migrants who were 
undercutting wages, though this cannot be seen as isolated from the unemployment, poverty 
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and inequalities between white and black created during apartheid. The legacy of colonialism 
in Africa is still fresh, and this includes elements of apartheid.  
It is most likely that the impact of colonialism in Africa will continue as long as the European 
countries preserve their own pragmatic policies, which in turn will undoubtedly undermine 
the development of the notion of SSP between the continents, but the EU also seems to 
increase its commitment to create peace and peace. Building peace and security in Africa 
necessitates social, economic, and political stability. Meanwhile, building security 
cooperation between  Africa and the EU also obliges social, economic and political stability. 
The challenge for Africa, with its legacy of colonialism, manifests itself in poor security, and 
negative socio-economic and political development.     
7.3 POLITICAL PROBLEMS  
Over the last decade, African leaders have taken substantial political steps in sustaining peace 
and security. For instance, remarkable political and strategic moments for the development of 
Africa include the creation of the AU and the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD); democratic transitions in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe; the birth and the 
reinforcement of the concept of African ownership; and active multi-dimensional foreign 
policies of the regional and sub-regional organisations with the international community. 
However, many challenges continue to threaten the future and security of Africa, including 
poverty, corruption, infectious epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, conflicts, terrorist attacks, poor 
infrastructure, high unemployment rates, wide gaps between rich and poor and events in 
North Africa. Political conditions in Africa are still delicate and directly influence security. 
Understanding the political dilemma in Africa is indeed challenging because there are many 
factors that affect development, including leadership, the impact of colonialism and the Cold 
War era, and the interests of international actors. 
Tordoff (2002:40-1) and Falola (2003:XXVIII) point out that the colonial legacy still has a 
negative impact on political development, in particular the increased interdependence between 
Africa and Europe. The concept of interdependence in this case refers to unequal relations and 
gains between the two continents, with benefits to Europe at the expense of Africa. Many 
African leaders continue to be dependent on their countries‟ former colonial powers, thus 
inhibiting the birth and development of independent African-centred policies. Arbitrary states 
and boundaries created social and economic problems, but most importantly, long-term 
political challenges for Africa. For example, the colonial system shattered political stability in 
Somalia, where five different sovereign states emerged, including British Somaliland, Italian 
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Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopia and Kenya. Likewise, Burkina Faso was divided 
into 21 ethnic groups during the colonial period and Tanzania was divided to more than 200 
ethnic groupings. In particular, the colonial legacy left two destructive inheritances for 
African politics, the first of which was ethnic and political division, the second irredentism 
(ibid., p.13), described by Thomson (2000:13) as “the desire to unite under one flag a 
community that is currently divided.” For example, Somalia waged a war with Ethiopia to 
control the province of Ogaden in the 1970s, resulting in many deaths and political crises that 
devastated the country (ibid., pp.12-13). 
Geo-economic and political interests of the international actors, such as China, India, Brazil, 
the former European colonial powers, and the USA, have played a significant role in Africa‟s 
politics, particularly in the geo-strategic and geo-economic arena during the Cold War. The 
ideological struggle between nuclear superpowers, the USA and USSR, between 1945 and 
1989-91, polarised the world between communism and capitalism, and deepened the political 
divisions in Africa, which are “still profound and mixed” (Nwauwa, 2003:18), following intra 
and inter-state wars that devastated the political stability. During the Cold War era, 6.5 
million African people died from conflicts and wars, including those between Ethiopia and 
Somalia, and others in Eritrea, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia and South Africa‟s destabilising 
policy towards Mozambique, Angola and, Namibia. The Cold War marginalised Africa‟s 
politics and weakened its political institutions (ibid., pp.18-9). 
Both the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War aggravated the political stability and 
security Africa. The dictators in Africa have undermined not only political stability but also 
socio-economic stability, leaving the people they are supposed to have lead in extreme 
poverty and suffering. Superpowers developed strategies according to their own economic 
and political interests, and thus indirectly strengthened the dictatorship system. For example, 
France supported a dictatorial political system in Gabon; the USA reinforced and supported 
dictators in Zaire (now the DRC); and the USSR and China supported a dictatorial structure in 
Ethiopia, Burundi and Angola (Falola, 2003:XXVIII-XXIX). At the same time, arms and drug 
trafficking increased, further weakening the political stability (Falola, 2003:XXVIII; 
Nwauwa, 2003:16). 
Military coups d'état in Africa are also amongst the greatest obstacles for maintaining political 
stability and security. It is important to note that domestic and international factors have 
played a tactical role in emerging military coups in Africa, with 71 between 1952 and 1990. 
Thomson (2000:123) defines a military coup d'état as a “sudden illegal displacement of 
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government in which members of the security forces play a prominent role”, of which 60 
percent of African states have been affected. Even though the period of the Cold War ended in 
1990s, important actors within the EU, such as France, the UK, and Italy have pursued their 
traditional foreign and security policy towards Africa. For instance, they reinforced the ousted 
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and sold weapons to him
21
. The dictators and military coups 
in Africa also prevent the emergence of democratically elected leaders and render security 
cooperation with the EU more difficult. 
Since the end of the Cold War, however, there have been signs of optimism. The former 
president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki‟s reference in 1998 in Johannesburg to an “African 
renaissance” drew a great deal of attention to the leadership problem in Africa, with emphasis 
on the leadership problem behind the challenges of Africa, such as conflicts, wars and 
corruption. It was seen as necessary that Africa create its own leaders, who would only work 
for the interests of African people. The establishment of the AU in 2002 was another historic 
moment for socio-economic and political development of Africa, as it has strengthened the 
notion of African ownership as well as leadership. The establishment of the AU called on the 
continent to unite the divided states and resolve issues under an effective leadership. 
However, the new developments in North Africa at the beginning of 2011 damaged the signs 
of optimism and the evolution of SSP between Africa and the EU. Both Egypt and Libya had 
been the most influential states in the AU, and were giving significant financial assistance to 
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Figure 5:  Current map of Africa  
 
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/africa.pdf 
Ong‟ayo (2008:6-7) and Salih (2001:1) regard as problematic whether or not African states 
will succeed in transforming from a dictatorial political structure to a democratic structure 
under Western pressure. During the democratic transitions in Africa, violence has erupted and 
weakened the political stability, including that of Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe. It is 
indeed a challenging task to bring Western democracy into African states without considering 
indigenous features. This political situation has also undermined the birth and the 
reinforcement of the concept of SSP. Making true strategic partnership with a powerful actor 
may require a united political structure, without which it cannot be  genuine SSPs stemming 
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from a fragile political structure can be vulnerable and dependent on the powerful actor. 
While the powerful actor gains more, the weak one gains less because of complicated political 
fragmentation.  
7.4 SOCIAL CHALLENGES  
The social structure of many African states is still vulnerable, with poverty, HIV\AIDS and 
malaria, unemployment, corruption, illiteracy, refugees, and poor infrastructure seen as the 
greatest obstacles to sustainable development. This section will examine the social problems 
in Africa and discuss how they would affect security and the concept of SSP.  
Though African states, regional and sub-regional organisations, such as the AU, the SADC, 
the ECOWAS and the IGAD and the international community, including the EU, the G8, and 
the UN have made efforts to eradicate poverty in Africa, levels are still higher than on other 
continents. The majorities of African people live in extreme poverty, in particular in sub-
Saharan Africa. While the proportion of poverty dramatically falls in the other continents, it 
remains constant in Africa. For example, the poverty rate has been reduced from 80 percent to 
20 percent in East Asia in the last 25 years, but has remained chronic at 50 percent in sub-
Saharan Africa over the same period (UN, 2008:1). Since the 1990s, the poverty rate has 
increased in Africa, with 34 of the 54 states categorised by the UN as the least developed 
countries (LDCs). More than 250 million African people live on less than $1 a day, which is 
not enough to cover their basic needs, including clean drinking water, food, health services, 
housing and clothing. Meanwhile, life expectancy is below 40 and more than two million 
children die of malnutrition every year (UNECA, 2005:5; 2006:2; WB, 2001:3). 





Source: World Bank, 2008:47. 
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According to Table 6, the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 in a day 
remained high in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2005. When the rate of poverty was 
2.0 percent in Europe and Central Asia in 1990, it was 57.6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the same year. Even though the rate of poverty was 60.2 percent in China in 1990, it was 
reduced to 15.9 percent in 2005,  expected to be decreased to 6.1 percent until 2015, as the 
table shows. However, poverty remains the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa and it is not 
expected to be reduced too much until 2015. In addition, India also reduced the rate of 
poverty significantly since 1990, to 25.4 percent from 51.3 percent.  
Poverty also leads to the emergence of other social problems in Africa, including education 
and health, unemployment, and corruption. The education infrastructure is very poor, with the 
majority of children still having no access to schools and teachers having low salaries. In 
2001, more than 40 million children in Africa could not enrol at primary schools and in 2002 
more than 60 percent of the African population did not know how to read or write. The 
illiteracy rate is the largest in sub-Saharan Africa, compared to the other regions, with the 
illiteracy rate amongst African girls and women persistently high. The literacy rate was below 
40 percent in Benin, Burkina Faso, the Niger, Senegal, and Mali in 2002. West African states 
have also been facing education problems since 1990. More than 65 million West African 
people remain illiterate, 40 percent of whom are women and girls (UNESCO, 2005:1-2). Even 
though education is one of the most important fundamental rights for people, African people 
cannot receive education. Thus, the majority of the African population cannot play dynamic 
roles in developing their own societies or contribute to the development of strategic 
partnership with the EU. While many NGOs and think tanks in European countries contribute 
to this partnership, few contribute to it, a situation that weakens the Africa-EU SSP. This 
partially confirms hypothesis 7, which is “the lack of a common African identity and African 
internal challenges undermine the success of security cooperation between Africa and the 
EU.”    
Furthermore, the health parastatals in Africa have been deteriorating with infectious 
pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, measles, tuberculosis, and diarrhoea killing many 
African civilians each year. Globally, an estimated 33.3 million people currently carry the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, one of the most destructive conditions in history. An estimated 22.5 
million people in Sub-Saharan Africa carry the condition, of whom 1.3 million died between 
2001 and 2009. Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland are among the 
countries with the highest rates of HIV/AIDS, which slows down population growth and 
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reduces life expectancy, with women and girls the most affected groups (UNAIDS, 2010: 7; 
20). 
 Armed conflicts have also devastated the health infrastructure in many African states. For 
instance, 45 percent of Ethiopians do not have access to health services due to the armed 
conflicts, poor management, and poverty (Ojukutu-Macauley, 2003:108-9; 120-9). The 
unemployment rate in Africa is also among the highest in the world, with 56 percent of sub-
Saharan Africans unable to afford to support their families. Despite the high mortality rate, 
the population in Africa is expected to rise from 793 million in 2001 to 1.37 billion in 2025, 
with governments unable to create jobs for so many people. This situation aggravates the 
unemployment rate as well as social development in Africa (UNECA, 2005:57-8). 
The conflicts and wars in post-independence Africa have also increased the refugee problem, 
which is one of the most essential social challenges to social development on the continent. 
According to a report published by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 
2010:7; 21-2), there are more than 2 million refugees in Africa, the second largest number in 
the global total of 8.8 million. Furthermore, of the 15.6 million internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in the world, 6.4 million are in Africa, also the largest number of any continent. 
During the armed conflict in the DRC in 2009, some 2.1 million people were displaced, with 
more than 144,000 having to flee the country. Likewise, 132,000 civilians had to flee their 
country in Somalia in 2009 due to the armed conflicts (ibid., pp.6-8). Refugees are usually in 
poor living conditions, with health, education and food problems chief among others. Women 
and girls are again the worst affected groups (UNHCR & World Food Programme, 2003:1-2).  
The notion of civil society is crucial for social, economic, and political developments. Civil 
society organisations in a country, such as NGOs, the media, think tanks, and academia, 
provide alternative solutions to social, economic, and political problems. Moreover, civil 
society contributes to the development of the notions of democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights, and it promotes accountability and transparency in a country. However, the 
concept of civil society varies from state to state or from continent to continent. Internal 
factors, both economic and political, play major roles in reinforcing the concept of civil 
society, but the notion of civil society in Africa is different from that in Europe, where it plays 
critical roles in developing social, economic and political institutions. Political and economic 
problems, as well as ethnic divisions, weaken the concept of civil society in Africa.  
Civil society institutions in a country also make a critical contribution to peace and security, 
however many African governments tend to control civil society institutions. Therefore, these 
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cannot work effectively for Africa‟s social, economic, and political developments. Even 
though the African regional and sub-regional organisations, including the AU, the ECOWAS, 
the SADC and the IGAD, have been actively playing important roles in developing the notion 
of civil society in recent years, they do not have effective capacities to resolve Africa‟s 
problems (UNESCO, 2009:31-3). Edwards (2009:5) writes that if there were strong civil 
society institutions in Kenya, conflicts would not have taken place during the 2008 election 
period. The lack of strong civil society in Africa also undermines the development of security 
cooperation between Africa and the EU. 
Maintaining peace and security necessitates social stability, but social problems, such as 
education, health, poverty, refugees and the lack of social society, lead to the emergence of 
security problems. The challenge is how a continent such as Africa, that faces social 
problems, will contribute to world peace and security and become a strong and equal partner 
or continent in establishing a fair and genuine SSP with the EU.  
7.5 ECONOMIC CHALLENGES  
Economic developments play key roles in sustaining peace and security, which is difficult 
without economic stability. Internal and external determinants of Africa, including poverty, 
political crises, conflicts and wars, the international actors‟ economic interests, high 
unemployment rates, and poor infrastructures have been affecting economic growth and 
developments. Although the Regional Economic Communities of Africa (RECs), such as the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), have been playing noteworthy roles in developing economic 
cooperation throughout the African states over the last decade, economic developments 
remain very slow.  
According to a report published by the UNECA (2006a:2), 34 of the 54 African states are 
viewed as LDCs, while another economic report published by the UN Economic Commission 
for Africa (2006b:31) notes that achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 
Africa is indeed a difficult task, due to its complex economic and political structures. In 2005, 
only ten African countries saw higher than seven percent of economic growth, namely Angola 
(19.1%), Burkina Faso (7.5%), the Republic of the Congo (7.7%), Equatorial Guinea (9.3%), 
Ethiopia (8.9%), Liberia (8%), Libya (8.5%), Mozambique (7.5%), Sierra Leone (7.3%), and 
Sudan (8%) (ibid., p.31). According to the 2010 MDGs Report, poverty and unemployment 
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rates have been very high in Africa, therefore the continent‟s fragile economic structure 
continues to threaten political and economic stability in many countries and in turn, may make 
the future of security cooperation between Africa and the EU more difficult. Table 7 (below) 
shows real GDP growth in Africa between 2005 and 2010. 




Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and African Union, 2010:135. 
 
As the table shows, real GDP growth has been slow in Africa since 2005. While GDP growth 
was 6.0 percent in Southern Africa in 2005, it decreased to 4.1 percent in 2010. East Africa 
saw 7.5 percent of real GDP growth in 2007. While GDP growth was 6.0 percent in Southern 
Africa in 2005, there was recession with -1.6 percent in 2009, but economic growth of 4.1 
percent again in 2010. Since 2007, real GDP growth in Africa has decreased. The global 
economic crisis of 2007 also affected economic growth in Africa, with it slowing down 
signficantly but 2010 shows an increasing trend again in terms of growth. 
 
While many African leaders enthusiastically emphasise that enhancing transparency and 
accountability and creating good governance are preconditions for economic development, 
economic growth in Africa is still lagging behind other continents. For instance, per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) in East Asia has increased 800 percent since the 1960s, but has 
not changed substantially in Sub-Saharan Africa in that time. Economic stagnation has also 
exacerbated levels of poverty. With Africa accommodating 10 percent of the global 
population, it also contains 30 percent of the poor. Since the 1980s, the number of Africans in 
poverty has increased, and is estimated to reach 400 million by 2015. Economic problems 
also deepen inequalities between rich and poor (Madavo, 2005:1-2), causing the president of 
Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaore, to describe Africa as a “champion of the negative indicators” 
in the world.  
Though the continent is rich in terms of natural and human reserves, it has been regarded as 
the poorest in the world. Hence, the notion of political stability and economic stability is 
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farfetched in the African context and the relationship between the two has to be based on 
parity, and without the former the latter would not take place. It has been said that one of the 
greatest problems concerning economic development in Africa is the absence of effective 
political institutions. Meanwhile, corruption, nepotism, rent-seeking, and other opportunistic 
unethical attitudes are the barriers of economic development. Conflicts and wars have also 
destabilised economies, as well as some 139 military coups in Africa since the independence 
era (Fosu, 2007:211).   
Economic crises and huge external debt burdens have debilitated economic development of 
African states. External debts of Africa have relatively increased, rising from $158 billion in 
1985 to $230 billion in 1989 (Dibua, 2003:509), $286 billion in 2008, and $300 billion in 
2009 (UNECA and AU, 2010:101). The 2007 global economic crisis also hit Africa, causing 
economic growth of Africa to decrease from six percent in 2007 to 4.9  percent in 2008, and 
1,6 percent in 2009. At the same time, the 2007 global economic crisis has affected a wide 
range of business sectors, such as textiles, tourism, mining, and the manufacturing sector. 
Also, many people lost their jobs in this period as economic crises and the external debt 
burdens in Africa led to an increase in unemployment, poverty, inflation and other chronic 
problems (ADB and ADF, 2009:4-14). 
International financial institutions (IFIs), such as the IMF and the WB, as well as 
industrialised countries, have been giving loans to African states since the independence era. 
However, debt policies of the IFIs and industrialised countries have not been an effective way 
of developing Africa‟s economy. On the contrary, external debt burdens only increase 
dependency on West and the IFIs (Dibua, 2003:510). Foreign aid policies only reflect geo-
strategic and economic interests of the donor countries (Solimano, 2005:49). More 
importantly, African countries cannot be represented fairly in the IFIs, hence, the IFIs are not 
likely to reflect the economic interests of African people precisely. For example, while 
Western powers‟ voting rights were 67.5 percent in the IMF in 1984, those of the 43 African 
states were only 5.2 percent (Dibua, 2003:510). According to Boaduo  (2008:94-7) and Dibua 
(2003:512-5;528), the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have brought no substantial 
changes but rather have increased Africa‟s dependency on the capitalist system.  
Economic stability is fundamental for preserving peace and security, however many African 
states are characterised by inefficient economic structures. Moreover, their economic 
problems have also weakened regional and sub-regional organisations‟ peacekeeping roles. 
For example, even though the AU, IGAD, and ECOWAS have played active roles in keeping 
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peace and security in conflict regions of Africa in recent years, economic constraints of these 
organisations have undermined their peacekeeping operations. The future of Africa‟s 
economy is at great risk from conflicts, corruption, education and health problems. 
Furthermore, economic instability impacts on foreign policy of countries and international 
organisations. States and international organisations that do not have economic power cannot 
play proactive or constructive roles in maintaining international peace, security, and stability. 
Without economic development, effective security cooperation with the EU is much more 
challenging. This supports hypothesis 7.  
7.6 EVALUATION 
The focal point of this chapter was an analysis of the internal and external factors affecting 
security in Africa, including social, economic and political developments. Whilst a strong 
actor with well-built internal dynamics can play a more proactive role in creating a strategic 
partnership and benefit from it, the weak actor that suffers from its internal problems plays a 
less proactive role and is likely to benefit less. This chapter predicts that if Africa cannot 
resolve its internal problems it will have to play a passive role, not only in this SSP but also in 
the new strategic partnerships with different actors in the future. Internal problems of Africa 
are indeed complex, in particular with the legacy of colonialism still affecting the continent‟s 
social, economic, and political life but combined with structural problems. This chapter found 
that Africa faces profound social, economic and political problems, and its internal challenges 
damage the development of the Africa-EU SSP. This strengthens hypothesis 7. 
The argument presented in this chapter advocates Africa‟s re-investment in improving 
peoples‟ life standards by mobilising its own energy. In so doing, the leadership plays a 
strategic role in making a difference in internal dynamics. Over the last decade, historical 
changes have occurred, including the creation of the AU and NEPAD, as the notion of 
African ownership has grown as democratic movements struggled to emerge. More 
importantly, proactive roles of the AU in sustaining peace, security and stability in conflict 
areas promise to bring fundamental political change to the continent. This chapter also found 
that the EU‟s colonial relations with Africa necessitate cooperation in the fields of peace and 
security, however, its violent history inhibits the emergence of true cooperation between the 
two continents. Africa‟s structural problems make the African organisations dependent and 
weak actors in world politics. This chapter also found that African organisations cannot play 
an influential role in shaping the Africa-EU SSP.  
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According to realism, while strong actors benefit more from international cooperation, weak 
ones benefit less. Weak actors face many challenges, including social, economic and political, 
so they do not have enough power to benefit equally from a strategic partnership. However, 
weak actors need to cooperate with global ones because if they do not cooperate with global 
actors they feel unsecure. Hypothesis 6 is “power imbalance makes cooperation between the 
EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the SSP.” This chapter explored social, economic 
and political challenges affecting security in Africa, which make the Africa-EU SSP difficult. 
While the EU plays a more active role in developing the Africa-EU SSP by using its 
economic power, Africa plays a less active role due to the mentioned challenges.  
The next chapter elaborates upon African regional and sub-regional organisations‟ security 
strategies, in particular those of the AU, the IGAD, the SADC, and the ECOWAS. It also 
examines the way in which Africa is attempting to build a strong regional security framework.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
AFRICAN REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL 
 ORGANISATIONS’ SECURITY POLICIES  
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter will examine peace and security policies and strategies of the AU, IGAD, 
ECOWAS, and SADC. Upholding peace and security has been the first priority for the 
African organisations following independence. The leaders have recognised that Africa‟s 
security can only be maintained by Africans, not outside actors. In doing so, the African 
leaders have made efforts to create their own peace and security mechanisms through the 
regional and sub-regional organisations. In particular, the philosophical principle “without 
peace and security there is no sustainable social and economic development” plays a major 
role in developing the African organisations‟ peace and security policies.  
The establishment of the AU, NEPAD, and the African sub-regional organisations‟ efforts to 
preserve peace and security led to the re-emergence of the concept of African ownership,
22
 
which now plays a strategic role in developing their peace and security policies. The history of 
the concept of African ownership goes back to the Pan-Africanist movements
23
. According to 
Esmenjaud and Franke (2009:3), there are two kinds of “African ownership”, one negative the 
other positive. While the concept of negative African ownership is controlled by external 
actors and concentrates on the interests of the external actors, the other is controlled by 
Africans and focuses on the interests of the African people. The concept of African ownership 
has been evolving since 2000, but has done so with the financial and political support of 
external actors. Integration movements among the African nations play a significant role in 
evolving and developing the concept of African ownership. In particular, the emergence of the 
                                                 
22
 Boughton and Mourmouras (2002:3) define ownership as “a willing assumption of responsibility for an 
agreed program of policies, by officials in a borrowing country who have the responsibility to formulate and 
carry out those policies, based on an understanding that the program is achievable and is in the country‟s own 
interest.” 
23
 The notion of regional and sub-regional organisations was institutionalised in Africa during the nineteenth 
century, based on racial struggle and turning to independent struggle during the twentieth century. The role of 
the Pan-African Congresses (PACs) had a significant effect on materialising the idea of regional organisations 
and the notion of African ownership, as the participants emphasised the importance of political and economic 
cooperation among the African states. The PACs were held on different dates and in various countries, in the 
USA, France, and England, in 1919, 1921, 1923, 1927, and 1945. The idea of Pan-Africanism particularly was 
formalised in the fifth meeting of the PAC held in England, in 1945. This movement has played an historical role 
in the formation of the notion of Pan-Africanism, the notion of regional organisations in Africa as well as the 
notion of the African ownership (Geiss, 1968:3-8).  
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new African organisations, including the AU and NEPAD, has had a positive impact on the 
development of this concept. Creating an independent concept of African ownership is 
necessary to make African organisations‟ peace and security policies effective. This chapter 
will explore the challenges facing the African organisations‟ peace and security policies, and 
create a link between them and African-EU SSP. 
8.2 THE AU’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA  
Africa‟s first continental organisation was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), 
established on the 25
th
 of May 1963 by 32 African countries in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The 
OAU had two essential aims, namely to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states 
and to eradicate all forms of colonialism from the continent (Article 2 of the OAU Charter). 
Even though the OAU failed to resolve Africa‟s social, economic, and political problems, it 
did play a pivotal role in the decolonisation process of the African states. It did not succeed in 
preventing conflicts or wars in Africa during its 39 year history, and could not develop an 
effective security policy towards Africa. However, it contributed to the emergence of the 
notion of unity and solidarity among the African nations.  
Established on the 9
th
 of July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, as a successor to the OAU, the 
African Union (AU) was intergovernmental and the most important regional organisation on 
the continent, comprising 53 African states. Only Morocco is not a member, having already 
withdrawn from the OAU, on the 12
th
 of November 1984, following OAU recognition of the 
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) (Western Sahara) as an independent state in 
February 1982 (Wellens, 1990:48).  
The first chair of the AU, Thabo Mbeki, explained the significance of this historical 
transformation at the 40th Anniversary Celebrations of the OAU in Durban, South Africa on 
the 25
th
 of May 2003:  
New challenges confront us today, brought about by world-wide phenomena such as 
globalisation and shaped by our desire to see a prosperous, healthy, stable, unified and 
peaceful continent, fully living up to its promise and potential. We need to harness and 
use our meagre resources at hand especially our natural, cultural and human resources. 
We suffer hardships in our Continent, most notably, poverty and conflict. We need to 
address these challenges with dedication and commitment, and recognise that these 
hardships extend beyond the original, political mandate of the OAU. For this reason we 
have transformed the Organization of African Unity into the African Union in order to 
deal with the socio-economic development of the continent in tandem with the need to 
build political stability. 
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Whereas the OAU objectives were too narrow, the AU objectives were more comprehensive, 
in particular to: (1) achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the 
peoples of Africa; (2) accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; 
(3) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; and (4) promote democratic 
principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance (Article 3 of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union). 
Since 1960, more than 20 civil wars have broken out in Africa, and most African states have 
been involved in conflicts or wars, with consequent damage to social, economic, and political 
infrastructures, and an estimated 14 million deaths (Leitenberg, 2006:77-79). While 
preserving peace and security has been the most fundamental objective of the Constitutive Act 
of the AU, decolonising the African states became the most ambitious aim of the OAU 
Charter. During the OAU\AU Summit in Durban in 2002, the African leaders underlined that 
social, economic and political developments were prerequisites for sustaining peace and 
security, encapsulated by Mbeki‟s pronouncement that there can be no sustainable 
development without peace, without security and without stability.  
It was of significance to Africa in terms of the emergence of a new political climate, with 
three important strategic institutions being founded, namely the AU, NEPAD, and the African 
Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The idea that social, economic, and political challenges 
have caused conflicts and wars spread over the continent and became a common view among 
the African leaders in the new century. In this spirit, NEPAD was built at the 37
th
 Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the OAU in Lusaka, Zambia, 
in July 2001, as a socio-economic programme of the AU. The fundamental aims of NEPAD 
were: 
… to eradicate poverty; place African countries, both individually and collectively, on 
a path of sustainable growth and development; halt the marginalisation of Africa in the 
globalisation process; accelerate the empowerment of women; and fully integrate 
Africa into the global economy (NEPAD Secretariat, 2003:1-9). 
The second body, the APRM, was created within NEPAD at the sixth Summit of the Heads of 
State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of NEPAD in Abuja, Nigeria in 
2003, the main aim being to help African governments improve their government system. The 
members of the AU can voluntarily become members of the APRM, which has 29 members 
(NEPAD Secretariat, 2003:9). Whereas the new regional organisation of Africa addresses 
Africa‟s social, economic, and political problems, it also makes efforts to reinforce its security 
policy. In doing so, the AU adopted the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and 
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Security Council of the African Union” at the 1
st
 Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the 
African Union, in Durban, South Africa on the 9
th
 of July 2002. The Protocol came into effect 
on 26 December 2003, charting a course for the AU‟s security policy towards Africa, and is 
the most prominent security strategy for the AU. The creation of the AU, NEPAD and APRM 
shows that African nations can develop a common African identity and play a more active role 
in solving their own problems. This provides evidence against hypothesis 7. 
The Peace and Security Council of the AU (PSC) was officially established on the 25
th
 of May 
2004, and is described in the Protocol as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement 
to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (Protocol 
of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 2). It claims that the AU as a 
regional power has a primary responsibility for keeping peace, security, and stability in Africa, 
significantly emphasising that these are preconditions for sustainable social, economic, and 
political developments. Its three essential principles related to the AU‟s security policy are, 
firstly, to increase cooperation with the international and African sub-regional organisations; 
secondly to strengthen relations with the African states and their security policies; and thirdly, 
to increase the dignity of the continent at both regional and global levels, by preventing 
conflicts and wars in Africa (Protocol of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 
Article 3). 
The Protocol built three important strategic instruments to strengthen the AU‟s security 
policy. A “Panel of the Wise” was established as an advisory mechanism to the AU in the 
fields of conflict prevention, and a “Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)” objective to 
facilitate, anticipate, and prevent conflicts. However, the third, an “African Standby Force 
(ASF),” is the most significant security mechanism in the Protocol, created as a peacekeeping 
force of the AU and composed of civilian and military missions. In addition, developing a 
Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) has been a prominent aim since the 
establishment of the AU. To achieve this, the AU adopted the Solemn Declaration in February 
2004, in Sirte, Libya, a momentous step in creating a CADSP. The Declaration emphasised 
that building a common defence and security identity was necessary to retain peace, security, 
and stability in Africa, and is regarded as one of the most noteworthy components of the AU‟s 
security policy.  
The AU as a new organisation has begun to play a central role in preserving peace and 
security in the conflict zones of Africa since its creation. It has deployed three major 
peacekeeping operations since 2002, which are the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the 
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African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMIB 
was deployed in April 2003 in a mission that ended in June 2004, the main aims of which 
were to monitor the Ceasefire Agreement and to reinforce the peace process in Burundi 
(Siradag, 2009:70). AMIS ran from July 2004 to December 2007, with the main objectives 
being to monitor and verify the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) and maintain 
peace and security in Darfur (ibid., p.46). AMISOM was mandated in February 2007, and was 
still running, Its main aims are to sustain peace and security and to improve the humanitarian 
condition in Somalia (ibid., p.76). The AU also authorised a peacekeeping mission in the 
Comoros in March 2006 to observe and keep peace and security during the electoral period. 
The AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC) completed its 
mission in June 2006 (ibid., pp.80-2). Furthermore, the AU has strengthened its relations with 
international organisations, including the UN, the EU, the WB, the IMF, and the RECs in 
Africa in the field of security. Even if there are internal challenges, institutionalisation within 
Africa may help overcome some of them and also facilitate cooperation with other actors, 
such as the EU. The creation of new security mechanisms, such as the the PSC and CADSP, 
demonstrated that the African nations can establish their own common security identity and 
reinforce cooperation with other actors despite internal challenges. AU civilian and military 
operations in Africa (see Table 8, below) are evidence that institutionalisation efforts in Africa 
have forced African leaders to take more responsibility in maintaining peace and security. 
This does not confirm hypothesis 7, which is “the lack of a common African identity and 
African internal challenges undermine the development of the Africa-EU SSP.”  
Africa has strengthened its security structure since the last decade and taken independent 
initiatives for the sake of Africa‟s peace and security. At the same time, Africa has increased 
its security cooperation with international actors, in particular with the EU. For instance, 
security cooperation between Africa and the EU during the Darfur conflict proved that 
different actors can create a strategic security partnership. This also refutes hypothesis 6, 
which is “power imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the 









Table 8:   AU civilian and military operations in Africa 
 
Source: Siradag, 2009:130. 
Though the AU has made some structural reforms and great efforts in a short time to reinforce 
its security policy, as a young regional organisation it faces serious challenges. Firstly, the 
lack of political union within the member states of the AU remains the greatest challenge for 
developing the CADSP of the AU. Each African country traditionally has different economic 
and political policy, importantly with different colonial relationships with the former colonial 
powers. The second challenge for the AU‟s security policy consists of financial and logistical 
constraints, which are common to AU‟s peacekeeping operations in Africa. In particular, 
outside donations and assistance from different international organisations and developed 
countries have played a critical role in the implications of the AU‟s security policy. The third 
challenge is the lack of the AU capacity building. The AU established the African Peace and 
Security Architecture (APSA), which consists of the ASF, the Panel of Wise, and the CEWS. 
However, the AU lacks an effective leadership, conflict-management and resolution policy 
and sufficient military and civilian structures. The AU itself also described this challenge as a 
„chronic shortage of capacity‟ at a meeting on the 14
th
 of May 2007. Meanwhile, the AU 
failed to keep peace and security in North Africa in the beginning of 2011. Although Africa 
has taken independent initiatives to sustain peace and security in conflict areas, the lack of 
unity and solidarity among the African nations and Africa‟s internal challenges weaken the 
development of a common African security identity and its security cooperation with 
international actors. This confirms hypothesis 7. 
At the Fourth Joint Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Finance of the AU held in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, in March 2011, the President of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, said that 
Libya, Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa provide 15 percent of the AU‟s budget each 
year. Some 77 percent have been provided by the global actors, mainly the EU. Libya was the 
largest financial supporter of the AU from among its members. Following the start of the 
Libyan War of 2011, the AU‟s financial power has weakened seriously. Ping warned that if 
the AU members would not support the Union, it would not carry out its mission 
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independently. In this study, hypothesis 8 is “the Africa-EU SSP makes African organisations 
more dependent on the EU.” During the conflict in Sudan, the EU provided significant 
financial assistance to the AU peacekeeping operation in Sudan (AMIS). Had the EU and 
other global actors not supported the AMIS, the AU could not have deployed a large 
peacekeeping mission in Sudan. African organisations‟ financial and logistical constraints 
render Africa more dependent on outside actors, which confirms  hypothesis 8. Meanwhile, 
hypothesis 6 is that “power imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult 
in the framework of the SSP.” The EU‟s financial and political support to African 
organisations are playing an important role in strengthening an SSP with Africa. This also 
supports hypothesis 6. Mixed evidence is found for hypothesis 6. While African internal 
challenges make security cooperation with Africa more difficult, new threats and challenges 
necessiate cooperation on peace and security between Africa and the EU. 
The AU‟s efforts in peace and security in Africa have contributed to the development of the 
Africa-EU SSP; however the AU‟s structural problems have damaged it. Developing an 
effective common security policy within the member states of the AU is necessary for playing 
a more active role in this strategic partnership. Without it, this partnership would not work 
effectively. Furthermore, fair security cooperation between the AU and the EU depends on the 
AU‟s political will and capacity. If the AU cannot resolve its structural problems, this 
partnership cannot reflect the interests of the African people and it would remain unfair. 
Africa‟s internal problems also damage the development of an SSP with the EU, which also 
confirms hypothesis 6. 
8.3 THE IGAD’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS EAST AFRICA  
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is a regional organisation in East 
Africa, established on the 21
st
 of March 1996 as a successor to the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) created in January 1986 by six Eastern 
African countries. Its head office is located in the city of Djibouti in the Republic of Djibouti, 
and it currently has seven members, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, 
Eritrea, and Uganda. The IGADD‟s aims were to combat famine, drought, economic issues, 
and ecological degradation in East Africa (IGAD Charter, 1996:2). Its objectives were 
widened in 1996 to include social, economic, political developments in East Africa. Since the 
establishment of the IGAD, creating an effective security policy among the member states has 
been its primary aim.  
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The IGAD‟s main objectives are to retain peace, security, and stability and toaccomplish 
prosperity and regional integration among the member states. The IGAD‟s security policy 
towards East Africa is stated in Article 18A of the IGAD Charter: (1) To act collectively to 
preserve peace, security and stability which are essential prerequisites for economic 
development and social progress; (2) To take effective collective measures to eliminate threats 
to regional co-operation peace and stability; (3) To establish an effective mechanism of 
consultation and cooperation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and (4) To 
deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are 
referred to other regional or international organisations. 
The Peace and Security Division is the most important means of the IGAD sustaining peace 
and security in the region. It consists of Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution 
(CPMR), political affairs, and humanitarian affairs. It also organises the programmes of the 
IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT). One of the greatest 
challenges IGAD faces is its capacity building, so, the heads of state and governments of the 
IGAD adopted a protocol in Khartoum, Sudan on the 9
th
 of January 2002, regarding the 
establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the 
IGAD‟s Peace and Security Division. In particular, CEWARN aims at reinforcing the IGAD 
member states‟ capacity building in the fields of conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution. It is the key component of the IGAD‟s Peace and Security Division (Article 5 of 
the Protocol of the CEWARN).  
The AU ASF is divided into five groups to coordinate its peace and security activities 
effectively in Africa, namely the North Africa Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), East 
Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), Central Africa Force Multinationale de l‟Afrique 
Centrale (FOMAC), Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), and ECOWAS Standby 
Brigade (ECOBRIG). IGAD coordinates the programme of EASBRIG and works closely with 
the AU in the areas of peace and security (Alghali & Mbaye, 2008:34-5), as well as with the 
Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), which was established with the Nairobi 
Declaration on the 15
th
 of March 2000. RECSA‟s main function is to combat the proliferation 
of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and East Africa (Nairobi 
Declaration, 2000:1-3). 
Since the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, IGAD has 
been playing a key role in facilitating and observing the Sudan peace process. Furthermore, it 
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contributed to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), with two peacekeeping 
battalions from Uganda and Kenya. In Somalia, it has played vital roles in reinforcing the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and assisted the TFG to prepare the National Security 
Stabilisation Plan (NSSP). In addition, it has made efforts to lift the UN arms embargo against 
the TFG, to make it a more active and more effective political instrument in the country. In 
January, IGAD was authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council to deploy a 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia, named IGASOM. However, it could not implement it in 
2006, but rather the AU Peace and Security Council authorised a peacekeeping mission, 
AMISOM, in April 2007 (IGAD, 2007:45-6).  
A series of internal and external factors have contributed to the deterioration of IGAD‟s 
capacity. There is not such strong coordination between the members, because while some are 
actively engaged in IGAD‟s programmes and activities, others are not. For instance, Kenya 
and Uganda have recently developed their relations with the East African Community (EAC), 
originally established in 1967 and revived in July 2000 (Institute for Security Studies, 
2003:19-21). It currently has five members, namely Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and 
Burundi. IGAD is also greatly dependent on outside donations and assistance, and regularly 
organises a Donor‟s Forum. Since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, the 
country has not had an effective central government. Likewise, Sudan has faced complicated 
internal problems for a long time, with border disagreements between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
continuing. All these political and economic challenges in the region have threatened IGAD‟s 
effectiveness and reduced its power. 
Healy (2009:15) points out that IGAD does not have an effective security policy towards East 
Africa, and moreover it still uses traditional political mechanisms to stop the conflicts in the 
region, which are respect for “the sovereign equality of all Member States and non-
interference in the internal affairs of Member States” (Article 6A of IGAD Charter). 
Importantly, international actors, including the USA, France, Britain, China and Italy have 
become strongly engaged in political developments in East Africa. International actors‟ 
involvement has made East Africa complex and weakened the IGAD‟s security policy. The 
making of an effective security policy toward East Africa might be possible with strong 
political determination of the member states of the IGAD rather than engagement by 
international organisations or other outside powers.  
IGAD, as a regional actor, has critical duties for the maintenance of peace, security, and 
stability in East Africa, and for reinforcing the Africa-EU SSP. It has strengthened its political 
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and economic relations with international organisations, such as with the UN and the EU, and 
so far has taken important responsibilities to facilitate the peace processes in Somalia and 
Sudan. However, it failed to bring lasting peace and security to the region. IGAD‟s ineffective 
security policy contributes neither to security in East Africa nor to the development of 
strategic partnership in security matters between Africa and the EU.  Mixed evidence for 
hypothesis 7 was found throughout the dissertation.  While IGAD also contributes to the 
development of a common African security, its internal problems weaken the enlargement of 
security cooperation between Africa and the EU.  
8.4 THE ECOWAS’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS WEST AFRICA  
The leaders of the fifteen
24
 West African countries signed the Treaty of Lagos in Nigeria on 
the 28
th
 of May 1975 to establish the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), a regional organisation in West Africa and one of the most prominent pillars of 
the Regional Economic Communities
25
 (RECs) in Africa, with headquarters in the city of 
Abuja, Nigeria. The notion of a West African Community goes back to the Liberian President 
William Tubman, who made a proposal to the West African countries to create a community 
in order to increase economic integration in 1964, which however failed. The establishment of 
ECOWAS was an historic event in the development of West Africa and the continent as a 
whole, the main purpose being to achieve economic integration in order to set up an economic 
union in West Africa (Article 2 of the ECOWAS Treaty). The leaders of the West African 
countries recognised that without economic integration in the region, political and social 
improvements would not exist, so, the notion of economic partnership emerged as a 
precondition in West Africa for raising the living standards of African people. 
Article 58 of the Treaty of ECOWAS contains strategies and policies regarding peace and 
security in West Africa: (1) Member states undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate 
relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region; and 
(2) in pursuit of these objectives, member states undertake to cooperate with the community in 
                                                 
24
 When ECOWAS was created in 1975, it only had 15 members. Cape Verde became a sixteenth member of the 
organization in 1976. However, Mauritania left the organization in 2002. The current ECOWAS‟ members are 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  
25
 It consists of seven sub-regional organisations in Africa, which are Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). 
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establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and 
resolution of intra-state and inter-state conflicts. 
Economic and political infrastructures in many Western African countries remain fragile. 
Even though promoting economic integration has been the first priority of the ECOWAS at 
the first years of its establishment, preserving peace and security in the region has been a more 
important concern in the long run. ECOWAS‟s objectives have widened to include social and 
political developments, according to the new challenges emerging in the sub-region and in 
Africa. With the outbreak of civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the principle 
of “without peace and security, there is no sustainable social, economic, and political stability” 
has become more popular in West Africa. Therefore, the ECOWAS leaders have begun to pay 
more attention to sustaining peace and security in the region since the 1990s, and in so doing 
have taken serious steps to strengthen the appropriate mechanisms. 
A Protocol
26
 relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peace-keeping and Security was adopted by the ECOWAS members on the 10
th
 of December 
1999 in Lome, Togo. It established two important peace and security mechanisms: ECOWAS 
Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which is a civilian and military force of the 
organisation, and a Sub-Regional Peace and Security Observation System (ECOWAS Early 
Warning System). The 1999 Protocol aimed to “strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict 
prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping operations, the control of cross-border crime, 
international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines among the 
members” (Article 3, d). ECOWAS also adopted the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other related materials in Abuja, Nigeria on the 
26
th
 of June 2006, the main objective of which was “to prevent and combat the excessive and 
destabilising accumulation of small arms and light weapons within ECOWAS” (Article 2 of 
the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons). 
The outbreak of the conflicts and wars in Liberia in 1989, in Sierra Leone in 1991, in Guinea 
Bissau in 1998 and Côte d'Ivoire in 2002, undermined the ECOWAS‟s security policy and led 
to the emergence of the ECOWAS‟s new and more active conflict prevention strategies. The 
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) adopted on the 1
st
 of January 2008 in 
                                                 
26
 This Protocol replaced Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in 1978 and Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance 
of Defence signed 1981, both defined the concept of security from a narrow perspective and approached conflicts 
and wars according to the period of the Cold War. However, the 1999 Protocol was written in accordance with 
the new millennium. For instance, it deals with conflict prevention, management, and resolution strategies and 
polices and defines the concept of security from a broader perspective.  
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Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso is the most important strategic plan regarding the ECOWAS‟s 
security policy towards West Africa. Essentially, ECOWAS‟s security paradigm has shifted 
from “state security” to a “human security”
27
 through the ECPF (Section II, 4 of the ECPF). 
The primary responsibility of the ECPF is to „strengthen human security
28
 in the region‟ 
(Section II, 5 of the ECPF).  
ECPF particularly encourages strengthening cooperation with African and international 
organisations, and global actors in the areas of conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution. It also coordinates the ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG). It is worth noting 
that the ECPF provides an impetus for the establishment of a consistent and effective security 
policy towards the sub-region. In addition, it conceptualised the ECOWAS‟s conflict 
prevention, management, and resolution strategies and policies. Significantly, it creates a link 
between security and democracy and good governance. The ECPF stresses that promoting 
democracy and good governance in West African countries will help to maintain peace, 
security, and stability in the sub-region (Section VIII, 52 of the ECPF).  
ECOWAS deployed peacekeeping operations in Liberia in 1990 and 2003, in Sierra Leone in 
1997, the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) in 2002, and the ECOWAS Mission 
in Liberia in 2003 (ECOMIL). Its peacekeeping experiences and strategies in West Africa 
became a worthy asset for the AU and the RECs. However, ECOWAS has also faced some 
challenges that damage the evolution of security cooperation between Africa and, for example, 
the EU. It has failed to implement its strategic plan regarding conflict prevention, 
management, and resolution. First, the lack of a strong coordination between the members 
within ECOWAS remains the greatest challenge and weakens its security policy towards the 
region. Second, nor does ECOWAS pay attention to civil societies, therefore there is still not 
enough cooperation between ECOWAS and them in the areas of conflict prevention. Third, 
ECOWAS does not have a strong relationship with external actors in the fields of peace and 
security. Fourth, ECOWAS still does not have an effective conflict prevention mechanism to 
predict potential conflicts and wars. Fifth, it lacks capacity building and human capacity. In 
                                                 
27
 It is defined in the ECPF as “the creation of conditions to eliminate pervasive threats to people's and individual 
rights, livelihoods, safety and life; the protection of human and democratic rights and the promotion of human 
development to ensure freedom from fear and freedom from want” (Section II,7 of the ECPF).  
28
 ECOWAS developed three important systematic methods to guard and strengthen human security in West 
Africa through the ECPF. The first is “the Responsibility to prevent,” which allows for taking actions to prevent 
intra and inter state conflicts and wars, and to remove the root causes of conflicts. The second is “the 
Responsibility to react,” which allows taking for actions to stop humanitarian disasters. The third one is “the 
Responsibility to rebuild,” which allows for taking action in post-conflict reconstruction, such as rehabilitation, 
recovery, and reconciliation after conflicts, wars, or natural disasters (Section VII,41 of the ECPF).  
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particular, when it deploys a peacekeeping operation in a conflict area, its financial and 
logistical constraints undermine its power. Sixth, the rivalry between Anglophone and 
Francophone countries in West Africa have continued and diminished ECOWAS‟s 
effectiveness in the areas of conflict prevention (Section II, 2-3 of the ECPF). This partially 
confirms hypothesis 7.   
ECOWAS‟s new security paradigm, which is a transformation from the state security to 
human security, has brought a new perspective to Africa‟s peace and security. Its new strategy 
also underlined that traditional security policies of the African organisations failed to achieve 
peace and security. Moreover, it underscored that peace and security can only be sustained by 
Africans, not outside actors. A new security paradigm of ECOWAS emerged as a necessary 
circumstance to effectively maintain peace and security in West Africa, and appeared as an 
independent security policy of ECOWAS rather than external pressures. It is difficult to say 
that ECOWAS can contribute to the development of strategic partnership in the areas of peace 
and security between Africa and the EU, because of its serious political and financial 
challenges.  
8.5 THE SADC’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS SOUTHERN AFRICA  
The history of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) lies in the 1970s. On 
the 1
st
 of April 1980, the Front Line States (FLS) group
29
 organised a conference entitled “the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)” in Lusaka in Zambia and 
adopted the Lusaka Declaration, which aimed at increasing economic cooperation among the 
FLS group members in Southern Africa and getting rid of the economic dependence on 
apartheid South Africa (Bowen, 1990:29-31). The FLS group was dissolved when the black 
majority of South Africa won the first democratic election in 1994. The fifteen Southern 
African countries signed the Declaration and Treaty of SADC at the Summit of Heads of State 
and Government in Windhoek, Namibia, on the 17
th
 of August, 1992. Then, SADCC was 
transformed into SADC with the Declaration and Treat of SADC in 1992. Currently having 14 
members
30
 and a head office located in Gaborone, Botswana, it is an inter-governmental 
                                                 
29
 The FLS group was established in 1970 to struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa and to achieve 
liberation movements in the Southern African region. The FLS‟ members were Angola, Botswana, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia. Zimbabwe joined the group in 1980 after it gained its independence 
from Britain (Bowen, 1990:29-31). 
30
 The current members of the SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. SADC suspended the membership of Madagascar in 2009 due to the emergence of a military coup in 
this country.  
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organisation. Schoeman (2002:6) states that the new transformation from SADCC into SADC 
emerged as a result of the end of the Cold War and demise of apartheid in South Africa.  
The main objectives of SADC are to “achieve development and economic growth, alleviate 
poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support 
the socially disadvantaged through regional integration” (Chapter 3, Article 5 of the SADC 
Treaty and Declaration). The most important protocol of the SADC regarding its peace and 
security policy is Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation adopted in 
Blantyre, Malawi, on 14
th
 August, 2001. The Protocol institutionalises SADC‟s peace and 
security policies and strategies. Significantly, it established the Organ
31
 on Politics, Defence 
and Security Co-operation, the main objectives of which are to: (1) protect the people and 
safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law 
and order, intra-state conflict, interstate conflict and aggression; (2) promote political co-
operation among state parties and the evolution of common  political values and institutions; 
(3) prevent, contain and resolve inter-and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; (4) promote 
the development of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of state parties 
and encourage the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the Charters and 
Conventions of the Organisation of African Unity and United Nations respectively; (5) 
observe, and encourage state parties to implement UN, AU and other international 
conventions and treaties on arms control, disarmament and peaceful relations between states; 
and (6) develop peacekeeping capacity of national defence forces and co-ordinate the 
participation of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations (Article 2 
of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation). 
Schoeman (2002:6) points out that whereas SADCC approached the definition of security 
from only a military perspective, SADC approaches it also from societal, economic, 
environmental, and psychological perspectives. The 2001 Protocol created two important 
mechanisms within the Organ, namely to conduct SADC‟s political and security programmes, 
which are the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC), and the Inter-State 
Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) (Article 3 of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and 
Security Co-operation). ISDSC is the most substantial mechanism within the Organ to 
conduct the SADC‟s peace and security programmes. In April 2002, SADC reinforced its 
peace and security institute with the adoption of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ 
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 According to the Protocol (2001:2), “the Organ constitutes an appropriate institutional framework by which 
Member States could co-ordinate policies and activities in the area of politics, defence and security.” 
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on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (SIPO), which provides strategies regarding 
SADC‟s peace and security policies and explores the challenges that weaken the SADC peace 
and security efforts. Besides, SIPO (2002:37) emphasises that structural problems, such as 
poverty, HIV\AIDS, corruption and crime, weaken the SADC peace and security mechanism 
and cause social, economic and political instability in the sub-region.  
On the 26
th
 of August 2003,  SADC signed the SADC Mutual Pact in Dar es Salam, Tanzania, 
which provides strategies to create collective self-defence
32
 among the SADC members, and 
complements the 2001 Protocol of SADC. The Pact stresses that developing the notion of 
collective self-defence among the members is indispensable to sustain peace, security, and 
stability in the region (Article 4 of the SADC Mutual Pact). Meanwhile, SADC became a part 
of the AU Standby Force by establishing the SADC Standby Brigade (SADCBRIC) on the 
17
th
 of August 2007, in Lusaka, Zambia. This comprises civilian, military, and police 
ingredients, but the most significant feature is that it enables deployment of a peacekeeping 
operation in a conflict area in the region of Southern Africa for the sake of peace, security, 
and stability (Article 4 of the SADCBRIC). In 1995, SADC set up a Regional Peacekeeping 
Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare, Zimbabwe, in order to strengthen its peacekeeping 
capacity. SADC deployed two peacekeeping operations in 1998 in the DRC and Lesotho. 
Only small numbers of the SADC members were involved in the peacekeeping operations in 
both countries. Since 1998, SADC has not authorised any peacekeeping operations. The poor 
coordination among the members of SADC during the two peacekeeping operations 
weakened its security policy.  
Critics argue that SADC‟s peace and security policies and strategies are too vague and 
ambitious, and that SADC makes them without taking into consideration its financial or 
human capacity (Derblom & Hull, 2009:32). Political issues in Zimbabwe and in the DRC, 
and the emergence of a military coup in Madagascar in March 2009, damaged regional 
stability. It is important to underline that SADC prefers to use its soft power to resolve peace 
and security challenges facing Southern Africa rather than its hard power. SADC called upon 
the international community to lift the sanctions against Zimbabwe and urged that placing 
economic sanctions against Zimbabwe would aggravate the political crisis and increase 
suffering in the country. Schalkwyk (2005:38-9) argues that SADC failed to develop an 
effective security policy towards Southern Africa. The ideological camps between the 
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 It is described in the SADC Mutual Pact as “the measures undertaken collectively by the State Parties to 
ensure peace, stability and security in the Region.” 
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members of the SADC and unclear security concepts of the Organ have made SADC peace 
and security policy ineffective. SADC needs to create a holistic approach regarding its peace 
and security policy. More importantly, it should focus on the concept of human security rather 
than that of state security.  
SADC, as an important regional actor, plays a strategic role in mitigating political crises in the 
region and developing the Africa-EU SSP. Especially, its soft power increases the importance 
of the concept of pro-active diplomacy and active leadership of SADC. Developing the notion 
of soft power diplomacy through SADC can also be an asset for the progress of security 
cooperation between Africa and the EU. However, it requires human and logistical capacity.  
Even though the African organisations have several structural challenges that weaken 
strategic partnership among the African countries, they have taken significant steps to create a 
collective security system for the whole continent. Importantly, the African organisations‟ 
efforts have enhanced the notion of strategic partnership. These developments seem to 
provide support for neoliberal institutional predictions, according to which, cooperation can 
reinforce political and economic stability and contribute to peace and security. However, the 
main problem behind the establishment of a collective security framework in Africa is that 
economic and political relations among the African states are not strong and therefore the 
concept of economic interdependence cannot play a dynamic role in consolidating the 
continental security framework. It can be said that the assumptions of the neoliberal 
institutionalist theory do not really seem to be supported when focusing on African 
organisations.  
8.6 EVALUATION  
The AU and the RECs have taken significant steps to sustain peace and security in the conflict 
areas of Africa. In particular, the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002 brought new 
hope for the whole continent to keep peace, security, and stability. The African organisations‟ 
efforts led to the re-birth of the concept of African ownership, and strengthened the principle 
of African solutions to African problems. However, the concept needs to be strengthened by a 
strong political will. Increasing inclusive relations between the African states is necessary to 
raise the standards of the African people and maintain peace and security. Implementing a 
peace and security policy is a challenging task for the African organisations, because there are 
many challenges that damage it, such as internal and external factors, including poverty, 
unemployment, disasters, and mismanagement, the ideological divisions between the states 
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and the external actors‟ economic and political interests in Africa. In this case, hypothesis 7 is 
also supported. 
This chapter has argued that the African organisations‟ weak security policies and strategies 
cannot contribute to the development of strategic partnership with the EU in the areas of 
peace and security. Nor can such security policies create independent security concepts or 
concentrate on the interests of the African people. Whereas the African organisations‟ 
effective security policies contribute to the emergence of genuine cooperation with the EU, 
their weak security policies undermine its development. The establishment of the AU in 2002 
consolidated the concept of strategic partnership; however, African organisations‟ fragile 
security policies seem not to correspond fully with the predictions of neoliberal 
institutionalism. Strengthening political, social, and economic relations between the African 
nations is necessary to create economic interdependence among the African nations.  
Constructivism stresses that establishing a common identity among nations can foster 
cooperation in a wide range activities. Each African state has different interests with different 
actors, for instance, while Francophone African countries have different economic and 
political interests, Anglophone African countries also have different ones. Having different 
foreign and security policy within the framework of African organisations weakens the 
emergence of strong regional organisations on the continent of Africa. This chapter 
discovered that the lack of unity and solidariy within the African organisations damages the 
development of African-EU SSP. This provides some support for hypothesis 7. The next 
chapter scrutinises security cooperation between Africa and the EU, and explores a series of 




THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIP 
AND ITS CHALLENGES 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
Having analysed the African regional and sub-regional organisations, namely the AU, IGAD, 
ECOWAS, and SADC and their security policies, this chapter investigates strategic 
partnerships between these African organisations and the EU in the area of peace and security. 
Understanding the concepts of mutual accountability and mutual responsibility is vital to 
developing security cooperation between Africa and the EU, the meanings of both of which 
are very close. The concept of accountability was clarified at the UN Millennium Summit of 
September 2000 and the Monterrey Conference of March 2002; and the concept of 
international cooperation between different actors was developed during the Johannesburg, 




We have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality 
and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world‟s 
people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular, the children of the world, to 
whom the future belongs.  
The Paris Summit of 2005 modified the concept of mutual accountability, since regarded as 
an aid relationship between donor and recipient countries and the monitoring of reciprocal 
commitments.
34
 With their deep historical, economic, and political relationships, both these 
concepts have been crucial for the EU in strengthening its security relations with the continent 
of Africa.  
9.2 A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AFRICA-EU SSP  
According to Brüne, Betz and Kühne (1994:26), the roots of the EU‟s current strategic 
partnership with Africa lie in the colonial period, which started with the Berlin Conference of 
1884-85. Europe‟s association with Africa is based on special economic, cultural and 
historical ties, but the first cooperative links between the continents began at the start of the 
twentieth century, and involved “commodity-money relations” (Maslennikov, 1983:13-21). 
Prior to that, the relationship had been one of colonial subservience. During the colonial 
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 See the original document United Nations Millennium Declaration, (A/55/l.2), 18 September 2000.  
34
 See the original document Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, February 28-March 2, 2005. 
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period, cooperative activities had served the interests of capitalist countries who exploited the 
natural resources and people of Africa. Even following the end of the slave trade, and the later 
collapse of colonialism, any cooperation between African and European countries was not 
primarily aimed at improving the social and economic life of Africa‟s people. On the 
contrary, it increased insecurity and the gap between rich and poor between the two 
continents.  
However, it was only with the Treaty of Rome (1957) that there was a discernible shift 
towards a strategic partnership between Europe and Africa, leading to the establishment of the 
Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). Only following this did the 
content of strategic partnership between Africa and Europe begin to change significantly from 
hegemonic relations to institutionalised relations in the post-independence era. Since the 
establishment of the EC in 1957, a set of strategic conventions and summits have been signed 
and organised by Africa and the EU, in order to strengthen socio-economic, political, military, 
historical and technologic relations and to establish a solid strategic partnership between the 
two continents. Table 9 shows the historical phases which paved the way for the 
establishment of a strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. 





Source: Own compilation 
While the Yaoundé I, II Conventions and Lomé I, II, III Conventions only focused on trade 
and aid agreements, the Lomé IV Convention had a broader scope, including the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Likewise, the Cotonou Agreement 
ushered in a set of original innovations and approaches to the notion of strategic partnership 
between Africa and the EU. For example, in 2000 it firstly referred to the concepts of peace-
building, conflict prevention and resolution, civil society and good governance, as well as, 
also for the first time, the term “strategic partnership” itself. It has subsequently become a 
common term, including 13 usages in the “Joint Africa-Europe Strategy” adopted by the EU 
and Africa in Lisbon in 2007. Thus, it can be seen that the use of the terms “strategy”, 
“partnership”, and “strategic partnership” have gradually increased in usage through 
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conventions and summits. The AU adopted the “Protocol relating to the establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council of the AU” in 2002, which underlined that strengthening strategic 
partnership in the fields of peace and security with international organisations was vital for 
the maintenance of peace and security in Africa, as well as in the world. Likewise, the 
adoption of ESS by the European Council in 2003 was also an important step in increasing an 
SSP with Africa, as well as with other global actors.  
Security cooperation between Africa and the EU includes a comprehensive strategy that 
relates to political and economic challenges. Even though security cooperation is the most 
critical field in the strategic partnership between Africa and the EU, it is the most difficult 
area to accomplish due to security issues being related to complicated economic and political 
challenges, as well as policies that are a legacy of colonial states in Africa. 
9.3 BETWEEN THE AU AND THE EU  
Since the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo, in April 2000, security cooperation between the 
two has increased considerably. The AU‟s involvement in peacekeeping operations in 
Burundi, Sudan, Somalia, and Comoros showed that the concept of African ownership has 
evolved and the principle of African solutions to African problems has been implemented 
seriously by the Africans themselves. The AU has played a significant role in implementing 
strategic partnership in the fields of peace and security with the EU since 2000. Importantly, 
the AU has been the most important regional actor in Africa for the EU to strengthen security 
relations between the two continents. The EU has consolidated its security cooperation with 
the AU in four categories: (1) To strengthen the AU peace and security capacity; (2) To 
support the AU-led peacekeeping operations; (3) To reinforce diplomatic relations with the 
AU; and (4) To strengthen the AU‟s capacity building. 
Backing up the AU peace and security mechanism and making it a strong regional actor have 
been a priority of the EU as it seeks to establish a strong SSP with Africa. The EU and the AU 
became engaged in promoting peace, security, and stability in Burundi when the European 
Commission allocated €25 million for the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), deployed in 2003. 
Both actors made an intensive effort to bring together the groups in the country, signing the 
Arusha Peace Accord (APA) between the Government of Burundi and the National Forces of 
Liberation on the 7th of September 2006. In addition, the EU and the AU organised a regional 
summit in Dar-es-Salaam to find a comprehensive solution to the conflict in Burundi in 2002 
(Siradag, 2009:72).  
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The Maputo Summit held by the AU in Mozambique in 2003 was a cornerstone in the 
developing notion of the AU-EU SSP, as the AU heads of state and governments called upon 
the EU to establish a common peace and security mechanism in order to effectively keep 
peace and security in Africa. Following the Summit, the African Peace Facility (APF)
35
, as a 
financial instrument of the EU, was established under the authority of the AU in 2004
36
. The 
APF had three important aims, the first of which was to strengthen the concept of African 
ownership and to support peacekeeping operations in Africa through the AU and the sub-
regional organisations. The second aim was to cement solidarity among the African nations 
and increase dialogue between Africa and Europe. The third and most important aim was to 
maintain economic, social, and political development in Africa (European Commission, 
2004:5). This provides support for hypotheses 3 and 4. European integration seems to help 
reinforce cooperation with Africa, whilst strengthening and disseminating values and actions 
linked to peace and security. 
In 2007, the AU and the EU extended the level of the APF
37
 to include conflict prevention and 
post-conflict reconstruction activities. Since the creation of the APF in 2004, the EU has 
earmarked €739.8 million
38
 to the APF through the European Development Fund (EDF), one 
of the main objectives of which was to reinforce capacity building of the AU and RECs. The 
EU has played a critical role in reinforcing the APSA through the APF, which allocated €100 
million to strengthen it.
39
  
In addition, the APF contributed to developing the doctrine of the ASF and planning its 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for AU peacekeeping operation deployments. The 
creation of the APF under the authority of the AU in 2004 reinforced the AU‟s strategic role 
in the fields of peace and security in Africa. The EU allocated €15 million to the AU and its 
RECs for the Early Response Mechanism (ERM)
40
, which aimed to make strategic plans for 
Peace Support Operations (PSO). On the 29
th
 of February 2008, the Council of the European 
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 The APF is created in accordance with the Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement signed between the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries) and the EU in 2000. 
36
 See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support 
Operation Facility for the African Union, assembly/AU/dec.21 (II), 10-12 July 2003, Maputo.  
37
 See Annual report, the African Peace Facility, 2009, Brussels, European Commission. 
38
 The EU distributed €250 million in 2004, €50 million in 2006, €139.2 million in 2007, and €300.6 million in 
2008 for the African Peace Facility, see annual report, the African Peace Facility, 2009, Brussels, European 
Commission, pp.12-13. 
39
 The EU earmarked €100 million for the APSA through the ninth EDF between 2000 and 2007 and tenth EDF 
between 2008 and 2013, see annual report, the African Peace Facility, 2009, Brussels, European Commission, 
p.14. 
40
 The EU allocated €100 million for the ERM through the tenth EDF between 2008 and 2011, see annual report, 
the African Peace Facility, 2009, Brussels, European Commission, p.14. 
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Union appointed General Pierr-Micher Joana
41
 as a Special Advisor for African peacekeeping 
capabilities. He is playing a key role in beefing up the AU‟s peacekeeping capacity and sub-
regional organisations‟ peacekeeping capacities
42
. The Council of the EU adopted an “Action 
Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa
43
” in Brussels on the 16
th
 of November 
2004, a key strategic document for the EU in outlining the borders of the Africa-EU security 
cooperation. It stated that:  
… the EU shall support, over the long term, the enhancement of African peace support 
operations capabilities, at regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels as well as the 
capacity of the African States to contribute to regional integration, peace, security and 
development. 
The APF has contributed to the reinforcement of the AU peacekeeping operations, including 
AU Missions in Sudan (AMIS), in Somalia (AMISOM), and for support to the elections in the 
Comoros (AMISEC). The facility allocated €600 million to support the African-led 
peacekeeping operations. In turn, the AU deployed AMIS in May 2004 (known as AMIS I), 
but it had a narrow mandate and only 465 personnel. Its objectives were only to observe the 
implementation of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) signed between the rebel 
groups and the Sudanese government on the 8
th
 of April 2004. On the 20
th
 of October 2004, 
the AU called upon the international community to build up AMIS. At the request of the AU, 
the EU adopted an “EU civilian-military supporting action to the AU Mission in the Darfur 
region of Sudan (AMIS II)”
44
 on the 18th of June 2005. It included a wide range of support 
for AMIS, including financial, equipment, military, technical support, police officers and 
political advisors.  
During the Darfur conflict, security relations between the AU and the EU peaked and made a 
significant contribution to developing strategic partnership between Africa and the EU in the 
fields of peace and security. The causes of the Darfur conflict were complicated, having 
erupted in the western region of Sudan in February 2003 it was halted in May 2006, when the 
foremost rebel group, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Government of Sudan 
reached a comprehensive agreement. On the 9
th
 of January 2011, Southern Sudan held a 
referendum to determine whether the region would become a separate state. On the 7th of 
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 See the decision of Council of the European Union, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, 
appoints General Pierr-Micher Joana as a Special Advisor for African peacekeeping capabilities, S091/08, 
Brussels, 29 February 2008. 
42
 General Pierr-Micher Joana has pursued his mission since March 2008. 
43
 See the details about Action Plan for ESDP Support to Peace and Security in Africa, 10538/4/04 REV 4, 
Brussels, 16 November 2004. 
44
 See the details of Darfur-Consolidated EU package II, AMIS II/00 (initial), Brussels, 1 July 2005. 
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February 2011, the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission
45
 published the final 
referendum results, according to which people with 98.83 percent of the total vote in the 
Southern region of the Sudan decided to separate from the Government of the country. A new 
state was officially established as “Southern Sudan” on the 9
th
 of July 2011.  
Even if the conflict had ended, the political atmosphere remains fragile and complex in the 
Sudan. The APF earmarked €303 million to the AMIS, and the AU spent €348 million on the 
implementation of the AMIS. €303 million was used mostly for logistic and military needs of 
AMIS, training programmes, media support, and planning. South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, 
Rwanda, Zambia, Senegal, and Gambia sent staff to the AMIS, with a total of 7,500 
peacekeepers joining the operation. The main objectives of the AMIS operation were to: (1) 
Maintain peace and security in Sudan; (2) Observe implementation of the peace agreements 
made between the rebel groups and the government of Sudan; (3) Protect civilians in Darfur; 
(4) Provide a security environment for humanitarian operations in Darfur; and (5) Sustain 
political stability in Sudan. On the 31
st
 of December 2007, the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) replaced AMIS. 
Meanwhile, the EU fortified its political and diplomatic cooperation with the AU during the 
Darfur conflict. Both actors worked together for the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 
(HCFA) signed by the rebel groups and the government on the 8th of April 2004. Moreover, 
the EU and the AU joined in the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and Joint Commission with 
other international actors. The EU and the AU played a key role for the Abuja peace talks, 
which led to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, between the rebel groups and 
the government, which started in Abuja, Nigeria on the 23rd of August 2004. When the Abuja 
peace talks stopped on the 10th of June 2005, the EU and the AU together put much effort into 
restarting it, and played an active role in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) in January 2005 between the groups, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) and the Sudanese government. At the same time, the EU appointed Pekka Haavisto 
as EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan to consolidate diplomatic cooperation with 
the AU and to facilitate the peace agreements in Sudan on the 18th of July 2005. Torben 
Brylle replaced Pekka Haavisto as second EUSR for Sudan in May 2007. The AU also 
appointed Salim Ahmed Salim in May 2005 as the AU Special Envoy and Chief Mediator for 
the Inter-Sudanese Political Talks on Darfur, a position he held until May 2006. This shows 
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that both Africa and the EU have increased and strengthened security cooperation. This does 
not support hypothesis 6.    
Rosalind Marsden was appointed as third EUSR for Sudan on the 11
th
 of August 2010
46
, and 
worked closely with the AU in preparing the referendum in Sudan. More importantly, the 
European Council and the Commission appointed Koen Vervaeke
47
 as a EUSR to the AU in 
Addis Ababa and Head of Delegation of the European Commission to the AU on the 6
th
 of 
December 2007. The EUSR to the AU plays a crucial role in strengthening the Africa-EU 
SSP. Meanwhile, the AU appointed Mahamat Saleh Annadif as a Permanent Representative 
of the AU to the EU in May 2006. Both Vervaeke and Annadif have worked closely to 
reinforce African ownership and the EU-AU strategic partnership in the areas of peace and 
security. Moreover, the EU worked together with the AU in the implementation of the 
Preparatory Committee for the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC)
48
 process 
and the Darfur Assessment and Evaluation Commission (DAEC). DDDC and DAEC are 
mechanisms established by the AU to implement and reinforce the peace agreements made 
between the rebel groups and the GoS. Political and diplomatic cooperation between the AU 
and the EU during the conflict of Sudan strengthened the notion of security cooperation.  
The AU PSC authorised the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on the 19
th
 of 
January 2007, the main objectives of which were to brace the Somali Transitional Federal 
Institutions (TFIs), to provide security for humanitarian aid in the country, and sustain peace, 
security, and stability. The current conflict in Somalia began in 1991 and has destabilised 
political, economic and social development, with more than 300,000 civilians having died 
since 1990. Only Burundi and Uganda sent staff for AMISOM, with a total of 5,150 
peacekeepers joining the operation. The EU worked with the AU for the implementation of 
AMISOM, with the APF earmarking €95.5 million to reinforce it. It is still completing its 
mission in the country. Also, the Stability for Instrument
49
 allocated €4.75 million to 
AMISOM. The European Commission adopted the “Somalia Special Support Programme
50
 
(2008-2013)” on the 30
th
 of October 2007 and assigned €215.4 million for this programme, 
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which included supporting governance, education, development, agriculture, and hospitals. 
The EU and the AU together made efforts for the implementation of the Djibouti Peace 
Process signed in 2008 between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance 
for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), and played an active role in holding a presidential 
election in Somalia on the 30
th
 of January of 2009. The EU also supports the efforts of IGAD. 
In spring 2006, the AU PSC deployed the AU Mission for Support to the Elections in 
Comoros (AMISEC), the essential tasks of which were to observe the elections in the country, 
to provide peace and security during the elections, and to protect civilians. A total of 500 
personnel joined AMISEC, from South Africa, Egypt, the DRC, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Madagascar, and Mauritius. It operated until the 9
th
 of June 2006, with the APF 
allocating €8.5 millions. The EU financial support to AMISEC played a sizeable role in 
implementing its mandates in the Comoros.  
With regard to challenges behind security cooperation between Africa and the EU, the EU 
authorised its first peacekeeping operation in Africa in the DRC in 2003, named ARTEMIS, 
and is currently conducting two civilian and two military operations
51
 in Africa. The EU also 
authorised its military operation in 2007 in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) 
without cooperating with the AU or its RECs. While the EU cooperated with the AU to 
support African-led peacekeeping operations, such as in Darfur and Somalia, it did not 
collaborate with the AU in the DRC, Chad and the CAR, nor Guinea Bissau.  
It is worth noting that the EU has not cooperated actively with the AU in the areas of peace 
and security regarding current events in North Africa. These examples indicate to critics that 
the EU does have a contradictory security cooperation policy with the AU in the areas of 
peace and security, which undermines its global credibility. Creating a coherent foreign and 
security policy is an essential condition for strengthening the AU-EU SSP.  
 It seems that the APF also has some strong elements. For example, it does not include North 
Africa or South Africa, and excludes military and arms expenditures
52
 of the AU. It can be 
argued that the assessment of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU in the fields of 
peace and security is mixed. The AU has similar challenges in developing security 
                                                 
51
 The EU‟s current peacekeeping operations in Africa are the European Union's Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) 
counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin since 2008, European Union military mission to 
contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) since 2010, EU Police Mission for the DRC 
(EUPOL RD Congo) since 2007, and EU advisory and assistance mission for security reform in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) (EUSEC RD Congo) since 2005. 
52
 See Decision 3/2003 of the ACP-EC Council of Ministers of 11 December 2003 on the use of resourcesfrom 
the long-term development envelope of the ninth EDF for the creation of a Peace Facility for Africa. 
 150 
cooperation, as does the EU, such as Francophone and Anglophone African countries having 
different economic and political relations with their former colonies, which impedes the 
development of a common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). In the meantime, 
many African countries face poverty and other structural, economic, social, and political 
problems, which undermine this cooperation between the equal and strong.  
The lack of coordination between the AU and its RECs is another important issue for the 
implementation of the AU-EU SSP, because the roles and successes of RECs of the AU in the 
fields of peace and security are an asset for the AU‟s leadership and conflict prevention, 
management, and resolution capacity. According to Pirozzi (2009:17), the EU and the AU 
should develop “longer-term capacity building options in order to make the African peace and 
security architecture more independent and self-sustainable.”  
9.4 BETWEEN THE IGAD AND THE EU  
The EU has paid attention to international terrorist attacks after 9/11 and begun to focus on the 
root causes of international terrorism. Since 2008, the EU has deployed two important 
peacekeeping operations in Somalia, namely EU military operation (EU NAVFOR Somalia) 
and European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces 
(EUTM Somalia). It can be noted that the states live in an interdependent world today, when 
no country or actor can resolve global challenges on its own. In this regard, the EU‟s 
cooperation with the IGAD has been crucial in the areas of peace and security. The EU 
fortifies the IGAD peace and security capacity, supports the IGAD‟s efforts in increasing 
regional integration in the region, and enhances its diplomatic relations with the IGAD. 
The first IGAD-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting took place in Kampala, Uganda on 23 
October 2003. During the third IGAD-EU Troika meeting
53
 in Brussels, on 1 April 2009, the 
Council of the European Union stressed that making the IGAD a strong regional actor was in 
the interest not only of the region but also of the EU. The EU supports the IGAD CPMR 
programmes, namely ICPAT and CEWARN. In 2007, the European Commission donated €10 
million to strengthen the IGAD peace and security capacity (IGAD, 2007:7). According to the 
European Commission, the EU financial and diplomatic support to the IGAD contributes to 
developing the concept of African ownership in Eastern Africa.  
Both actors have worked closely to implement the Djibouti peace process to stop the civil war 
in Somalia and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan. The IGAD has been 
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involved in implementing the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the First Action Plan of the Joint 
Strategy accepted by African and the European leaders in Lisbon in 2007. The IGAD‟s 
involvement in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy provides an impetus for the reinforcement of the 
Africa-EU SSP. In 2009, the European Commission funded €1 million to build up the IGAD‟s 
institutional capacity (IGAD, 2009:4). The EU also supports the IGAD regional integration 
efforts. On the 15
th
 of March 2010, the EU funded €15 million to support the IGAD‟s regional 
economic integration efforts (IGAD, 2010:1). The IGAD established an IGAD Liaison Office 
in Juba, Sudan and appointed an IGAD–EU liaison officer in 2010. The Office plays an 
important role in developing political relations between the IGAD and the EU and the 
implementation of the CPA in Sudan. The EU is involved in the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) 
to reinforce the IGAD. The IPF provides three important partnership levels between the IGAD 
and the EU, namely ministerial, ambassadorial, and technical. The first IPF was held in Rome, 
Italy in January 1998.  
The lack of coordination among the IGAD members weakens the IGAD‟s effectiveness as 
well as the development of the IGAD-EU security partnership. The IGAD and the EU security 
cooperation in the eastern region of Africa has been inadequate and ineffective in resolving 
the region‟s security issues. Structural problems, such as poverty, disasters, civil and border 
conflicts damage the future of the IGAD-EU security cooperation. Importantly, the lack of a 
strong cooperation between the IGAD and the EU also undermines the current security 
partnership between Africa and the EU. This provides some support for hypotheses 6 and 7. 
Western Africa is the most important part of the continent of Africa in terms of its geo-
strategic importance. Therefore, international actors have their own interests, which 
destabilise political and economic stability in this region. This breaks the evolution of a strong 
Africa-EU SSP under the IGAD-EU security cooperation. Meanwhile, the financial 
constraints and insufficient capacity of the IGAD have also decreased the effectiveness of the 
IGAD-EU security cooperation, especially due to its financial problems.  
9.5 BETWEEN THE ECOWAS AND THE EU  
ECOWAS has authorised four peacekeeping operations, namely in Liberia in 1990 and 2003, 
in Sierra Leone in 1997, and Ivory Coast in 2002. ECOWAS is viewed as a strategic partner 
for the EU, whose economic power plays a significant role in developing security cooperation 
with the body. The EU provided €2,365 million to the ECOWAS to strengthen its capacity-
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building between 2002 and 2007.
54
 According to the EU, ECOWAS‟s economic and regional 
integration efforts contribute to peace and security and increase welfare among the members. 
Therefore, the EU allocated €258 million to support the ECOWAS‟s economic and integration 
activities in the region between 2002 and 2007.  
In 2003, the EU underwrote €50 million to reinforce the ECOWAS‟s peacekeeping mission in 
Liberia, called ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). During the Ivorian conflict, the EU 
donated €500 million to support the ECOWAS‟s conflict prevention, management, and 
resolution mechanisms. Furthermore, the EU donated €5.5 million to the ECOWAS to back 
up its conflict prevention mechanism between 2006 and 2010. ECOWAS established the 
ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme (ECOSAP) in June 2006 to combat the 
proliferation of small arms in West Africa. The EU has supported ECOSAP and provided 
€1,450,000 million for it. In April 2007, a Joint Declaration on Proliferation of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons (SALW)
55
 was adopted by the ECOWAS and the EU in Luxembourg. The 
Declaration plays an important role in fighting against the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons in West Africa.  
Since 2000, the EU has organised ministerial Troika meetings with the ECOWAS. During the 
17
th
 EU-ECOWAS Troika meeting on 15 June 2010, both sides developed common strategies 
to improve security in West Africa. The EU acknowledged that the EU would support and 
finance the ECPF. According to the Council of the EU, the ECOWAS should be a central 
actor and become more actively involved in peace and security in the region. Meanwhile, the 
ECOWAS joined the 2
nd
 and the 3
rd
 Africa-EU Summits in 2007 in Lisbon and in 2010 in 
Libya. The ECOWAS‟s role in building up the Africa-EU SSP was of great importance. The 
EU and the ECOWAS worked closely in observing elections in West African countries, such 
as in Guinea, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Niger in 2010. Both actors emphasised that 
implementing successful elections in the countries was essential for improving social, 
economic and political conditions. 
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The ECOWAS does not have effective coordination among its members. Likewise, the lack of 
a political unity within the EU has also undermined the security cooperation between the EU 
and the ECOWAS. When the UK deployed a peacekeeping mission in Liberia in 2003, France 
authorised its own peacekeeping operation in Ivory Coast in 2002, and even in April 2011, 
because of its significant political and economic interests in these countries. France and the 
UK‟s peacekeeping policies in West Africa reflect their geo-economic and geo-political 
interests. The EU support to the ECOWAS‟s economic and regional integration endeavour is 
also problematic. Without taking into considering the internal factors of the region, the EU‟s 
financial support will not strengthen the ECOWAS‟s integration efforts. On the contrary, it 
undermines the region‟s economic and political stability.  
9.6 BETWEEN THE SADC AND THE EU 
The official relationship between SADC and the EU began with the first SADC-EU 
Ministerial Conference in Berlin in September 1994. Every two years, SADC and the EU 
organise a ministerial meeting to consolidate economic and political relations. At the first 
SADC-EU conference, the EU stressed that consolidating the rule of law, human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, democracy, and good governance in Southern African countries is 
necessary for keeping peace, security, and stability. In 1994, both parties agreed to cooperate 
in combatting international crime, including money laundering, drug and women trafficking, 
and the proliferation of WMD. The EU associated political and economic instabilities in the 
region with the principles of democracy at the first SADC-EU conference. Even though the 
conflicts continued in the DRC and Angola, the EU did not develop its cooperation with 
SADC in the areas of peace and security during this conference, in particular conflict 
prevention policies towards the DRC and Angola. The EU has mainly developed its political 
and economic relations with SADC rather than its security relations since 1994. 
In 1995, SADC became involved in conflict prevention in the DRC and deployed a 
peacekeeping mission to this country. The EU provided financial assistance to SADC to 
facilitate the ceasefire process for this country. In November 2006, SADC and the EU 
established a “SADC Elections Advisory Council (SEAC)” to observe elections, to reinforce 
democracy and good governance in Southern African countries. In addition, there is a 
significant difference between the SADC and the EU on the issue of Zimbabwe. For instance, 
SADC rejected receipt of EU financial support to observe the elections in Zimbabwe in 2008, 
claiming donations from the former colonial powers would not help to resolve the political 
crisis in Zimbabwe. The EU and SADC could not develop a common effective security policy 
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towards Zimbabwe. Whereas the EU insisted that sanctions would help to resolve the political 
crisis in the country, SADC argued that USA and EU sanctions were causing political 
instability in the country and therefore should be lifted.  
Importantly, the EU‟s economic power is also playing a substantial role in developing 
comprehensive relations with SADC. On the 11th of November 2008, the SADC-EU Troika 
Ministerial Meeting took place in Brussels. The EU allocated €116 million
56
 to reinforce the 
capacity building of SADC and its regional and economic integration efforts. SADC had two 
important strategic plans to increase regional integration among the members, namely the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan for 
the Organ (SIPO). The EU has especially supported its strategic plans and provided financial 
assistance for the implementation of the plans. According to the Council of the EU, regional 
and economic integration efforts can bring peace and security in the region, thus, the EU 
allocated €135 million to SADC to increase regional and economic integration programmes of 
SADC at the SADC-EU Troika Ministerial Meeting in the Kingdom of Lesotho on the 17
th
 of 
November 2006.  
However, there is not such a strong relationship between SADC and the EU in the areas of 
peace and security. SADC is also highly dependent on the international community‟s 
donations and the lack of strong coordination among its members impairs its security policy 
towards the region. Ineffective capacity of the SADC also undermines its international role, in 
particular cooperation with the EU. SADC‟s role in the fields of peace and security is critical 
to developing the Africa-EU SSP, and it plays a worthwhile role in implementing the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). As a result, SADC and the EU did not create strong 
security cooperation on the issues of Zimbabwe, therefore, SADC-EU cooperation failed to 
resolve the political crisis in Zimbabwe. Ineffective cooperation between SADC and the EU 
partically damages the evolution of security cooperation between Africa and the EU. This 
provides support for hypothesis 7.  
9.7 EVALUATION  
With the adoption of the ESS in December 2003, the EU consolidated its security relations 
with the African organisations. The EU has a special partnership with the AU in the areas of 
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peace and security among the African organisations. The OAU‟s transformation into the AU 
in 2002 provided the drive to changing security relations between Africa and the EU. The EU 
has especially strengthened the AU‟s security capacity, such as the establishment of the APF 
within the AU in 2004 and the reinforcement of the APSA. Furthermore, the EU has also 
increased its diplomatic relations with the AU in recent years. According to the Council of the 
EU, the AU is the most important regional organisation in Africa, making it a strong regional 
organisation in Africa of great significance to the interests of both Africa and the EU. The 
security relations between the EU and the AU peaked during the Darfur conflict, with the EU 
mostly providing financial assistance and diplomatic support to the AU during the conflict in 
Sudan.  
At the same time, the EU has increased its security relations with the sub-regional 
organisations in Africa. It can be underlined that it has generally used its soft power to 
consolidate its security relations with the African organisations. This chapter showed that the 
EU‟s financial assistance to the African organisations plays a major role in reinforcing the 
concept of the Africa-EU SSP. In addition, the EU‟s cooperation and dialogue with the IGAD, 
the ECOWAS, and SADC in the areas of peace and security have also contributed to the 
development of security cooperation between the two continents.   
This chapter found that the African organisations are working as dependent actors on outside 
powers because of financial and logistical problems. According to realism, when a global 
actor cooperates with a weak actor, it only concentrates on its own security concerns and 
economic interests. At the same time, the global actor cooperates with the weak ones to fights 
against the new threats and challenges effectively. Liberalism points out that strategic 
partnership among different actors can provide peace and securıty and increase economic, 
social and political interactions. 
Hypothesis 3 in this study is “the EU strengthens regional organisations on the African 
continent through the Africa-EU SSP.” The EU established the APF to reinforce African 
organisations through the AU in 2004 and allocateed €740 million for this facility. Moreover, 
the European Commission provided €10 million to strengthen the IGAD in 2007 (IGAD, 
2007:7). The EU assigned €258 million to consolidate the ECOWAS between 2002 and 2007 
and also made a €116 million donation to strengthen capacity building of SADC. This 
supports hypothesis 3. However, whether or not the EU‟s soft power will be enough to 
strengthen regional organisations in Africa is not clear. Consolidationg security frameworks of 
African organisations with the EU‟s donations is not a long-term solution to make them 
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effective actors in Africa because financial dependency can weaken the effectiveness of 
African organisations. This strengthens hypothesis 6.  
It is important to underline that the EU adopted its first security strategy in 2003, entitled 
“European Security Strategy”. It posits that wars, conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of 
WMD, state failure, and organised crime damage the EU‟s peace and security, as well as 
international security, therefore the EU should make greater efforts to promote the 
strengthening of regional cooperation in the world, especially regional and sub-regional 
organisations in Africa. To this end, the EU deployed its first peacekeeping operation in 
Africa, named “Artemis Operation,” in 2003 to the DRC so as to maintain peace and security. 
In addition, the European Commission provided €25 million to strengthen the AU 
peacekeeping operation in Burundi in 2003 (European Commission, 2004:3). Importantly, the 
EU‟s support to the AU during the Darfur crisis demonstrated that the EU aims to support 
regional organisations in Africa by reinforcing an SSP with African organisations. This 
supports hypothesis 3. At the same time, security concerns, such as conflicts and wars, 
international terrorism, immigration issues, the EU‟s members‟ interests and the EU‟s 
enlargement create a pattern of security cooperation between Africa and the EU.   
Fostering African organisations by increasing unity and solidarity among African countries 
and enhancing political relations between the EU and African organisations on the basis of 
mutual interests can make African organisations more effective actors in Africa and in the 
world. Realist views also contend that different levels between the different actors can 
damage the emergence of a genuine strategic partnership. While a global actor is fostering its 
cooperation with a weak actor, global actors‟ strategic positions can make a weak actor more 
dependent on itself, and that has a negative impact on emerging of a true strategic partnership. 
Hypothesis 8 is “the Africa-EU SSP makes African organisations more dependent on the 
EU.” This chapter showed that the EU‟s financial aid to the African organisations make them 
more dependent actors on global powers but on the other hand, helps to strengthen African 










The introductory chapter of this dissertation outlined the general structure of the study, 
including the introduction and the main topics to be addressed. The main research questions 
this dissertation aimed to answer were: What are the main driving forces and elements of 
security cooperation between the EU and Africa?  And  Why does the EU pursue an SSP with 
Africa? The sub-questions addressed were: What determines the patterns of cooperation 
between African regional organisations and the EU? And How can an SSP be established 
between unequal actors?  
Chapter Two examined the theoretical framework of international cooperation in IR theories 
and the concepts of strategic partnership and international organisation. On the basis of the 
theoretical framework, Chapter 2 formulated the related hypotheses. The concept of an SSP 
between Africa and the EU is a relatively new phenomenon, dating from the first Summit 
between the two groups held in Cairo in 2000. The elements creating the concept of strategic 
partnership are geo-strategic, geo-economic and geo-political interests, and mutual 
responsibility. At the same time, internal and external dynamics, such as socio-economic and 
political development, global economic crises, international terrorist attacks, and institutions, 
NGOs, think tanks, academia and business also influence it.   
Complex interdependence has been affecting security relations between Africa and the EU as 
new challenges of the modern world have threatened economic interests and security of the 
global actors. Moreover, realist views stress that global powers have a propensity to increase 
their economic and political interests while cooperating with weak actors, however, liberal 
theorists of IR contend that strategic partnership among different actors can reduce the 
possibility of uncertainty and increase economic, social and political relations. At the same 
time, actors can fight against new global threats and challenges more efficiently by reinforcing 
international cooperation in a wide range of activities. According to constructivism, common 
identity and culture, historical relations and shared knowledge can also contribute to creating 
strategic partnership between different actors. Chapter 2 discussed the significant role played 
by economic and political interests in creating an SSP between Africa and the EU. At the 
same time, there are also other important elements influencing the establishment of a strategic 
partnership on peace and security between different actors, such as international terrorism, 
conflicts and wars, and immigration issues. This chapter also argued that colonial relations 
between Africa and Europe have forced EU members to increase their security cooperation, 
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albeit to a lesser extent. It found a mixture of motivations behind the creation of an SSP 
between Africa and the EU. 
Chapter Three focused on the security concept and its related elements and values, a concept 
so complicated as to include social, economic, political, and military dimensions. This chapter 
revealed that the concept of security cooperation should include not only the traditional 
security dimension, but also socio-economic, political, technological and physiological 
dimensions. This chapter discussed that the EU and African organisations have gradually 
widened the concept of “security”, including aspects such as poverty reduction, economic 
development, education and other elements as strategic aims. According to liberalism, 
cooperation between different actors is necessary to increse mutual interests. Hypothesis 1 in 
the study is “mutual interests lead to the emergence of security cooperation between Africa 
and the EU.” Conflicts and wars damage not only Africa‟s economic and social interests, but 
also the EU‟s economic and political interests. The EU established the African Peace Facility 
(APF) in 2004 with the AU to foster security cooperation between the two continents. 
Importantly, the EU has deployed 10 peacekeeping operations in Africa since 2003 to 
maintain peace and security on the African continent.  One of the most important aims of the 
APF is to sustain peace, security and stability in Africa. In particular, the 9/11 attacks on the 
USA forced the EU to strengthen its security cooperation with African organisations. At the 
same time, new threats and challenges, including immigration issues, drug trafficking, state 
failure, organised crime and proliferation of WMD forced EU members to develop a more 
effective security strategy towards Africa to combat these problems. In this sense, hypothesis 
1 is largely confirmed. 
Chapter Four scrutinised the historical background of the EU‟s foreign and security policy 
and its foreign and security policy objectives. The CFSP\ESDP has played a significant role in 
developing the EU‟s security policy inside and outside the EU. Until the end of the Cold War, 
the CFSP of the EU did not contribute to international peace and security because of the 
domestic developments in Europe. The end of the Cold War changed the international 
framework as a multipolar international structure replaced the bipolar international system. 
According to liberal approaches,  international cooperation among different actors is possible 
and can contribute to peace and security. At the same time, cooperation can increase common 
interests among the nations. After the Cold War, the significance of international 
organisations also increased. Internal dynamics in the European countries have played a major 
role in the expansion of the SSP between Africa and the EU. In particular, integration 
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movements in Europe have had an impact on the development of the Africa-EU SSP. For 
instance, the admission of ten new European countries into the EU in 2004 provided a 
forceful momentum to increase the EU‟s global power in world affairs. Since 2004, the EU 
has begun to take more global responsibilities in sustaining international peace and security, 
and strengthening its institutional ties with different regional and sub-regional organisations, 
such as security cooperation with African organisations. 
The new international system also brought substantial changes to Europe, in particular its 
security concept. In 1992, the EU established the CFSP with the adoption of the TEU at 
Maastricht, which also created the notion of security cooperation. However, developing the 
CFSP of the EU has been one of the most controversial areas of the EU. In particular, different 
national policies within the EU and discrepancies between the different institutions, including 
the WEU, NATO, and the CFSP, have impeded the evolution of the CFSP of the EU. This 
situation undermines the effectiveness of the CFSP outside the EU, and these challenges have 
also damaged the evolution of a strategic partnership with Africa. Making cooperation among 
different actors in a particular area is a challenging task. Hypothesis 2 is “the lack of cohesion 
and discrepancy between the EU members damages the development of the Africa-EU SSP.” 
The USA-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the South Ossetia War in the Caucasus in August 2008 
between Russia and Georgia, and the Libyan War of 2011 proved that the divergence among 
the EU members has continued to undermine its global strategies, including the SSP with 
Africa. These examples provide evidence for hypothesis 2.  
France and the UK have played the most important roles in the EU peacekeeping operations 
in Africa while the other members of the EU remain so passive. More importantly, huge 
economic and political interests of France and the UK in Africa are among the major factors 
influencing the Africa-EU SSP, however, this damages the creation of a strong security 
partnership between the two continents. The EU needs to develop a common African strategy. 
Without creating a common strategy with regard to Africa, the Africa-EU SSP cannot work 
effectively. To this end, the EU should strengthen its CFSP in order to create strong strategic 
partnerships with African organisations. Meanwhile, the adoption of the ESS by the EU 
members in December 2003 was a turning point for making the CFSP influential and 
consistent. The ESS provided energy for the EU members to play a more active role in 
maintaining international peace and security. Even though the EU has made efforts to make 
the CFSP effective, different national policies of the EU members, in particular the national 
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interests in Africa of France, the UK, Italy and Germany, have undermined the development 
of the Africa-EU SSP. This also largely supports hypothesis 2. 
This chapter also examined the EU‟s foreign and security policy objectives and drew attention 
to the EU foreign and security policy objectives. In this study, hypothesis 3 is “the EU 
encourages reinforcing regional organisations on the African continent through the Africa-EU 
SSP.”  After the EU adopted the ESS in 2003, it started to play a more active role in keeping 
international peace and security. According to the ESS, the EU as a global actor should take 
more global responsibilities to sustain international peace and security in conflict areas and 
reinforce its institutional relations with different actors. Furthermore, the ESS emphasises that 
new threats and challenges, as mentioned above,  damage the EU‟s economic and political 
interests, therefore, the EU should increase its security cooperation with Africa. To this end, 
the EU has provided financial assistance to foster African organisations. For instance, the EU 
set up the APF to strengthen African regional and sub-regional organisations‟ peace and 
security mechanisms through the AU in 2004 and earmarked €740 million for this facility. 
Furthermore, the European Commission donated €10 million to reinforce the IGAD in 2007 
(IGAD, 2007:7).  
In addition, the EU assigned €258 million to consolidate the ECOWAS between 2002 and 
2007 and also made a €116
57
 million donation to fortify the capacity building of SADC and its 
regional and economic integration efforts. The European Commission granted €25 million to 
the AU to reinforce its peacekeeping operation in Burundi in 2003 (European Commission, 
2004:3). The EU authorised its first peacekeeping operation to the DRC in 2003, in order to 
sustain peace, security and stability. It can be said that the EU‟s financial and political support 
to the AU peacekeeping operation in Darfur during the conflict played a key role in fortifying 
the AU‟s security structure. These developments support hypothesis 3.      
This chapter argued that the Africa-EU SSP aims not only to stop conflicts and wars in the 
conflict areas in Africa, but also aims to spread norms and values in the African countries. 
One of the most important objectives of the CFSP of the EU is to promote democracy, human 
rights and good governance. According to liberalism, setting up cooperation is easier among 
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democratic countries, however, the lack of democracy, the rule of law and human rights can 
prevent the emergence of a fair strategic partnership between different actors.  
Hypothesis 4 is “the EU aims to spread its norms and values in Africa through the SSP.” After 
the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the EU started to put more pressure on African governments to 
put into practice principles of liberalism and democracy. According to the ESS,  the EU 
should make a contribution to global peace and security by disseminating its own norms and 
values, which requires it to establish new strategic partnerships with different global actors.  
To this end, the EU has alredy established the APF through the AU, in 2004 and provided 
significant financial, diplomatic, military and civilian assistance to the AU peacekeeping 
operation in Sudan (AMIS II) in 2005. The EU‟s support of the AU during the Darfur conflict 
played an important role in empowering its peacekeeping operation and emerging security 
cooperation between the EU and Africa (Siradag, 2012, 136-139). It is important to note that 
the APF became a significant tool for the EU to spread its norms and values throughout 
Africa, which largely confirms hypothesis 4.  
This chapter has argued that the EU does not have a consistent foreign and security policy in 
the world. In particular, its economic and political interests shape its foreign and security 
policy or its strategic partnership policies. For instance, the EU imports 50 percent of its gas 
and 30 percent of its oil from Russia (Monaghan, 2006:1). Economic and political relations 
between the EU and Russia influence the EU‟s foreign and security policies. For example, 
when the war started between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the EU could not develop an 
effective foreign and security policy to prevent it. Likewise, some of the EU members, such 
as Italy, Germany, the UK, and France had strong economic and political relations with the 
ousted Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, selling weapons to the value of €343.7 million to 
Libya in 2009, The EU‟s contradictory foreign and security policies in the world damage its 
international power and the development of an SSP with Africa.  
Chapter Five dealt with the former European colonial powers‟ security policies towards 
Africa and their impact on security cooperation among Africa and the EU. The European 
colonial powers, in particular France and the UK, have a strong economic and political 
interest in their former colonial countries in Africa. Their historical relationship with Africa 
has influenced the birth of the notion of an SSP. The colonial legacy in Africa is still 
undermining the development of security relations between the two continents. According to 
constructivism, ideas, identities, shared knowledge, and historical relations can make a 
contribution to the concept of strategic partnership. In particular, economic interests have 
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been playing significant roles in developing the Africa-EU SSP and the former colonial 
powers‟ policies towards Africa. Meanwhile, new challenges of the twenty-first century 
provide the impetus for the former European colonial powers to make security cooperation 
with the African organisations. This also revealed that  EU members have not only aimed to 
keep their economic interests through the SSP with Africa but have also fought against new 
threats and challenges.  
Some members of the EU play a more active role in establishing an SSP with Africa. For 
instance, France allocated €300 million between 2010 and 2012 in order to foster African 
states‟ and organisations‟ security capacities during the 25
th
 France-Africa summit in Nice in 
2010. Also, France set up its own security mechanism in 1998, known as the Reinforcement of 
African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) programme. RECAMP consisted of 
Francophone African countries, the USA, the UK, Belgium, and five Anglophone countries. 
Its main aim being to enhance African organisations‟ and states‟ peace and security capacities 
by creating a strategic partnership with Africa. RECAMP has been a strategic means for 
France in strengthening African organisations in the areas of peace and security. This supports 
hypothesis 3. On the other hand, France was opposed to the creation of the ECOWAS in 1975, 
which aimed to sustain peace and security and increase economic cooperation among the 
members in the Western part of Africa. France‟s geo-economic and geo-political interests 
have shaped its security relations with Africa. This does not support hypothesis 3. Germany 
also donated €30 million to African states and African organisations to strengthen Africa‟s 
peace and security structure at the 2007 German G8 Presidency. At the same time, Germany 
joined a EUFOR mission in the DRC in 2006 and provided financial, political and logistical 
support for it. This also provides evidence for hypothesis 3. In light of these developments, 
political and economic interests influence EU members‟ foreign and security policies towards 
Africa.  This shows that important countries within the framework of the EU have developed 
individual strategies towards Africa that are damaging the unity and solidarity between the EU 
members and the current strategic partnership on peace and security between the two different 
continents. This supports hypothesis 2. 
Realism claims that the EU does not have an aim to establish an SSP with Africa, because the 
members of the EU have different interests in Africa and block its creation. However, 
liberalism points out that  the world has changed and multilateralism has been significant in 
diplomacy to fight the global challenges and increase common interests. So, some of the most 
important aims of the SSP are to combat the new threats and challenges. This also supports 
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hypothesis 1. Moreover, realist views stress that global powers have a propensity to increase 
their global power on the international arena while cooperating with weak ones. 
 
Chapter Six analysed the EU‟s security policy towards Africa and driving forces behind it. 
The first Africa-EU Summit, held in Cairo in 2000, played a significant role in the emergence 
of the new paradigms between the two continents, including the notion of the strategic 
partnership. The second significant step was the EU Strategy for Africa adopted by the 
European Council in December 2005. For the first time the EU proposed to Africa that they 
establish a strategic partnership in the fields of peace and security. Moreover, the EU declared 
2005 as a “year of Africa.” The other substantial pace to conceptualise the Africa-EU security 
cooperation was the second Africa-EU Summit, held in Lisbon 2007. This particularly 
brought together the European and African leaders and provided a momentum to change the 
security relations between the two continents. It is worth noting that this security partnership 
was intended to be a long-term relationship, forged in the most difficult partnership area. The 
third Africa-EU Summit, held in Libya in 2010, did not bring a new approach to Africa‟s 
security, but merely repeated the old strategies.  
This chapter revealed internal and external dynamics behind the current security cooperation. 
Internal dynamics of this partnership are political, economic and historical. The new 
developments in the EU, such as enlargement and the economic crisis of 2007, have had a 
foremost impact on this partnership. Furthermore, the political and economic interests of the 
former European colonial powers impacted on the creation of this partnership. External factors 
have also contributed to the progress of the Africa-EU SSP, including the emerging the new 
global actors in Africa, the 9\11 terrorist attacks on the USA, and globalisation. Globalisation 
forced the EU to strengthen an SSP with Africa to combat new threats and challenges and to 
provide new opportunites. This supports hypothesis 9. The new emerging powers, such as 
China, India, Brazil and Turkey have increased their political and economic relations with 
Africa in recent years. For instance, China‟s total trade with Africa increased from $91.07 
billion in 2009 to $114.81 billion in 2010. Similarly, India‟s total trade with Africa increased 
from $25 billion in 2006-7 to $45 billion in 2010, and Turkey‟s total trade with Africa 
increased from $16 billion in 2008 to $30 billion in 2010. This largely supports hypothesis 5.  
According to the realist approach, states see each other as rivals and threats, so they increase 
their own material interests and security while cooperating. The EU is the largest trading 
partner for Africa and has a significant economic and political interest on the continent. This 
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largely supports hypothesis 5. This chapter indicated that there are two important main driving 
forces and elements of security cooperation between Africa and the EU, namely serving the 
EU‟s economic and political interests in Africa and combating the new challenges and threats 
more effectively. There has been a strong relationship between the EU‟s economic interests 
and its security policy towards Africa, and one of the main reasons behind the emergence of 
the Africa-EU SSP towards Africa has been its economic interests. Meanwhile, the other 
external factors have also provided a strong force behind its creation. The EU members‟ 
interests in Africa, security concerns and the EU enlargement have shaped a pattern of 
security cooperation between the two.  
 
Since 2003, the EU has begun to consolidate its strategic cooperation with African 
organisations in the areas of peace and security. Significantly, the EU deployed its first 
peacekeeping operation in Africa in the DRC in 2003, in order to maintain peace, security and 
stability. The EU‟s cooperation with African organisations in the fields of peace and security 
peaked during the Darfur conflict. The EU established an APF in 2004 within the framework 
of the AU to foster security capacities of regional organisations in Africa. When the AU 
deployed its peacekeeping mission in Darfur in 2004, the APF played a substantial role in 
reinforcing the AU‟s security structure and beginning a strategic partnership in the areas of 
peace and security between the two continents. Particularly, the creation of the APF is likely 
to enhance the global role of the EU in Africa against the new actors. This provides evidence 
for hypothesis 5. 
 
Chapter Seven explored internal and external factors that affect security in Africa, concluding 
that internal factors in Africa, such as historical, social, political and economic problems, 
weaken the development of strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. According to 
realism, global actors gain more from strategic partnership because global actors‟ economic 
and political power dominates cooperation with weak actors. Hypothesis 6 is “power 
imbalance makes cooperation between the EU and Africa difficult in the framework of the 
SSP.” African organisations have made efforts to increase security cooperation with the EU. 
In particular, the 9/11 attacks forced both African organisations and the EU to strengthen their 
security cooperation. The establishment of the APF and the EU peacekeeping operations in 
Africa show that security cooperation can be created between different actors. Furthermore, 
security cooperation between the AU and the EU during the Darfur conflict provides evidence 
against hypothesis 6. However, African organisations face financial, logistical and political 
constraints. The lack of unity and solidarity between the members of African organisations 
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undermines the development of a common African strategy. For example, the AU had huge 
financial, political and logistical restraints when it deployed  peacekeeping operations in 
Sudan and Burundi, known as AMIS and AMIB respectively. Mixed evidence was found for 
hypothesis 6 throughout this dissertation, since global developments make cooperation among 
various actors possible and necessary. However, different economic and political levels 
between Africa and the EU render a strategic partnership on peace and security more difficult. 
 
Africa faces political, economic and social problems. African internal challenges damage 
security cooperation between Africa and the EU, which provides support for hypothesis 7. 
The EU should cooperate more with African organisations in the fields of peace and security, 
and assume more global responsibilities in peace and security activities to strengthen its 
strategic partnerships with Africa. However, using its soft power to enhance an SSP with 
African organisations is not a strategic way for the EU. Rather, the EU should focus on the 
roots of conflicts and wars. The EU‟s financial support for Africa is not solving structural 
problems of Africa, such as poverty, unemployment, and AIDS/HIV, nor is its financial 
assistance bringing lasting peace and security. Also, the EU needs to reduce divergence 
between the members in order to develop a more consistent foreign and security policy 
towards Africa. Creating a common African strategy is necessary for making the EU a more 
active and effective global actor in Africa. 
 
African organisations lack a common African strategy due to the lack of unity and solidarity 
between African states. For example, when the AU authorised a peacekeeping operation in 
Burundi in 2003, only three countries, namely South Africa, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, 
provided troops. The poor coordination between African states and African organisations 
damages the effectiveness of the Africa-EU SSP, which supports hypothesis 7. African 
organisations should make their own common African strategy in order to play a more active 
role in the Africa-EU SSP. Effective coordination between the members of African 
organisations is essential for making Africa‟s peace and security activities more successful. 
Mechanisms should thus be reinforced by African states, rather than by outside powers. Good 
coordination between the members of African organisations can increase the success of the 
Africa-EU SSP. At the same time, increasing economic and political cooperation between 
African nations is needed to establish strong strategic partnerships with different actors. 
Without boosting cooperation among African nations, Africa‟s cooperation with global actors 
cannot work effectively. Mixed evidence was found for hypothesis 7 in the dissertation. While 
structural problems of Africa weaken the development of the Africa-EU SSP, the 
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establishment of the AU and NEPAD has reinforced its strategic partnership with the EU on 
peace and security.   
 
Chapter Eight examined security policies of the AU, the IGAD, the ECOWAS, and SADC. 
These African organisations have been playing an important role in sustaining peace and 
security on the continent of Africa, as African leaders have recognised that “without peace 
and security there is no sustainable social and economic development.” Therefore, the African 
organisations have developed their own security strategies since they were established. Their 
efforts for peace and security in Africa have strengthened the concept of African ownership, 
which this chapter indicated cannot play a dynamic role in keeping peace and security and 
instead has been shaped by the external powers, including the EU, the UN, G8, and other 
global actors. This also highlights that structural problems of the African organisations have 
weakened their security policies, as well as their security cooperation with the EU, including 
their financial and logistical constraints, and the lack of unity and solidarity within the African 
organisations‟ members. This provides evidence for hypotheses 6 and 7.  
 
Chapter Nine analysed the Africa-EU SSP and explored the main challenges behind it. The 
concepts of mutual accountability and mutual responsibility have been meaningful in 
developing the Africa-EU security cooperation. Before 2000, the EU was mainly involved in 
Africa in terms of aid and economic relations, however, the new developments in world 
politics created new strategic partnerships across a wide range of areas between the different 
actors. At the same time, the security relations between the EU and other important African 
organisations, namely, the IGAD, the ECOWAS, and SADC contribute to the development of 
this strategic partnership, but not greatly. Realism states that building up true cooperation 
between different actors is not possible because economic and political differences between 
actors can damage the emergence of a genuine strategic partnership. At the same time, 
unequal cooperation can make weak actors more dependent on strong ones. Hypothesis 8 is 
“the Africa-EU SSP makes African organisations more dependent on the EU.” The APF was 
established with the financial support of the EU in 2004, at a time when the EU was 
reinforcing the APSA with its financial assistance to enhance African organisations‟ peace 
and security mechanisms. Importantly, the AU strengthened its peacekeeping operation in 
Sudan in 2006 with the financial support of the EU, but the EU‟s economic assistance to 
African organisations is making African organisations more dependent on the EU. It seems 
that African organisations would not take action to sustain peace and security in conflict areas 
if the EU and other global actors did not provide financial support. This supports hypothesis 
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8. African organisations should find their own way of strengthening their own peace and 
security structure. For example, coordination between the members of the African 
organisations should be increased. The EU‟s financial contributions to crisis prevention and 
management efforts in Africa have strengthened African regional organisations, but, by 
necessity, have also made them more dependent on outside support. African organisations 
first need to increase economic and political cooperation between African nations to reduce 
dependency of Africa on outside powers.  
 
There are mixed motivations behind the establishment of the Africa-EU SSP. First, some of 
the EU members aim to protect their economic and political relations with Africa through the 
Africa-EU SSP. Second, conflicts and wars threaten political and economic stability in Africa 
and damage the EU‟s political and economic interests. Therefore, the EU wishes to play a 
more active role in sustaining peace and security in Africa through this partnership. 
Furthermore, the EU members consider that international cooperation is necessary for 
combating new threats and challenges. It can be said that the Africa-EU SSP also endeavours 
to fight against international terrorism, immigration issues and the proliferation of WMD. The 
third motivation is that the growth of the EU, with 10 new European states joining the union 
in 2004, has forced the EU to increase its global responsibility. The fourth motivation is 
historical relations between the two continents. In particular, some of the EU members take 
steps to foster their historical relations with Africa linked with their own interests. It has been 
argued that though historical ties do not have a great impact on the creation of security 
cooperation, the significance of historical relations should not be ignored in this partnership. 
The assumptions of realim, liberalism and constructivism apply to the Africa-EU SSP but the 
predictions of realism and liberalism are more applicable to this security cooperation. The 
EU‟s policy towards Africa is driven by somewhat contradictory rationales, characterized by 
dependence on natural resources and trade with Africa on the one hand and a genuine interest 
to maintain peace and stability on the continent on the other. 
African organisations need to increase their security relations with the EU in order to 
strengthen their peace and security structures. In particular, conflicts and wars have forced 
African organisations to cooperate with the EU in the fields of peace and security. An SSP 
between Africa and the EU can be possible, however, security cooperation should focus on the 
root causes of conflicts and wars, not only financial support for African organisations‟ security 
mechanisms. Both actors need to create a system that decreases Africa‟s dependency on global 
actors. For example, the members of the AU should create a common funding system to 
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support African peacekeeping operations without receiving financial assistance from outside 
powers. In particular, the members of the AU should increase cooperation with each other in a 
wide range of activities. Weak and ineffective African organisations will have to remain 
passive in world politics and cannot play a constructive role in solving their security problems.      
Empirical evidence as presented in this dissertation has shown that the EU has shifted its 
foreign and security policy towards Africa since 2000. Before 2000, the EU used its “soft 
power” to bolster its economic and political relations with African countries, but after 2000 it 
began to employ its “hard power” to enhance security cooperation. Clearly, new threats and 
challenges, potential EU enlargement, the EU‟s strong economic and political relations with 
Africa, and the 9/11 tragedy have all played a significant role in transforming the EU‟s 
foreign and security policy towards Africa. As important evidence of its changing foreign and 
security policy in Africa, the EU has deployed peacekeeping operations in the DRC, Chad, the 
CAR, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia.  
 
However, as this dissertation has demonstrated, the EU's military or security capacity is not 
enough to sustain lasting peace and security in the conflict areas of Africa. The EU failed to 
preserve peace and security in the Balkans in the 1990s during the war. At the same time, the 
EU could not play an active role in stopping war between Russia and Georgia in 2008. 
Importantly, the disagreement between the members of the EU on the foreign policies of its 
member states damages the development of a strong strategic partnership between Africa and 
the EU. Though the EU has played an important role in maintaining peace and security in 
Africa since 2003, its security activities in the conflict areas remain limited and ineffective. 
The evidence shows that the EU‟s first military operation in the DRC in 2003, called 
“Artemis Military Operations” was limited and ineffective in creating lasting peace, security 
and stability in the country.   
 
Empirical evidence provided in this dissertation demonstrates that African organisations do 
not have effective security mechanisms to sustain peace and security. In particular, the 
discrepancy between the members of the African organisations has undermined the 
effectiveness of African organisations. Furthermore, most of the African states face economic, 
social and political difficulties which undermine the evolution of a strategic partnership in the 
areas of peace and security with the EU. African organisations would not deploy a 
peacekeeping operation in a conflict area if the global actors would not support it, because of 
their economic and political challenges. For instance, the AU would not have authorised a 
peacekeeping operation in Sudan/Darfur in 2004 without the EU‟s financial and political 
 169 
support. Research presented in this dissertation has also revealed that international powers can 
use their financial support as a strategic tool to keep or shape their economic and political 
interests. The EU aims to secure its own security and increase its economic and political 
interests through the SSP with Africa. It can be said that the SSP between Africa and the EU 
was born as a result of conjunctional developments.  
 
After the 9/11 attacks on the US, the EU began to increase its institutional relations with 
African organisations. The EU‟s relations with Africa had been based mainly on aid and 
economic relations before 2000. Strengthening its relations with African organisations at the 
institutional level has offered significant opportunities for the EU. Firstly, the EU began to 
increase its global power in Africa through the SSP. Secondly, it took a strategic step to keep 
its economic and political interests in Africa against the new emerging actors‟ increasing 
economic and political relations with Africa by establishing an SSP. Thirdly, it set up its new 
security mechanisms in cooperation with African organisations so as to fight the new threats 
and challenges more effectively.  
 
Countering international terrorism, migration problems, climate change, failed states, 
conflicts, wars, and the proliferation of WMD has become the most important policy for the 
EU since 2000. To do so the EU has decided to increase its cooperation with African 
organisations in the areas of peace and security at the institutional level and to strengthen their 
security mechanisms. As this dissertation has shown, establishing an SSP with African 
organisations has become the most important strategy for the EU to battle against these 
challenges. The EU has also developed new international mechanisms in cooperation with 
African organisations to spread its own values and norms in the world. Finally, the EU wishes 
to take on more global responsibilities to contribute to global peace and security through the 
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Sinds Afrikaanse staten hun afhankelijkheid verkregen, bedreigen conflicten en oorlogen de 
veiligheid van het Afrikaanse continent. Om dit probleem op te lossen proberen verscheidene 
Afrikaanse organisaties vredes- en veiligheidstructuren te versterken en de vrede, veiligheid 
en stabiliteit in conflictgebieden te bewaren. De effectiviteit van deze Afrikaanse organisaties 
wordt echter geminimaliseerd door een gebrek aan effectieve veiligheidsmechanismen 
tezamen met financieel en logistieke beperkingen en het gebrek aan eenheid en solidariteit 
tussen Afrikaanse naties. De aanslagen op 11 september op de VS hadden een belangrijke 
invloed op de versterking van veiligheidsbetrekkingen tussen de Europese Unie (EU) en 
Afrika als bolwerk tegen internationaal terrorisme en andere gevaren. Na deze aanvallen 
begonnen internationale actoren met het ontwikkelen van nieuwe beleidsvormen om hun 
“strategic security partnership” (SSP) met Afrika te versterken. Binnen de context van de SSP 
ontwikkelde de EU een strategisch samenwerkingsbetrekking met Afrikaanse organisaties op 
het gebied van vrede en veiligheid.  
 
Sinds 2000 zorgen interne en externe ontwikkelingen ervoor dat Afrikaanse leiders geforceerd 
worden een actievere rol te spelen in het behoud van vrede en veiligheid en de verbetering 
van veiligheidsbetrekkingen met de EU. Nog belangrijker voor de ontwikkeling van de 
betrekkingen tussen Afrika en internationale actoren, met name die van de EU,  was de 
oprichting van de Afrikaanse Unie (AU) in 2002 en de New Partnership for African‟s 
Development (NEPAD) in 2001. De EU en de AU hebben gemeenschappelijk 
veiligheidsbeleid ontwikkeld om conflicten en oorlogen te voorkomen en vrede en veiligheid 
te behouden. In deze studie is de methode van “process-tracing” (PT) gebruikt om de 
volgende onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden: 
 
1. Wat zijn de belangrijkste mechanismen en elementen voor de samenwerking op 
veiligheidsgebied tussen Afrika en de EU? 
2. Waarom streeft de EU naar een SSP met Afrika? 
3. Wat bepaald het samenwerkingsverband tussen Afrikaanse regionale organisaties en de 
EU?  
4. Hoe kan een SSP tussen deze ongelijke actoren worden vastgelegd? 
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Economische en politieke belangen hebben een belangrijke rol gespeeld in de vorming van 
het concept: strategische coöperatie. Volgens het realisme is het moeizaam een strategische 
coöperatie tussen twee ongelijke actoren te vormen, aangezien de kans bestaat dat de sterkere 
partij de zwakkere zal proberen uit te buiten. Hoewel er een samenwerking is tussen 
internationale actoren, richt elke actor zich op eigen economische en politieke belangen. Deze 
studie betoogd dat door de substantiële economische en politieke belangen van de EU in 
Afrika, de EU wordt gedwongen om de veiligheidsbetrekkingen met Afrikaanse organisaties 
te versterken. Na de implementatie van de eerste veiligheidsstrategie in 2003, genaamd de 
European Security Strategy (ESS), heeft de EU besloten om z‟n institutionele banden met 
Afrikaanse organisaties te versterken om haar belangen op het wereldtoneel te behouden en 
bij te dragen aan wereldvrede en veiligheid. Na de implementatie van de ESS was het 
versterken van de veiligheidsbetrekkingen met Afrika een prioriteit voor de EU. Volgens deze 
studie blijken internationaal terrorisme, drugshandel, mislukte staten, conflicten en oorlogen 
de belangrijkste factoren te zijn voor de vorming van veiligheidsbetrekkingen tussen de twee 
actoren. 
 
Aanhangers van het liberalisme stellen dat samenwerking tussen verschillende actoren 
mogelijk is en dat dit noodzakelijk is om gevaren en uitdagingen effectiever te bestrijden in 
toenemende sociale, economische en politieke ontwikkelingen. Bovendien kunnen 
strategische samenwerkingsverbanden ook de afhankelijkheid tussen verschillende actoren 
versterken waardoor mogelijke conflicten en oorlogen worden voorkomen. In dit verband 
heeft de EU haar veiligheidsbetrekkingen met Afrikaanse organisaties versterkt en steunde 
hun financieel en op politiek gebied. Vervolgens heeft deze studie ook onderzocht hoe de EU 
de SSP met Afrika heeft gevormd om haar normen en waarden te verspreiden, om haar 
belangen in de wereld te behouden, om de Afrikaanse regionale organisaties te versterken en 
om een bijdrage te leveren aan wereldvrede en veiligheid.  
 
Het begrijpen van de onderliggende oorzaken van conflicten en oorlogen is van essentieel 
belang bij het vaststellen van een sterke SSP tussen de twee continenten. Echter, verscheidene 
factoren ondermijnen de veiligheid in Afrika, waaronder de belangen van internationale 
actoren, de erfenis van het kolonialisme, gebrek aan cohesie tussen Afrikaanse naties en 
corruptie. Het gebrek aan eenheid en solidariteit tussen Afrikaanse organisaties verzwakt hun 
onderlinge vredes- en veiligheidsstrategieën en hun veiligheidsrelaties met internationale 
actoren. Verbetering van veiligheidsbetrekkingen tussen Afrikaanse landen is noodzakelijk 
om een sterkere SSP met de EU te kunnen bewerkstelligen. Afrikaanse organisaties zullen 
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zelfstandig hun eigen veiligheidsbetrekkingen moeten ontwikkelen waarbij economische en 
politieke belangen de samenwerkingsbetrekkingen zullen bepalen tussen Afrika en de EU. 
Nieuwe bedreigingen en uitdagingen, waaronder de huidige Eurocrisis en mogelijke 
uitbreiding van de Europese Unie, zullen veiligheidsbetrekkingen tussen Europa en Afrika 
blijven beïnvloeden. Uit deze studie blijkt dat het gebrek aan een gemeenschappelijk 
Europees buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid, Europa‟s mondiale macht en 
veiligheidsbetrekking met Afrika ondermijnt. Hoewel de oprichting van een SSP tussen 
Afrika en de EU mogelijk is, wordt het bemoeilijkt door de interne problemen van Afrika. 
Verschillende motieven drijven de SSP tussen Afrika en de EU aan en uit deze studie blijkt 
dat de EU haar financiële macht heeft gebruikt om haar veiligheidsbetrekkingen met Afrika te 
vormen. Dit brengt het gevaar met zich mee dat Afrikaanse organisaties afhankelijk blijven 
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